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SECRET DOCUMENTS


THESE DOCUMENTS WERE NEVER BEFORE
PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH. THEY'RE FROM
NKVD-KGB AND CC CPSU FILES, PLUS
PERSONAL FILES OF J.V. STALIN.

*The original documents received were published in
Russian in the "Military-Historical Journal" only.*

Published by:

NORTHSTAR COMPASS

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


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FORWORD

By: Haresh Kirpalani

When King Richard III of England died, a whole army of stooges falsified history portraying him as "evil", as demanded by Richard's royal successors. Shakespeare's play, for instance, is good theatre, but is completely a-historic. In 1970 William B. Bland first pointed out that a similar demonization had taken place with Joseph Stalin. Bland proposed that "The Cult of Personality" around Stalin was built up by conscious revisionists in the USSR, in order to discredit socialism.

This subterfuge was necessary, said Bland, as the "Open Revisionism" of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin had been routed by the Bolshevik Party in mass debates led by Stalin. To achieve their objectives, the revisionists and counter-revolutionaries were forced to hide their true colours. They still tried to resurrect capitalist relations. But Stalin fought these so-called 'economic reforms' proposed by Voznesensky in 1939, as Bland showed in "The Restoration of Capitalism". Only after Stalin's death in 1953, could Khrushchev restore a hidden form of capitalism.

This general analysis is now more accepted. Previous sceptics are learning fast that bourgeois historians lied to us. In believing these lies, many generations of potential Communists were led into sterile avenues that did not fundamentally challenge state capitalist power. Even those who still called themselves "anti-Trotskyite Communists", or "Marxist-Leninists", after Stalin's death, did not wish to be identified with Stalin. Undoubtedly, the lack of documents impeded a principled defence of Stalin. Though the lack of evidence did not stop anti-Marxist-Leninist foes in bourgeois history, like the prolific Robert Conquest. Pseudo-academics pumped out denigrations of Stalin on the basis of a few recurrent 'fact-ions'. Some of these have been wonderfully exposed in "Fraud,

Famine and Fascism – The Ukrainian Genocide Myth From Hitler to Harvard”, by Douglas Tottle. This little known book, showed that the original “facts” on ‘Ukrainian Famines’ were lies of the anti-Communist Press baron William Hearst.

This slandering ‘fact-ion’ was a conscious tactic of the ruling capitalist class. This is recently confirmed by the revelation that after the Second World War, the British Government set up a Propaganda Unit expressly to counter the appeal of the Soviets. The Soviets as everyone knew, had saved the world from Nazism and fascism. To counter the upsurge of pro-Soviet enthusiasm, the British Government first instituted a Welfare State to raise the workers’ living conditions away from starvation; and secondly, they spread lies. In this work, they employed erudite intellectuals such as Bertrand Russell, to denigrate the USSR. In all this, the goal was to unseat Soviet power. Finally, they succeeded by assisting the hidden revisionists led by Nikita Khrushchev.

In all this process the facts were simply buried. Gradually however, the mountain of lies were slowly challenged. Even bourgeois academics began to challenge the grosser distortions, such as those of Robert Conquest. Arch Getty and colleagues insisted on: “Investigating Stalin period as history”; and not as myth. Naturally Conquest and other biased camps, including Trotskyites, denigrated them as apologists and “revisionist”. Arch Getty examined previous mythologies, using a unique Archive stolen from Smolensk in the Second World War. Arch Getty Jr. and the other academics explicitly challenged the old stereotype, including the vastly exaggerated numbers of those who were killed. Arch Getty also shows that blaming Stalin for the Kirov murder (as do traditional bourgeois and Trotskyites) is nonsense; and rests on a totally discredited individual – Alexander Orlov. Arch Getty shows, even the specially struck Politburo Commission of 1989, secretly exonerated Stalin.

Once challenges began, the prevalent dogma began to face even sharper facts. An avalanche of books began, the "Memoirs of Molotov"; "Stalin's Letters To Molotov", etc. The "Letters" showed Trotsky's plot over the so-called "Lenin Testament" with Max Eastman. Bland had already exposed this, as Trotsky's attempt to paint a 'Grasping Stalin over Lenin's dying body'. In "Stalin's Letters" the inside story is given. Stalin battled inside the CC to clear his name against Trotsky's slanders. In the light of speculations as to which of the Central Committee were hidden revisionists and which were not, it is important to note that the CC did not support Stalin's battle to have the full correspondence openly published surrounding the "Lenin Testament".

These works challenged the bourgeois painting of Stalin. We know what this is: Nasty and cruel and stupid, on the one hand; whilst simultaneously evil, genius, manipulative and devious; the Mad Man who was not responsible for good things like the Soviet defeat of the fascists; but who was however fully responsible for all the bad things, like the "millions" killed in the Gulag, etc. Ultimately, the truth will come out. But the academics still shrank from the implications - that Stalin was a great figure.

ONLY COMMUNISTS CAN PUT THESE FACTS TOGETHER.

It is up to us to understand how socialism was destroyed in the USSR. Who was responsible? Why were the proletariat and peasants of the USSR temporarily defeated in 1953? To answer these questions enables us to explain our views as having not only a past but a glorious future. Contrary to Francis Fukuyama "history" - [Fukuyama means Communism] is not dead!

THAT IS WHY THIS BOOK BY NORTHSTAR COMPASS IS OFFERED.

It allows Marxist-Leninists to further examine small pieces of the puzzle that confronts us: "How did the revisionists take control of the USSR and destroy socialism from within?"

SO WHAT MATERIAL DO WE PRINT HERE?

Finally, it is the collective efforts of many friends and comrades in the former USSR. They either read these articles in rare journals (e.g., "Military Archives"), or they found these in the original Archives. They have then been painstakingly translated by the Founding Editor of Northstar Compass Michael Lucas, with the aid of Max Rinis in one article. The articles fall into two main groups.

The First Group deals with Stalin's fight to defeat hidden revisionism, and ends with the CC actions after Stalin's death. The documents show attempts by honest communists to prevent revisionist sabotage that were frustrated. The vivid testimony from OGPU-NKVD files, of Ms. M.N. Volkova to the CC detail her attempts to avert Kirov's assassination, by warning the NKVD. In this section also is Stalin's speech to the "propagandists" in Leningrad surrounding "A Short History of the AUCP[B]." This book is a favourite target of Trotskyites who portray it as simplistic religious formulae, and a vanity of Stalin's. The book itself is the best refutation of this lie. But this document from the Archives of the CC reveals Stalin's approach was explicitly educational. Stalin points out that many previous "histories" were not even read by the CC, a state of affairs he calls "unhealthy". Which Marxist could disagree? Why do the Trotskyites hate the book so much? Could it be because it is clear and avoids the "Fog of Words" style of Trotsky? To assist the reader to obtain a general view of events over this period, we couple it with the reprinting of an article by W.B. Bland entitled "The Death of Stalin".

The Second Group of articles deals with issues having to do with the Second World War and the struggle against fascism.

Here, the lies told about Stalin reach a furious peak. This is because the importance of the struggle of the Soviet Union was of such world significance that Stalin's role must be belittled. Thus, the lie is put out that he was "frightened"; that he was "surprised"; that he was on the verge of "giving up". The document: "Stalin Never Thought of Giving Up Moscow" was first printed in the Military-Historical Journal and is the reminiscences of the Moscow Soviet Chairman Vasili Pronin. From Stalin's personal archives is drawn "Dissident elements in the Hands of German Reich Intelligence". This shows that the attacks of German fascism were indeed aided by traitors in the Red Army. The traitors were ready for the entry of Germany into the Baltic states, with official photo albums welcoming Hitler with the fascist salute. After the war was over, the lies began furiously. The "Katyn Massacre" was one of these, and we publish the testimony of Rimoud Svyatec. This consists of materials found in the archives in the UK and sent and published in 1991, by the Russian journal "Military-Historical Journal". The material outlines the German responsibility and the Polish insistence on using the incident as a means by which to enlarge their territory, at the expense of the USSR. It ends with the advice of Winston Churchill to stop unjustified attacks on the USSR, with these words: "Without the Russian army Poland would have been destroyed or brought into slavery and the Polish nation itself would have been wiped off the face of the earth".

We couple this with the re-printing of an article by H. Kumar on the War; and another by W.B. Bland on the manoeuvres of the imperialists to use Finland as a jumping off station into the Baltic States, for the German invasion.

THESE DOCUMENTS SHOW THAT UNDER STALIN, SOCIALISM WAS ADVANCING BUT WAS BEING SABOTAGED BY REVISIONISM AND BY IMPERIALISM. □



J.V. STALIN

Even though he died over 40 years ago, his enemies still attack his personage, his leadership and his dedication to Socialism and Communism.

THE LAST "RESIGNATION" OF STALIN

From Archives of NKVD-KGB

Published in Russian in the Journal "ISTOCHNIK", 1/1994

It is a well known fact, that J.V. Stalin had many times (starting with 1920's) raised the question of resignation from the heavy workload of his responsibilities in the party and government. His requests were always not accepted and he was urged unanimously by all to stay in his position as head of the party and his post as the leader of the Soviet Union. In the end, the "leader" was sent away and forced to resign, without him asking.

According to official announcement, Stalin died on March 5, 1953 at 9:50 p.m. Next morning, the tragic news was given on radio, while newspapers published an eulogy in his memory on behalf of the CC CPSU, Soviet of Ministers of USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR. In this eulogy, Stalin was mentioned as the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of USSR and as Secretary of the CC CPSU. But as will be seen by the document printed below, from these two posts the "Leader" was released even before he died, by the hastily convened meeting of these organs of power! Stalin, even while still alive, was stripped of his responsibilities. Gravely ill, Stalin was alive and one and one half hours before he died (was poisoned? – Editors) the newly convened agencies stripped Stalin of his posts. But, in order not to cause any misconceptions, they let Stalin's name stand as a member of the Presidium of the CC CPSU!

This situation – that is, the stripping of the titles of Stalin while he was still alive – gave rise to stories that Stalin died before the meeting of the CC CPSU and Soviet of Ministers, which, in actual fact, was stated in the official announcement.

This version was supported by people who were members of the CC CPSU and who took part in that important meeting. K.M. Simonov in his reminiscences writes about the possibility: “that Stalin died immediately and did not struggle to live for a couple of days, being in a coma ... I might suggest, (he writes in explanation) that it was suggested that the announcement of Stalin’s death should be postponed for a couple of days in order to allay fears by the people that Stalin is no more.” (Through the eyes of my generation. Thoughts about J.V. Stalin, 1989, p. 235.)

D.A. Volkogonov (a bitter anti-communist, renegade, traitor – Editors) cites as an example D.T. Shelipov, working in 1953 as the Editor-in-Chief of “Pravda”: “In the morning of March 5th, I received a telephone call, voice of Suslov on the line: ‘Quickly come over to the [ugolok] (corner – that is how the Kremlin workers called the office of the “Leader”). Comrade Stalin died.’ (Triumph and Tragedy. A political portrait of J.V. Stalin, 1990, p. 590.)

These reminiscences DO NOT correspond with the words and writings of S.I. Alliluyev, daughter of Stalin, who was an eyewitness to the agonizing death of her father for days and, who in detail, wrote about these days (20 letters to a friend, 190, pp. 8-15). Yes, even the same Volkogonov got hold of the

documents that say that Stalin died in the evening on March 5, 1953 ("Independent Newspaper", March 4, 1993).

Below is the document, published for the first time ever – the Protocol of the joint meeting of CC CPSU, Soviet of Ministers of USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from March 5th, 1953 – this also does not support the version of the immediate death of the "Leader of the People". This document from the archives of former Politbureau of CC CPSU is interesting in its details. First of all, here is concrete evidence, showing the joint meeting. Secondly, there is absolute certainty that all questions were decided in the narrow circle around Stalin and presented as 'fait-accompli' to the joint meeting without even ONE dissenting voice being raised by the Central Committee CPSU, and spread by others who did not even belong to the governing bodies. Thirdly, it is shown that the most active role was played in this tragedy by the so-called "Three Stalin's Guards" – L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov and N.S. Khrushchev, among whom very shortly there took place a death struggle for power. Fourthly, it is surprising that while the joint meeting of the governmental bodies was taking place, STALIN WAS STILL ALIVE, which is shown by the fact that he was STILL included in the Presidium of the Central Committee, although the most IMPORTANT POSTS were taken away from Stalin. Fifthly, the initiators of this action, being certain that their former idol was going to die, decided to bring some "order into the situation of the documents and papers of Stalin". This was done while Stalin was still alive, deathly ill to be sure – but alive and not yet buried.

The process of revamping the documents were already in process while Stalin was alive on his death bed.

* In translating the protocol, I tried to preserve the specifics of syntax and spelling - Michael Lucas, Editor.

**PROTOCOL OF JOINT MEETING OF THE PLENUM OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU, SOVIET OF MINISTERS OF
USSR AND PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF USSR**

March 5, 1953 ¹

The meeting took place at 10:00 p.m. and ended at 10:40 p.m.

Present at this joint meeting were:

Andreev, Andreanov, Aristov, Arutinov, Babev, Bagirov, Baibakov, Beliajev, Benedictov, Beria, Beshev, Bojcov, Borkov, Brezhnev, Vagapov, Vannikov, Vasilevsky, Volkov, Voronov, Voroshilov, Gafurov, Gryshyn V., Gryshyn I., Gusev, Denisov, Yegorov, Efimov, Efremov, Zhdanov, Zhegalin, Zhukov, Zasiadko, Zverev, Zimyanin, Ignatov, Ignatiev, Kabanov, Kaganovich, Kalnberzin, Kapitanov, Ketskhoveli, Kidin, Kirichenko, Kiselev V., Kisilev N., Kovrigina, Kozlov, Konev, Korneychuk, Korotchenko, Korchagin, Kosygin, Kruglov, Kuznetsov V., Kuznetsov N., Kuliev, Kutyrev, Kuusinen, Kjebin, Larionov, Latunov, Lebedev, Lukianov, Malenkov, Malyshev, Marfin, Mgeladze, Melnyk, Melnikov, Mikoyan, Mikhailov, Molotov, Moskvin, Mukhitdinov, Nedosekin, Nikolaev,

Niyazov, Organov, Pankratova, Patolicheva, Pegov, Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Poskrebyshev, Pospelov, Prass, Prokofieff, Pronin, Puzanov, Razzakov, Rumiancev, Saburov, Semin, Smirnov, Snechkus, Sokolovsky, Suslov, Taibekov, Tevosyan, Titov P., Titov F., Ustinov, Fadeev, Khvorostukhin, Khrunichiev, Khrushchev, Cheplakov, Chernyshev, Chesnokov, Shayakhmetov, Shvernik, Shelepin, Shkiriatiy, Yudin, Yusupov, Yakovlev, Yasnov.

* There were also present 111 Candidates to CC CPSU which we are not listing for space reasons – such as Budyonny, Grechko, Timoshenko, Kozlov, Zakharov, Furtseva and others – Editors.

Signed by:

Chairman Central Auditing Commission

Moskatov, Bolshakov, Voronov, Kuzminykh, Kurshev,

Psurcev, Skvortsov, Tretiakov, Fomin

Members of Presidium Supreme Soviet

Lebedeva, Tarasov, Fedorova

“Chairing the joint session is Khrushchev.

Comrade Khrushchev gives the opportunity to the Minister of Health of USSR Tretiakov for outlining the details of the health of comrade J.V. Stalin.

The report by Tretiakov is accepted as information.

Khrushchev informs the joint meeting, that from the start of the illness of comrade Stalin, there is always present by his bed a member of the Political Bureau of CC Presidium.² At this time, keeping watch is comrade Bulganin, that is why he is not present at this joint meeting.

Word is given now to comrade Malenkov.

Comrade Malenkov stated:

All understand the tremendous responsibility for the leadership of the country, which now falls on the shoulders of all of us.

All are aware of the fact that our country cannot allow even one hour to elapse without a transition to new leadership.

This is why the Bureau (three members) of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party has called this joint meeting of the highest organs of our country – Plenum of the CC CPSU, Soviet of Ministers of USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR.

The Bureau of the CC CPSU has instructed me that, in formulating these plans during this tragic period of our country, the most important thing now is to see the smooth transition of the government leadership, to unify itself, since now our country is without Stalin. The Bureau of Presidium of CPSU considers this moment imperative to name the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of USSR. The Bureau is nominating as Chairman of Soviet of Ministers of USSR comrade G.M. Malenkov.

The candidature of comrade Malenkov is supported unanimously by all. Khrushchev said that “we must all agree that there is absolutely no need of any other candidates at this time”.

After this, comrade Khrushchev gives the word to comrade Malenkov.

Comrade Malenkov proposes the following as the decision of the Bureau of the CC CPSU:

1. Proposal to nominate and elect as first Vice Chairman of Soviet of Ministers comrade L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, N.A. Kaganovich was adopted.

2. Combine the two organs of Soviet of Ministers – the Presidium and the Bureau, to be called Presidium of Soviet of Ministers of USSR.

Elect to this one Presidium the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of USSR, first Vice Chairmen and also Deputy Chairmen, who are members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU.

3. Recommend as the Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR comrade K.E. Voroshilov, and to remove from this post comrade N.M. Shvernik.

Appoint as Secretary of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet comrade N.M. Pegov, and relieve him of his post as Secretary of the CC CPSU. Appoint A.F. Gorkin, the present secretary of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR, to the post of Vice Chairman of the Secretariat of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR.

4. Unite the Ministry of State Security of USSR with the Ministry of Internal Security – to be called the Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR.

Appoint as Minister of Internal Affairs of USSR comrade L.P. Beria.

5. Appoint comrade V.M. Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Appoint as Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of USSR, comrades A.Y. Vishinsky, Y.A. Malik and V.V. Kuznetsov.

Elect comrade A.Y. Vishinsky as permanent representative of USSR at the United Nations Organization.

We must have as Ambassador to China a representative of the CC CPSU, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, comrade V.V. Kuznetsov.

6. Appoint Marshal of the Soviet Union N.A. Bulganin as the Minister of Defense of USSR and as First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Defense of USSR Marshal Vasilevsky and Marshal G.K. Zhukov.

7. Unite the Ministry of Internal Trade with the Ministry of External Trade.

Appoint comrade A.I. Mikoyan as Minister of Internal and External Trade – his Deputy to be P.N. Kumykina and V.G. Zhavoronkova – as Vice Ministers.

8. Combine the Ministry of Automobile with Tractor Building Ministry into Ministry of Machine Building and also unify with this Ministry the Ministry of Agriculture Machine Building, into the Ministry of Machine Building.

Appoint comrade M.Z. Saburov as its Minister and take him from his post as the Chairman of the GOSPLAN of USSR.

9. Unify the Ministry of Transport Machine Building; the Ministry of Shipbuilding; Ministry of Heavy Machinery and Ministry of Road Building Machinery into the Ministry of Transport and Heavy Industry building.

Appoint comrade V.A. Malyshev as its Minister.

10. Unite the Ministry of Electricity and Ministry of Electrical Machine Building into the Ministry of Electro-Stations and Electrical Industrial Building.

Appoint as its Minister comrade M.G. Pervukhin.

11. Appoint comrade G.P. Kosiachenko as Chairman of Gosplan, USSR.

12. Recommend comrade N.M. Shvernik as head of the VCSPS, remove comrade V.V. Kuznetsov.

13. The Bureau of the Presidium of CC CPSU suggests that the CC CPSU should have only one organ – the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU, instead of the Presidium and Bureau, which means that we should change the Constitution of the CC CPSU.

In this regard, the Presidium should be composed of 11 members and 4 alternate members.

We move that the following members compose the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

Comrades: G.M. Malenkov, G.M. Beria, L.P. Molotov, J.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov and M.G. Pervukhin.

Candidates to Presidium CC, comrades: N.M. Shvernik, P.K. Ponomarenko, L.G. Melnikov and M.D. Bagirov.

14. Since the decision regarding the Presidium of CC CPSU and Presidium of Soviet of Ministers were adopted, therefore it is in order to liquidate the Permanent Control Commission as part of CC CPSU – in charge of internal affairs and regarding questions of defense of the country.

15. Elect Secretaries to CC CPSU comrades S.D. Ignatiev, P.N. Poslepova and N.N. Shatalin.

16. Recognize immediately that comrade Khrushchev should come to work in the CC CPSU and together with this to

vacate his job as the First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

Appoint comrade N.A. Mikhailov as the First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of CPSU.

17. Free from any obligations comrades P.K. Ponomarenko and N.G. Ignatiev since they will be working in the Soviet of Ministers. Comrade L.I. Brezhnev – his new duties shall be as Head of Political Affairs of the Army-Navy Ministry.

Comrade Malenkov reports that the suggestions-decisions that he has presented were accepted unanimously by the Bureau of the Presidium of CC.

In order to give approval to the decisions adopted, it is agreed that the Supreme Soviet should be called into session.³

After this, comrade Malenkov reported that the Bureau of the Presidium of CC authorized comrades Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to undertake all steps, that the documents and personal papers of J.V. Stalin be put in order.

DEAR READER: This is a sure give-away from the minutes of the meeting. Stalin was meticulous in his speech, his work habits, his documentation and his penchant for extreme order of documents and other state materials! – Editors.

In conclusion, comrade Malenkov stated that during these very complex and tragic times for the party and the country, that the Central Committee CPSU, Soviet of Ministers of USSR and the Presidium of Supreme Soviet will guarantee stability in the leadership of the country.

Comrade Khrushchev asked if there were any questions or additions to the proposals of the Bureau of the Presidium of CC CPSU. There were no questions.

Comrade Khrushchev asks for a vote.

The joint meeting of the Plenum of CC CPSU, Soviet of Ministers of USSR and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR adopts the proposals ... as presented by the Bureau of Presidium of CC.⁴⁷

- N. Khrushchev

Chairman of the Joint Meeting

APRF 2 op. 2, D. 196, L. 1-7

Typewritten sample of the minutes, stamped by the official seal of the CC CPSU.

1. At the XIX Congress of CPSU (October 1952) the CC was composed of 125 members plus 111 alternate members. Bulganin did not attend since he was at the bedside of Stalin ... also 4 other members did not attend. Ten alternates to CC did not attend, including A.A. Gromyko.

2. At the Plenum of CC CPSU on October 16, 1952, there was elected a Presidium of CC consisting of 25 members and 11 alternates - the most numerous Presidium in the history of the Politbureau. On the initiative of Stalin, a Presidium of the CC consisted of the following members: Stalin, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, G.M. Malenkov, M.G. Pervukhin, M.Z. Saburov and N.S. Khrushchev.

3. The fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of USSR took place on March 15, 1953 and it adopted the decisions of the

CC CPSU, Soviet of Ministers and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR.

4. To the written Protocol were added the joint meeting records. This was published in "Pravda" and other newspapers on March 7, 1953 without mentioning the DATE on which the joint meeting took place. Interesting that the published version in "Pravda" said that there were 10 members and not 11 in the Presidium of CC CPSU. The article also failed to mention that Kuznetsov was appointed Ambassador to China, and also the fact that the decision was made to PUT I.V. STALIN'S PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS IN ORDER.

The above is based on materials from the Archives by Anatoli Chernev, alternate member of Historical Sciences.

NOTE: The document from the archives, contained in a sealed file, had imprinted on top the words: "STRICTLY SECRET". Archives d. #1. Stenographic copy (original) is missing from this document.

OUR COMMENT:

Now that you have read this "Strictly Secret" document, had time to digest it – may we suggest that you ask yourself the following questions:

- *When an important leader dies, such as Stalin, a leader of world renown, loved and hated, there is usually a postmortem performed to actually determine the cause of death. Why is this "postmortem" not included in any of the documents that we have seen, as to the actual cause of death?*

Written stories, biographies of people that were close to Stalin in his last days, do not agree with each other. The daughter of Stalin,

who was present when Stalin died, stated that her father "died an agonizing death over a period of days".

- Stalin was still alive when the joint meeting took place. Inside of 1 1/2 hours, the whole structure of the CC CPSU; Supreme Soviet; External and Internal Security and Defense; functionaries reshuffled; drastic economic changes instituted – in other words, everything that existed while Stalin was alive and leading, was turned around completely.

Anyone with a single brain cell in his head realizes that the drastic changes that were made instantaneously, could not have been accomplished inside of 1 1/2 hours. It took months of behind-the-scenes planning, to have people in place and in agreement to accept such and such posts.

The majority of the members of CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR did not know the behind-the-scenes manipulations that were taking place. They believed the reports of Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria as presented at this joint meeting upon Stalin's death.

- Some readers might query as to what is wrong with any Government having a contingency plan ready in the event that a leader dies? That's correct! BUT ... the question is not about changing or reshuffling personnel in the Government – the deeper question is why were the POLICIES changed overnight that were in force while Stalin was alive? Would these "policy changes" have been instituted while Stalin was alive? Of course not! Because Stalin knew that policies such as those instituted would eventually lead to exactly what has transpired in the former USSR.

• If it was the "Will of Stalin" that these changes be made, or if the whole of CC CPSU discussed these changes ahead of time and concurred – then why was this Document not published until 1994, in Russian only?

We are publishing it for the first time in English.

The answer to the above question is obvious! These traitors did not want the Soviet people to find out the truth earlier, because that would have been the end of these present Judases.

So ... for 42 years, the Government apparatus of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev was geared towards "demonizing Stalin", so that the truth, if it transpired, would not cause an upheaval as it would have done 40 years ago!

After all, there are now close to 3 generations who were brought up on the "Evils of Stalin"!

We are thankful to our Soviet friends who got this material from the publication "Istochnik" published in January 1994. □

STALIN NEVER THOUGHT OF GIVING UP MOSCOW!

From Military-Historical Journal, 1991

Fifty years have passed. The circle is again complete as it was in 1941. The fate of our country is being decided in Moscow. What will become of us tomorrow?

But in the bloody, deathly struggle, without being able to see the future, during the autumn and winter of 1941, we withstood the fascist attacks before the walls of Moscow. Let us go back to those days and get their impressions ... not from the military commanders' point of view, but from the Moscow Soviet Chairman, Vasili Pronin who was chairman of 'Mosoviet' from April 1939 to 1945. He was interviewed by the Editor of the Military-Historical Journal, Captain S.G. Ishenko.

– Vasili Prokhorovich, I am aware that you became head of the Moscow City Soviet when you were only 33 years of age. It is hard to realize that at that time, even Peoples Commanders travelled around Moscow on motorcycles. How did you become the head of the Moscow Soviet?

– I think that when I was working as secretary of the party organization at a watch-making factory, Khrushchev recommended me to the post of Secretary of the Leningrad district of Moscow. In April of 1939, I was called to see comrade Molotov. He did not say anything after greeting me – just stated that discussions will take place at another place. We came to Stalin's office. This was my first meeting with J.V. Stalin. Stalin,

in great detail, explained the problems facing Moscow now at the critical moment when German fascists were at the gates of Moscow ... problems of potatoes, vegetables. At that time, the Moscow authorities were able to save in reserve only 40% of the necessary products for the Muscovites. The people that were responsible for this sabotage were sentenced by courts. Stalin stated that this is a life-and-death struggle for the Soviet Union, therefore, saboteurs or enemies of the Soviet people must be exposed and all be put in jail. This is better than to leave millions of Soviet citizens to starve to death because of their sabotage. This, I felt, was also a warning to me, I thought naively!

- In our interview, we shall more than once touch on Stalin. You met Stalin often in your position as Head of Moscow Soviet. How do you look at all the anti-Stalin hysteria that we have heard in the last 40 years?

- This is a very hard question. In my work, of course, I met Stalin often. As the publicists, historians and present leaders write and speak about Stalin, there is nothing real in their writings, nothing actual or truthful.

Stalin was no fool or sick. He was a tough leader during very tough times and there were enemies within and outside our borders.

- Were you afraid of him?

- Stalin? Maybe I was. But Stalin was smart and a very learned man. He went into any given problem very methodically. In 1939-1940, this is the way we worked. There was intensive work to fortify the defenses of Moscow. Stalin visited all the regions of Moscow everyday, looking over the

fortifications, giving advice, finding fault with things that were not done and should have been done according to the master defense plan for Moscow. Every little thing interested him. He observed the smallest discrepancies. I accompanied him often. He himself told me where to go. Together with me, there was his personal bodyguard, General Vlasiv, Shcherbakov and Zhdanov or Molotov. This was more often than not closer to evening.

Coming to the location, we start to visit the defenses and building of emplacements and other structures. We discussed the plans and what could be done either to improve or take certain steps to speed it up. People, seeing Stalin, converged. I remember at a stop, on Lenin Prospect, Stalin told the people: "Comrades, this is not a meeting – we came here to look at the construction." Vlasik, perspiring as he ran here and there to see that no one tried to attack Stalin ... there were no other guards guarding Stalin, who freely met, talked, shook hands with people.

Stalin was interested in everything, knew everything and was on top of things regarding the defenses of Moscow. I remember vividly how Kaganovich got it from Stalin because Kaganovich agreed to tear down Zubovsky Boulevard. Or the time when construction of apartments or governmental buildings used to stop in winter (since we did not have the technology at that time to build in the winter season), Stalin listened sometimes for hours from technical and architectural staff about techniques and problems.

- *What about Khrushchev? What are your thoughts about him?*
- The cooperation was normal. He helped the Moscow

Soviet in its plans and proposals. He listened but NEVER gave any suggestions or ideas. He was not a person in his environment.

Most of the City Soviet people were at odds with Khrushchev, did not like him at all. Why? Because Khrushchev was very poorly schooled, was not very bright. This was his weakness.

He was the one that was mostly responsible for any repressions that took place. Why? Over his head, there hung the sword of Damocles. From 1920 onwards, Khrushchev always voted for and supported Trotsky and his platform ... even voting against Lenin in his last days. Fearing reprisals, he went at his work of "finding enemies" with zest and zeal. Khrushchev sanctioned repressions against mainly good communists and Soviet workers. Under him, all the 23 Moscow party secretaries were arrested, some without Stalin even being aware. All secretaries of districts, provinces, territories, such as Katselbogen, Margolin, even his own staff were arrested. While Khrushchev was still in the Ukraine in 1938, he demanded the cleansing and arrest of all functionaries in Moscow.

We, being young at that time, were amazed at how Khrushchev was bringing us up, how to be wary and be certain that we have good, honest communist cadres around us, while he himself, according to him, was surrounded by "enemies of the people". He was the only one left in the Moscow party committee!

– *Are you saying that the so-called repressions were in most part the work and responsibility of Khrushchev?*

– I would say in the largest measure. After 1938, when Shcherbakov came to head the Moscow party organization, none

of the Moscow City party comrades were repressed or let go off the job. I remember a meeting of the Politbureau in July of 1940: There was a question brought up by Khrushchev and his friends about taking Shcherbakov from his position – because of some question as to his competence. Also, he was accused of not taking enough action to get rid of “enemies” in the organization. Stalin was instrumental in saving Shcherbakov. In my presence, after Shcherbakov came to head the Moscow Party organization, he was instrumental in getting rid of the commander of NKVD from the party for fabricating accusations against party functionaries and their arrest. They were all saved by the intervention of Stalin and Shcherbakov.

– *Vasili Prokhorovich, how did you, in Moscow at that time, feel about the swift advances of German fascists to the gates of Moscow?*

– Starting from January 1940, the CC was always in full session planning and fulfilling the plans for the defense of Moscow. At that time, most of the factories and enterprises were starting to be converted to war production. Stalin especially demanded obedience and quick fulfillment of this, since it was meant to be the defense in the deadly struggle against fascism. Moscow had large aeroplane production facilities. The Moscow Soviet was in large measure given the responsibility of overseeing the production of planes and armaments. These questions were discussed many times by the CC CPSU and I was always called to be there. In July of 1940, because production output and readiness were not at their peak, the whole Moscow Soviet was hauled over the coals in the party.

Starting with the Finnish War, the readiness and quality of defenses of PVO and MPVO of the city were given top priority. There was a tremendous flow of construction, tunnels were built, water reservoirs were constructed, telephone links were being established in every district and outside Moscow territories. Metro was fortified to withstand bombing. Water mains were placed in all of the tunnels, as well as ventilation and ventilators. There were more than 2,000 bomb shelters built. Electrical lighting was centralized. Command posts across Moscow were constructed. Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites, not in the Army, were trained in fighting, defense, firefighting, first aid, etc., etc., over 600,000 persons, mostly women. In 1940 alone, we assigned more than 2,200 million rubles for the construction.

The coming war made us look at Moscow through different eyes. There were many problems. The population, even at that time, had grown by 150,000 people, coming from all outside districts. Transport problems were dealt with. The narrow streets of Moscow and the narrow bridges made it very hard for tanks to cross over them. Why do you think that we built in post-war years 12 wide bridges, 45 bypasses, underpasses and other structures? War has taught us a lesson.

During the 1930s, the Moscow river gave us a problem. There was a shortage of drinking water - the river was practically drunk dry. It was providing us with only 60 million gallons of water, while Moscow needed over a 100 million gallons. In the centre of the city, water could not rise higher

than the 5th floor of the apartments. After the construction of the Moscow-Volga canal, this problem was solved.

Hundreds of bakeries were built and heating plants were constructed. All this was not only done for the defense of Moscow, but it was done for post-war Moscow as well. There was no thinking of abandoning Moscow at all.

- *Then the war started ...*

- The sudden attack by the mighty forces of Germany and its allies demanded from us maximum production of all armaments in order to help the front. Therefore, the pre-war mobilization had to be increased two to three times. Can you imagine this? All these things had to be accomplished while the best and ablest manpower was mobilized for the front - hundreds of thousands of men from Moscow were at the front.

Within a few weeks, all of the factories and manufacturing industries were on a war-time footing. The State Defense Committee gave us the task to speed up production for the front. Uniforms and boots were easy to convert to war production, but it was very difficult to transform those factories and enterprises to manufacture guns, bullets, tanks, etc.

At the beginning of July 1941, the Moscow Soviet was requested by the General Headquarters to start producing tank artillery rockets. These "katyushas" were manufactured in over 50 enterprises in Moscow - a cooperative committee was set up to coordinate this important effort. The control of our production was given to Deputy Soviet Defense Committee Chairman, Voznesensky.

We met each day regarding production problems and we ran into the problem of rocket launchers. Tubes for these rockets had to be flown to Moscow from the Urals.

We desperately needed machine guns. Stalin demanded production, but we could only manufacture enough to provide 100 machine guns per corps of the army! We assigned 20 enterprises for this production. Already in 1943, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky's armies received over one million machine guns.

In October of 1941, Marshal Zhukov telephoned the Moscow Soviet, asking for autotransport vehicles. He explained the reasons: Since the front had extended to huge distances, there was a desperate need for transport trucks to transport soldiers from one danger point to another. Requests for cranes to get tanks out of the mud were received, which we, with our experts, immediately started the design and production of these crane monsters. We liberated over 1,200 tanks that were stuck in the mud ... not only ours, but we freed German tanks as well, which we used against the enemy.

A very large percentage of the factories was evacuated to the east, along with thousands of specialists. In spite of all this, Moscow produced 19,000 fighter aeroplanes, 3,745 rockets for artillery "katyushas", 3.5 million automatic rifles, 34 million mines and bombs, 10 million uniforms, etc.

- It would not be correct to overlook the question of the civilian population and its heroism. Now that the present leaders laugh and joke about these tragic days, try to state that the civilian population

did not want to save Moscow or the system, let us set the record straight, please!

- During the night of July 2, 1941, Secretary of the CC Malenkov telephoned me and asked me to come immediately to see him. I was busy at that time on some urgent business, so my assistant Korovel went to see Malenkov in the Kremlin. This meeting was attended by all secretaries of all districts. Malenkov stated: "Our Motherland is in mortal danger, we must organize a people's defense." In just 5 days of the appeal by the party, over 300,000 Muscovites, teachers and government employees volunteered for the Peoples Defense Committees. Among them, there were over 100,000 communists and 150,000 komsomols. Many factories and enterprises formed whole battalions of these people that helped dig trenches. These were people who were patriots, defenders of socialism and the Motherland.

We could not afford to send all of the people that volunteered to the front, otherwise the city would have been left empty. We only took 120,000 volunteers. We formed 12 divisions of the people's militia. We had problems with guns and clothing, since all efforts were for the Soviet Army. We had to again make certain that some enterprises went into production for this need of the people's militia. Immediately we reconditioned over 15,000 rifles that were used for training, gave the people grenades and Molotov cocktails.

The role played by the People's Militia is unbelievable. Today it is terrible to hear: "Was it necessary to have mobilized these civilians?", "Was it necessary to have these volunteers face

German fascist tanks? – this was the Army's job, not civilians." These people now do not understand, or they understand but want to heap abuse at these heroes. Everyone should understand the catastrophe that could have happened during the first days of the war! We must understand that the fascist attack, unprovoked, captured much war materiel that was in storage. Millions of rifles were captured by the Hitlerites in storage depots that were overrun by Germans. You cannot predict when the enemy is going to attack, in spite of our agents in the rear, double agents feeding misinformation or the misinformation that was fed to our General Staff by our future allies, who urged Hitler to attack USSR first.

We ought to bow our heads to the heroes that withstood the first attacks and gave their lives so that we might live.

– *When did the actual defense of Moscow commence?*

– Practically from the first days of the attack. The defense rings were prepared 20–30 miles outside of Moscow. There were three defense rings inside of Moscow. We had over 100,000 people working on the defenses of Moscow. Let me make this fact clear – there was NOT ONE deserter from the civilian population in charge of the defense.

This civil defense was trained and ready for street fighting. Every block had a command post, every district a headquarters. The spirit and dedication and love of the party and the Motherland was never so high.

– *In your capacity as a member of the General Central Command, were there any disagreements regarding the defense of*

Moscow or its evacuation?

– No, there was unity. When on the night of October 19 we were asked to come to the General Staff Command, only one question was on the agenda: Are we going to defend Moscow? At first, as was the custom, all the General Staff and Moscow secretaries met in the Kremlin: Beria, Malenkov, Molotov and others.

– Any from the Military High Command?

– There was only one – General Artemiev. Marshal Zhukov was at the front.

– *It seems that to defend or not to defend Moscow was left to the Government body – civilians!*

– It looked like it. When we were all gathered in the hall, ready to go to the office of Stalin, Beria said that he would try to convince everyone to evacuate Moscow. He was for evacuating Moscow, giving it up to the Germans and establishing the headquarters of defense on the Volga River. Malenkov was agreeing with Beria, Molotov was very agitated and against this. Others present kept mum. I remember the words of Beria as follows: “Well, with what are we going to defend Moscow? We have nothing with which to defend ourselves. They will break us apart and will shoot us all like partridges!”

Then we went to Stalin’s office. There were 10 of us. Stalin was pacing in his office as always, with a pipe in his mouth. When we were all seated, he asked the question: “Will we be defending Moscow?”

All of us kept quiet. He waited a couple of minutes and again, repeated the same question. Again, all of us were silent.

"Well, if all of you are silent, I'm going to ask each one individually."

The first one he asked was Molotov. Molotov said: "We're going to defend Moscow!" He asked each one personally. All of them, including Beria and Malenkov, said that we should defend Moscow!

He turned to me and said: "Pronin, write this down."

I took the paper and pencil and Stalin dictated. With this, we informed all citizens ... then he told me to get this message to the GHQ and on the radio. He then picked up the telephone, got in touch with the front lines and then from his small book where he had all the divisions, commanders, sections of armies, all marked ... he dictated commands as Commander-In-Chief to immediately deploy their divisions around Moscow. Someone from the Ural districts stated that he has not enough railway cars to bring his army to Moscow. Stalin stated emphatically: "You shall have the cars. Here sits Kaganovich, his head is on the line if he does not get you the train transport."

So, you see, Stalin never thought of leaving Moscow.

- It still seems that even with all the preparations ordered by Stalin in Moscow's defense, the present leaders did not think that Moscow could be defended?

- On September 20, I, together with Shcherbakov, was in the offices of NKVD and Beria. He reported that all bridges, roads, crossings were heavily mined and a Special division was assigned the task to blow these installations up in case of necessity.

When the Germans reached Kashiry, the secretary of the City telephoned Shcherbakov whether he should give the command to blow up these bridges and roads. Shcherbakov telephoned Stalin. He forbade this to be done, even though Germans were only 4 miles from Kashiry. We saved the electrical power station, which otherwise would have been blown up.

Yes, many wanted to blow everything up, afraid, and wanted to get the signal to evacuate.

- And how did the evacuation proceed from Moscow? On this question, many of the present leaders are trying to state that there was panic among the population, that there were thousands of deserters and that people were trampled to death at railway stations.

- All these are lies - empty wind blowing. There was absolutely no panic. On October 12th, a decision was made to evacuate eastwards over 500 factories and enterprises, specialists, highly qualified workers plus some necessary higher schools of learning. Unfortunately, we did not have the time to explain this situation, and in some factories, the workers started to defend the factories, thinking that the ones that came to evacuate the tools in these factories were deserters and traitors. In some districts, workers stopped the evacuation, stating that they would rather die defending Moscow and their factory than evacuate it. This was the overwhelming feeling of Muscovites ... rather die in Moscow than evacuate the factories.

What panic is that? This is the highest patriotism that our country has seen!

An incident happened that I can remember: When a highly qualified worker, Gubelman, came to me, demanding that he be evacuated immediately and accusing me of not caring for people, I told him that the whole Moscow Soviet, thousands of people unanimously decided to stay in Moscow. But his chief Yaroslavsky left Moscow and settled in Kuibishev ... while Guberman, after our talk, remained in Moscow.

Mikoyan left for the east. I only found this out on October 18th when Stalin telephoned me. He was furious with Mikoyan since Mikoyan was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Peoples Committee. Stalin also told me that he found out that Mikoyan and others were taking with them precious metals and left all of them at the railway station, some two tonnes.

Stalin never forgot anything. When in 1952 Mikoyan was removed from the Politbureau, Stalin reminded Mikoyan of his desertion during the war!

– There is talk now that Stalin himself wanted to leave Moscow if the situation got worse.

– I heard such talk, but these lies are spread by people who themselves ran away with tails between their legs at that time. They are doing this to make themselves look good before their children and grandchildren. I and my friend Kuznetsov and Poskrebyshev looked into this matter, perused archives and diaries of all different sources, but absolutely NOTHING whatsoever was found to say that Stalin wanted to run away. The opposite was true – he was the pillar of steadfastness and patriotism.

Furthermore, I was one of the leaders of PVO and I read that Stalin was seen running to and fro on some railway station, trying to get out of Moscow. Absolute lie! At that time, days on end German planes were over Moscow and if Stalin's train would have been going out of Moscow, our fighter planes would have been there to give him cover. Our command NEVER once got the order from Stalin that the High Command was planning to leave Moscow.

There was no truth to these lies, told by persons who themselves turned yellow with fear, thus trying to mask their flight by lying that even Stalin and the High Command were trying to escape from Moscow.

– In conclusion, let me ask you this question: You had and have such experience, being the head of Moscow Soviet at that time of great danger, how do you look at the present leadership of Moscow and the country?

– Any remarks or evaluation of a given management of a city or a country is based on the results achieved. Moscow industry and its management now work very badly. There is no building of apartments or other amenities for citizens. The services to its citizens are very poor at the best of times. Regarding trade and business that have sprung up in Moscow (private), I'm sick and tired of even talking about it. Everywhere, there is dirt, garbage, squalor. The crops of last year, in large measure, were left rotting in the fields. Instead of helping to gather in the crops, the Moscow City Council was too busy holding meetings, stopping demonstrations and otherwise trying to hold the lid down on the protests of the people.

Another year and another situation where vegetables, grain, fruits were left rotting in the fields instead of being gathered.

In my time, we made certain that all the fruit was picked so that Muscovites would have enough on their tables. We organized the whole city apparatus to help collective farmers bring in the crops, except during 1941 when the war started. We were not even allowed holidays, but all voluntarily went into the fields for the gathering and harvesting of crops. That was dedication and patriotism!

Let us take the dangerous times of the war – even at that time Moscow City Council was busy with erecting buildings, factories, bridges and subway lines, theatres, clubs and cinemas.

Even during 1944, we undertook to build the biggest gas pipeline the country has ever seen in Moscow. During all of the war years, we built, reconstructed all of the industrial potential in the city.

You yourself can compare those achievements during the terrible conditions of the war and post-war years, with the present situation in Moscow and the country.

– *Thank you Vasili Prokhorovich for this interview.*

OUR COMMENT:

It was very lucky that this interview was made in 1991 – since that time, Pronin passed away, and all this would never have been published for future generations to know.

But the question still remains to be answered ... why was the former head of the Moscow Soviet allowed to publish his reminiscences about those very important years – only in 1991?


We found out that it was only through certain circumstances that the Military-Historical Journal got permission to publish this historical piece.

V.P. Pronin was a dedicated communist, a patriot, a man who, as the head of Moscow Soviet, right in the midst of events that shook the Soviet Union, met very often with Stalin, knew in detail what was going on. Of course he had to be silenced, since his remarks refuted another lie that was perpetuated, nourished, promoted and forced on the population by the controlled media of the leaders, who, starting with Khrushchev, did not want the truth to be known about Stalin, since for over 40 years, the anti-Stalin campaign brought up two generations who absolutely DID NOT know the truth about J.V. Stalin.

Now, as we stated, another LIE is exposed and buried! How many more lies must be exposed, while the eyewitnesses are still living?

TRUTH ALWAYS COMES TO THE SURFACE!

□



Top: The pile of logs were ready to burn the corpses. These traces the Germans could not liquidate because of the Red Army onward rush. While below, the murdered bodies were ready to be burnt. They were also piled like logs.



THE TWELVE COMMANDMENTS FOR GERMAN FASCIST FORCES

From captured German documents

Published in Russian in the Military-Historical Journal, 1991

From secret archival documents which tell about the brainwashing that German officers and men received as they were training to invade the Soviet Union. The fascist leaders of Germany were brainwashing not only German people but its army about their racial superiority and the theory of "master race".

These "12 Commandments" are given here in a condensed form, eliminating the "procedures" of rank to rank indoctrination which was followed to the letter, all the way from General to the common infantry soldiers, as they prepared to invade the USSR.

1. You, who are being sent to the East, from you we demand hard work, obedience and absolute dedication.

2. Do not worry about making decisions which you could consider wrong. Single mistakes are going to be overlooked, mistakes are not important, fulfilling the commands is, working to orders for the glory of Germany is what counts. A soldier who is afraid to follow orders is not needed by the German Army.

3. You, young Germans, have the trust of your German officers. Do not approach the Russian problem with narrow Western examples in your mind. The inspectors appointed by the Fuehrer will check upon your fulfilling the commands only in special cases, otherwise, you are free to make your own

decisions as far as the Russians are concerned. You decide how to act on your own.

4. From the Commanders, I demand leadership. You have to act fast, less paper work, short precise orders to your staff and not be bound by humanitarian feelings. Do not explain anything to the Russians. They must know that it is we who give the orders. If you are not satisfied as to what your fellow soldiers are doing, do not let the Russians know. Do not treat the Russians by the method that we treat the Germans at home.

5. You should be very stubborn in achieving the German goal – for the glory of the German Reich.

6. The Russian lands that we conquered, are going to belong to Germany for a Thousand Years. Therefore, you have to treat the Russians very harshly. You have to fulfill all the requests that the government of Greater Germany is asking of you.

7. Do not even think of what is good for the Russian peasant or worker ... always think only about Germany, what's good for us! If the need arises, be very cruel, do not be swayed by laws or considerations. You should show the Russians how they must live.

8. Do not talk with Russians – act against them. You will not be able to out-talk the Russians. They can talk better than you, they like to “philosophize”. No debates or discussions with them at all. Orders, Orders and only Orders! Do not socialize or drink with them. Do not sleep with Russian women and girls voluntarily!

9. Do not get any communist ideas into your head. Russian young people were educated in communist ideology. Russia for hundreds of years was a country of bribes. We want to remake the Russians into tools in our hands. They could influence you. Always be very careful of Russians that you place in responsible positions. You have to make certain that you are not influenced if they try to bribe you.

10. We are not bringing to Russians a new religion. This is not your concern – there are other services of the German Reich that will look after this.

11. You are not to make living conditions better for the Russians – the opposite should be the rule. We do not want to raise their living standards up to those of the Germans.

12. You must look after yourself first and the German demands on these conquered lands. You cannot and must not feel any pangs of conscience in carrying out your duties. Do what you must do and God will help you and the German Reich.

– Berlin, June 1, 1941

Signed by G. BAKKE, Deputy to Fuehrer

OUR COMMENT:

When reading these "Twelve Commandments", you should also read between the lines, as to what they really told the German fascists to do.

Some German and Western historians try to white-wash this important document, pointing to its "humane, lawful and international laws of behaviour during conflicts by states"!

If this is so, then why were there Concentration Camps, Death Camps, mass butchery, mass graves, mass extermination furnaces, and above all, why did the Soviet Union lose 27,000,000 people?

Why did the Second World War cost humanity over 50,000,000 people?

Why were soldiers of the Western Allies treated differently than soldiers of the Red Army? The "twelve commandments" were the same, but historical actions proved otherwise.


This document "Twelve Commandments" was to mask the real intentions of German fascism! This was a document for "public relations", nothing more and nothing less.

Another document that we might translate in the future is a "Daily Diary of a German Officer", captured by the Soviets. In it, there is quite a different story regarding the "Twelve Commandments" and the role of a regular German Army and the SS, Gestapo and other punitive German detachments.

The Second World War was abetted by the monopoly capitalists of the West, which helped to arm Germany, promote its ideology, reaching even to the British Monarchy, leaders of Britain, France and others. Their whole aim was to have Germany bleed the USSR and then they, the "victors", would come and pick up the pieces, divide the spoils, rework the map of the world and proceed with their money making. The people who thought that surely we fought German fascism not only on the battlefields but also ideologically, had rudely been awakened as to the true aim!

Money-capital knows no boundaries, ideology or right or wrong! □

**FROM WHERE DID THE PRESENT UKRAINE'S
"DEMOCRACY" COME FROM?**



EMBLEM OF HITLER'S REICH



**SYMBOL OF UKRAINIAN
BANDERITE EXECUTORS.
AND NOW IN
ACTUAL FACT THE SYMBOL
OF "INDEPENDENT UKRAINE".**



**STATE SYMBOL OF THE PRESENT
"DEMOCRATIC UKRAINE".**

From newspaper "MAN WITH A GUN", #1, Kiev, 1996

THE ALLIANCE OF OUN-SS

From Archives of NKVD-KGB

Published in Russian in the Military-Historical Journal, 1991

We cannot but comment at the present time the coming forth of numerous demagogues, traitors, who utilize for their own ends nationalistic slogans, hiding under the umbrella of the "cult of the personality" (against Stalin – Editors). The nationalistic elements of today's Ukraine bring out these anti-socialist slogans and nationalistic appeals ... trying to hide their activities against the peaceful Soviet people. In this way, these traitors are trying everything in their power to blacken the patriotism of the people; to throw away from their shoulders overwhelming evidence of their terroristic activities, their cooperation with German fascism and especially with the German SS storm troopers against their own people!

According to these nationalists then (as it is now – Editors) they call the unity of Russian and Ukrainian peoples as nothing more than "Bolshevik occupation" of Western Ukraine. They try to explain their cooperation with German fascism as "contemporary tactics" of that period.

At all of the meetings, demonstrations and demands, these elements try with all their might and tactics to get the former bandits of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Underground Army) declared innocent and patriotic, they are building, erecting monuments in Western Ukraine to Petlura, Konovalets, Bandera, Shukevitch, Sheptitsky and other nationalists. But they always seem to forget to mention the "SS GALICHINA",

of the thousands of murderous acts or the thousands of murdered Soviet citizens! It would be disadvantageous!

Therefore, to our way of thinking, it is imperative that, based on Archival materials of the NKVD, plus captured documents from German SS and the nationalists' documents seized, that we expose these murderous nationalists, whom the people will never forgive – Editors.

IN THE SERVICE OF FASCIST INTELLIGENCE

This is from the confessions of the Colonel of "German Abwehr"¹ Erwin Stolze,² May 29, 1945.

"... we received in our employ a volunteer from Ukrainian nationalists, a colonel of the Petlura Army, Eugene Konovalts, through whom on the territory of bourgeois Poland and Western parts of Ukraine, there took place terroristic acts, diversions, and in some localities small uprisings were organized.

At the beginning of 1938 I personally received the order from the head of the Intelligence SS Admiral Kanaris, to employ as quickly as possible agents from Ukrainian nationalists in our ranks against the Soviet Union. Shortly after that, in the office of the Petlura's General Kurmanovic I met Konovalts and he, with enthusiasm, agreed to fulfill our plans. Much later, Konovalts was shot. OUN was headed by Andrej Melnyk, who joined our SS intelligence happily.

Konovalts, before he was killed, was recommended by a certain Yuryj from the Petlura Army ... his code name

was 'Consul-2'. He acted as an agent between the SS and Konovalets, who in turn was connected with the established underground.

The leaders of OUN-UPA were often in Berlin at the headquarters of the SS. We were informed daily about the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists and their work in Poland and Western Ukraine. Konovalets worked out a plan of conspiracy and actions to be taken in the USSR by these agents and also against the progressive elements in Poland. Therefore, after the plans were discussed and approved, the Abwehr (SS) undertook to finance all operations of Ukrainian nationalists.

In later meetings, Melnyk asked us to concur in establishing inside the OUN an intelligence section. He argued that such an intelligence and counter-intelligence section would go a long way, proving effective in gathering data from the Soviet authorities and other underground elements. His recommendation was adopted and financial assistance was confirmed. Such an intelligence section was organized in Berlin, and heading it was Petlura's man, Colonel Roman Sushko.

After the attack and subjugation of Poland, plans were in the works for an attack against the USSR. Therefore, Abwehr (SS) through Melnyk hatched plans of subversion against the USSR. But these plans were not enough. We received help from Bandera, one of the leaders of OUN, who was liberated by the Germans from a Polish jail where he was jailed for terroristic acts against Polish Minister Peratski. Who got Bandera involved, I cannot remember, but I worked with him ... At the

beginning of 1940 we became aware of a conflict between Melnyk and Bandera, which saw the split in the leadership of OUN.

With our attack against the Soviet Union, Bandera got over to us the most active Ukrainian nationalists. Then he was responsible for forcing Melnyk out of the leadership. The struggle between Melnyk and Bandera as to who could be of better service to German Abwehr (SS) came to a climax!

In August of 1941, Bandera was arrested by us near Berlin, placed under house arrest. In 1940 he received from Abwehr (SS) a huge sum of money for his activities in order to finance the OUN operations against the USSR, but he decided to keep it for himself and opened a bank account in Switzerland. We, of course, were able to get that money out of the bank – the Swiss were very cooperative. The same happened with Melnyk also.

QUESTION: How did the Ukrainian nationalists struggle against the partisans and its party leadership in the occupied Ukrainian territory, and what kind of leadership did the German Abwehr (SS) supply?

ANSWER: Abwehr (SS) utilized and activated Ukrainian nationalists in all of its operations during the war against the Soviet Union. We organized from their ranks groups, companies trained especially to fight the partisans, we trained agents to be dropped behind the Red Army lines to spy, terrorize and for diversions.

At the time of our retreat from Ukraine, Admiral Kanaris gave an order to form special sections from the nationalists to

fight behind the lines, in the territory liberated by the Red Army. These bandit formations were left behind, given every armament necessary, radio contact receivers, finances and it was led by trusted SS Officers."

This statement by prisoner Stolze was checked and rechecked and it was proven to be reliable, that these Ukrainian bands of nationalists were under the command of the Abwehr (SS). Besides this, it was proven that these Ukrainian agents with their German masters did manage in many divisions to infiltrate the Red Army. During military operations, these bands were responsible for attacks against units of the Soviet Army.

Example ... the operation of March 1944 against these UPA bands, the Soviet Army killed many, and among these Ukrainian bands we found the bodies of 7 German soldiers, all members of SS - thus proving that the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalist bands worked together and coordinated their attacks. On April 7, 1944, in the Ternopol region, Ukraine, the Soviet Army attacked this band of nationalists, killed most of them, captured two German officers, radio receivers, arms, 700 grenades, mines and other armaments that they were readying for another diversion.

ACCORDING TO NKVD ARCHIVES OF JUNE 30, 1944

"... June 27, 1944 at 4:00 a.m. near the village of Kokhanivka, there took place a parachute jump from German plane Yunker-52

of a group of diversionists of 16 men. Seven men were captured. In the interrogation, it was found out that all of them had finished intensive training in a German spy school, military training in the village of captured Dubliany, Drohobitsky province, and they were sent by one of the heads of UPA, Krawchuk, pseudonym 'Sivy'.

In November of 1940 I was transferred to Abwehr (SS), where I found out that Melnyk not only worked with the Gestapo, but worked directly in the German Military Intelligence. He was a member of the 'Berlin Abwehrstab'. I know this because I myself was employed as an intelligence agent inside USSR. Intelligence data received from USSR, Melnyk received from Ukrainian nationalists from Western Ukraine, plus from his personal residence in Novyj Zol, Czechoslovakia.

When I was sent to Krakow, Poland, in 1944 to the 'Abwehr 304', there I received full information of all the coordinated efforts between German SS, the German Army and the OUN-UPA in their extensive plans of fighting the Soviets. Captain Kirn of the SS told me that in August of 1944 he met the leadership of UPA and their discussion was the coordinated efforts against the Red Army which was swiftly advancing. But there was a catch - we were asked to liberate Bandera from house arrest, plus all of the Ukrainian nationalists who were in jail for various offences. He also asked (seeing that the war was not going in their favour) to agree to the establishment of a Sovereign Ukrainian State in Western Ukraine. He also demanded that

Germany supply all uniforms, arms, medicines, transport, radios and other necessary services.

He also promised that all OUN-UPA groups would be under the command of German officers and the Abwehr (SS), plus the demand that Abwehr (SS) open up diversion schools to train Ukrainian nationalists how to work behind the lines of the advancing Soviet Army. He concluded that all Ukrainian nationalist bands should be integrated into the German units, Abwehr sections and special, terroristic groups trained for future use. He demanded that the OUN groups should be given the task to go with the retreating German army and take part in its actions from Warsaw to the Rumanian borders!

German Abwehr (SS) agreed to these demands, except the formation of the Ukrainian Sovereign State. They opened up special schools to train the personnel of UPA.

Our Abwehr-206 was responsible for training Ukrainian nationalists who now managed to hide in the Carpathian forests. These agents were then sent behind the Soviet Army lines with specific tasks of sabotage, murder of commissars, heads of collective farms, besides harassing the Soviet Army units.

Many agents were recruited from concentration camps, and from prisoners of war."

We are going to give the word to Vasil Toikut, from the district of Kovel'sk in the Volyn province of Ukraine, who was a member of the diversion UPA group and captured, interrogated behind enemy lines. He was a member of the group 'Paul-2'. In his August 30, 1945 interrogation, he stated as follows:

"In August of 1941 I joined the police set up by German occupation forces. In May of 1943 I went from the police and joined UPA, took the pseudonym 'Baida' and became a commander of a section of UPA. We joined forces with Germans in order to fight the partisans, carrying the name of 'Fedorov'. In Spring of 1944, fearing retribution for my being a policeman from the advancing Red Army and also being a member of UPA, now that the war was ending, I ran away with the retreating German Army. In Krakow, Poland, I appealed to the so-called Ukrainian Committee, which was in command of all of the operations of OUN. In 1944 I was given the task, under the pseudonym 'Marchuk', to attend the diversionary-intelligence school of the German intelligence service in the city of Mel, where cadres were being trained to go behind the Soviet Army lines. There were 21 of us in this school, of the former bandits of OUN, who also ran away with the retreating German Army. We were divided into 3 groups. In my group, there were 8 men. All of them were born in the Volyn district of Ukraine.

On April 15, 1944 we were transported to Prague, Czechoslovakia. From Prague, our group parachuted down to the district of Kamyn, Volyn territory."

The statements of Stolze, Muler and Ilyushik show more than ever the tight cooperation and the leading role that German Abwehr (SS) played in the Ukrainian nationalist OUN-UPA. The propaganda that is tried by the present nationalists to state that they themselves operated against the

Soviet Army, as 'patriots' is nothing but an attempt to white-wash their guilt before the people.

"I do know that when Germany was on the brink of defeat, the high command of UPA-OUN made immediate contacts with the British-American Army. Dannili and Burlay were given the task by OUN-UPA to cross the lines and establish direct talks with the intelligence sections of the American-British sides. The task was to persuade the American-British side to accept Ukrainian nationalists, include them in their joint forces and let them operate behind the Soviet lines in the Ukraine.

Beginning in April of 1945 at the command of the high command of OUN, the formation of a special division group was started by Bandera in order to help defend Berlin against the advancing Soviet Army. Bandera left his summer dacha, given to him by German SS near Berlin, and left for Weimar ... to join the American forces."

In a captured document which shows the 'public program' of OUN-UPA regarding their attitude to other nationalities in the Ukraine, this public relations document spoke of the "equality of all nationalities" in the eyes of OUN-UPA. But ... their actual deeds speak louder than words ... they murdered other nationalities outright and also their own people if they did not support their fascist-nationalist actions.

Here is a stenographic, hand-written confession at his trial by the leader of UPA Yuri Stelmaschuk, February 28, 1945.

"In June of 1943 I received my instructions from the headquarters of OUN to physically annihilate all Polish people

living in the Western Region of Ukraine. Fulfilling this command, in August of 1943, together with bands of UPA, we killed over 15,000 Polish citizens in some of the districts of Volyn. We robbed them of their valuables and burnt all the villages down to the ground. Among those we butchered and shot were also women, children and elders. We did this by gathering people into large groups and surrounding them, we opened fire with machine guns, rifles and then bayoneted the others, or cut them up with swords."

Now, let us turn to eye-witnesses of these horrors of OUN-UPA.

A.I. Gavriiliuk from Litogoshe, Roshinskij district, Volyn province. In June of 1945, he was interrogated at the trial of some of the captured banderites. He was a witness at the mass executions taking place at the end of Summer of 1943 at the villages of Hai and Sukhodoly. "I was forced to bury the bodies of this massacre ... I buried over 150 bodies ..."

F.M. Stoliarchuk: In June of 1945 at the trial stated: "In March of 1943 into our village came a band of nationalists under the command of Pashkewitch. Before then, he was a commander of German police. They murdered 42 Polish families ..."

Now, let us quote some excerpts from captured Ukrainian bandits – from their trial records.

Head of a section of OUN, interrogated after capture on November 9, 1945.

"... During the night of February 3-4, 1944, the group of 'Seromatsev' went into the Polish village of Ganachiv. We

killed about 180 Poles, wounded about 200, and we burnt all their homes, about 80% in total. The Poles put up a fight with axes, sticks or bare hands ..."

NKVD archives contain hundreds of eye-witness accounts of the crimes perpetrated by the OUN-UPA bands. They are all recorded in detail, taken by stenographic secretaries, sometimes alone, sometimes facing the OUN-UPA captured bandits.

NKVD documents tell of many attacks by these bands against the Soviet Army, ammunition dumps, train movements of soldiers being derailed, bridges being blown up, mines being laid on the roads where the Red Army columns were marching.

As we see, the Ukrainian nationalists not only killed and terrorized the civilian population, but fulfilled the orders of the German Army by doing all diversionary attacks and sabotage.

But these modern day 'Ukrainian bandits' through their so-called 'Helsinki Union' try to prove through their well-financed campaign all over the world, that OUN-UPA never were involved in terroristic activities against the civilian population of other nationalities. They stated that they never killed even one Jew. Only the Germans did the killing.

From thousands of documents in the Archives of NKVD-KGB, we just list one, which is typical. This is important since the details and records were only formalized, after investigations in 1969. We found in these records the actions of the so-called 'Ukrainian Police' and Uniate Church. It is a fact that the Ukrainian Uniate Church is always a proponent of nationalism!

"In October-December 1969 in the Palace of Culture in the village of Krasne, Lvov province, in an open court there took place a trial of the leaders of OUN: Kupiak Dmitry, Andrej Moroz, Vladimir Olejnik, Lioni Potselujko, Stefan Chuchman, Paul Chuchman ... all of these bandits had pseudonyms in order to hide their identity ... but facts have a way of coming forth.

It was proven that these bandits from 1944-45 killed more than 200 Soviet men, women and children in cold blood, fire bombed scores of villages.

Unfortunately, the head of these bandits, Kupiak, was not present. In 1945, he escaped to Canada, where he is the owner of a fashionable restaurant in Toronto, and is looked upon as a significant businessman!

His biography and his terrible murderous deeds were read to the court and he was sentenced to death as were others. Pages upon pages of documented proof, witnesses, documents captured from OUN-UPA, German Abwehr and SS proved convincingly that this Kupiak was a butcher and using his pseudonym of "Klei", he was not able to be extradited from Canada, due to the Canadian government refusing to hand him over as a criminal.

The records show that in cross-examinations, questions and answers during this trial, one fact emerges ... the leadership of OUN-UPA were not only in the service of German fascism, but these killers were also interested in grabbing property, enriching themselves, and they hated any other nationality not Ukrainian or German.

We list here one episode of a question and answer between the Soviet prosecutor and the bandit Olejnik.

PROSECUTOR: (To Olejnik) "You stated that you fought only against the Soviet Army and Soviet activists, against those that did not support your ideal of an "independent Ukraine". What kind of activists were 2-3 year old children, whom KUPIAK, you and your bandits were killing, by the most terrible and sadistic of methods?"

Olejnik kept mum for a while, then blurted out: "Yes, this was in actual fact a terrible crime, which I cannot just blame on anyone else. The civilian population more and more was hating our nationalist bands - it would not cooperate. But KUPIAK always demanded that we must always hold the civilian population in terror ... and there is only one way of doing this - terrorize them and then kill them."

The NKVD-KGB records show that during the trials that took place, confessions were made as to the enormous sums of dollars and gold, diamonds, valuable articles that were taken by people like KUPIAK and others when they ran towards the American zone in Germany. They were able to buy themselves off, to get immediate villas, cars and later, to get passage on aeroplanes to the West.

Here is an interesting question and answer to A.P. Moroz by the Prosecutor, regarding the Uniate Church.

PROSECUTOR: "How did the Uniate Church look upon actions of bandit terror in the western parts of Ukraine, during the time of German occupation?"

MOROZ: "We were trained in Seminaries in the spirit of nationalism and every priest believed and worked for the "independent Ukraine" tied-in to Greater Germany. Our terroristic acts were completely supported and financed by the Uniate Church. The priests always forgave our sins. They always preached to us that 'without the knife or the gun, we shall never have an independent Ukraine'."

In order to understand this "unity" between the Uniate Church and the OUN-UPA bandits, it is necessary to know what were the teachings and ideas of the head of this church, Metropolitan Shepticky, and the church's cooperation with fascist intelligence.

In the Ukrainian nationalist newspaper "Ukrainian Daily News" of July 1, 1943, was printed the Declaration of the Metropolitan Shepticky – of welcome to the German army as it occupied Lvov.

Here is a fragment from this "welcome document":

"... with the blessing of the Almighty and the Trinity, the hour of liberation of Ukraine has come. The people's assembly (in the Uniate Church where this Declaration was being read, all the heads of the Uniate Church, the OUN-UPA leadership, German High Command, German SS and Abwehr officers were present).

The war years will ask us for much sacrifice, but the process has begun in the name of God ... the victory of the German Army, we welcome as a liberating army from our enemy. We will give our obedience and listen to our liberators."

Here is the letter of greetings that Shepticky sent to Hitler on September 23, 1941:

"Your excellency,

As the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church I give you my heartfelt greetings on the occasion of you liberating our capital city, Kiev ...

The question of defeating and uprooting Bolshevism, to which you, as the Fuehrer of Greater Germany took upon yourself, deserves thanks of the whole Christian world.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is proud of this historical undertaking on your part and the German people. The future of our people depends on God and you, my Fuehrer, we are certain that in your hands lies our salvation.

In thanks for this historical period, our church, tied in to world Christianity, I will pray to God in order to grant you victory, which will see a world at peace with your Greater Germany and the German Army.

- With deepest regards,

Andrej Count Shepticky, Metropolit"

Another letter to Hitler, on the same theme as the above, was sent, but this time, signed by the following leaders-heads of the Ukrainian nationalists:

- Count Andrej Shepticky Metropolit, President of the Ukrainian National Council in Lvov;

- Andrej Levitsky deputy to Symon Petlura, Head Ataman of Ukrainian National Union, Warsaw, Poland;

- Professor Velichkovsky, President of Ukrainian National Council in Kiev;

• General Omelianovich-Pavlenko, Chairman of General Council, former Commander of Ukrainian National Council, Prague, Czechoslovakia;

• Colonel Andrej Melnyk, Head of Ukrainian Nationalists, Berlin, Germany.

Listing any more documents – and there are thousands of them in the archives – we feel, is not necessary. No matter how the present Ukrainian nationalists all over the world would try to white-wash the traitorous and criminal acts of the bandits from OUN-UPA and other organizations, Church seminaries and front organizations ... facts prove the deep and close cooperation of German fascists, German SS, German Abwehr Agency, Uniate Churches ... they all had the same aim: they can never run away from responsibility in the eyes not only of the Ukrainian people, but of the whole world.

Today's attempts by world reactionary forces who try to help these Ukrainian nationalist-bandits to hide their crimes – will never work. Documents are available that prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the terrible guilt of this nationalist movement. This historical truth can never be erased.

– V. Zareshnij for the Archives”

OUR COMMENT:

It is impossible to be neutral or not be moved after reading this document!

What is even worse is the fact that present day Imperialism and the transnational corporations, together with the capitalist class who

control the media – these giants of manipulation of the people's minds, will NOT print any of these materials.

These materials are now available – why does the “freedom loving West” refuse to publish them?

Another question should be asked: Why were these materials not published in full until 1991? Who prevented it? Who did not want these facts to be revealed?


Were these present traitors waiting until the last eye-witness and survivor was dead? But what about the archives? Are they also to be destroyed by the present rulers of the former Soviet Union?

When are we going to see the CIA and USA government archives of this period? What about the Ukrainian fascists and Russian quislings who ran over to American and British lines after the Second World War – these documents in Washington would be interesting to read!

Why is this chapter a closed secret of the CIA?

We're certain that you know the answers.

HISTORY CANNOT BE HIDDEN FOREVER! TRUTH WILL COME OUT SOON AND MOST PEOPLE WILL BE SHOCKED BY THE COMPLICITY OF THE WEST IN THIS TERRIBLE CHAPTER OF WORLD HISTORY AND SUFFERING! □



S.M. KIROV

He was assassinated by enemies of Soviet power due to traitors that wormed themselves into the central organs of CPSU, the NKVD and other responsible positions of power. This was a sure sign that the enemies were active and proceeding to do their anti-state sabotage, murder and conspiracy.

I KNEW THAT KIROV WOULD BE ASSASSINATED

***According to OGPU-NKVD (Soviet State Security Agency)
Published in Russian in journal "Istochnik", Feb., 1994***

The assassination of S.N. Kirov is called the enigma of the century. Concerning his death, there are many versions, but the most publicized version is this one: L.V. Nikolaev – single assassin.

Second version: Was there a conspiratorial collusion?

In 1988-1990, the Supreme Court of Russia after the XX Congress of CPSU looked into this assassination that took place on 22 December 1934 and came to the conclusion that there was no organized conspiracy against Kirov in Leningrad.¹

The people that were involved in his assassination were all rehabilitated on November 30, 1990 except L. Nikolaev.

The documents below are published from the Archives in Leningrad. Documents of the cooperation with NKVD by Y. Volkova are also from the Archives. Volkova was a worker who worked together with NKVD and helped them to uncover the truth about the assassination of Kirov in Leningrad.

No. 1.

From a letter by M.N. Volkova to CC CPSU about the events that led to the assassination of S.M. Kirov

May 30, 1956

To: Central Committee CPSU

I, Volkova M.N., am giving an explanation, that in 1934 of July 24 in her apartment (Maria Morazona V.) - I came unexpectedly on a meeting of former green soldiers.² I did not participate in this meeting, only sat on the sideline, behind a curtain (the room was divided by a curtain) and while reading a book, I listened to the talk on the other side of the curtain ... of people that I never saw before. I could not understand what they were talking about, because they talked in riddles, but I understood one thing - that the talk was about the coming revolution and uprising. At 2 a.m., I left for home, my friend was walking me home, when I asked who those people were. She said that they were her friends, coming from the same district as she did, she rhymed off their names. I was at that time an undercover worker of the district OGPU, Smolnisky region.

On July 25, 1934 I went to the District Committee of OGPU to the head, Malinin, but instead of Malinin, there was Sokolev (since the last time I was there, there was a change of personnel). He welcomed me, listened, asked some questions and asked me to get to know these people more closely but not to get involved in their discussions. After that, I got to know a person called Dubinskij-Nikolaev, also known as Sadikov.³ I met this person often, on behalf of Sokolev who instructed me to go out with him, and I found out from him that in Leningrad there existed a counter-revolutionary group, headed by Kotolonov⁴ ... another group headed by Shatskim.⁵ Nikolaev told me that in

Leningrad, Kirov would be killed. I also met Zvezdochkin⁶, his friend. Two times I went with him ... to the German Consulate where he received money. Once he received 10,000 rubles, the second time 1,500 rubles. I remember an instance when we came together ... there were people who were discussing an important question. Later Nikolaev told me again that Kirov would be killed in Leningrad, while in Moscow, Molotov and Voroshilov will also be assassinated. This would be accomplished on the same day and at the same time, in order to kill all together. In Leningrad, it will be up to Shatsky and him, while in Moscow, it would be up to Smirnov, a man of average height that I saw, with a black beard.

I, on behalf of Nikolaev, delivered two letters: one to station Vyritsa to Zvezdal⁷, the other to station Podborovoye to Maslakov. These letters by my superior were copied, after that I took them to the places noted. From Vyritsa, I brought a letter to a worker in Smolny – deputy to the head of organizational section Miasnikov – a letter and 5,000 rubles to the worker in Smolny Korshunov. The head Sokolov also copied these letters, and after that I took them to the designated places. From Nikolaev, I came to know some workers working in Smolny; in charge of section Leningrad Soviet Zeltser,⁸ his deputy Miasnikov, director of car garage "ATUR" Sositskij,⁹ head of Leningrad Railway system Levin,¹⁰ his former deputy LSPO Liskovitch (he still works there now), head of the Transport of Leningrad Vlasov, Smirnov from Moscow, Rataichik from Moscow, Ambassador in England with only the

letter "U", I cannot remember his full name. This group of Kotolonov and the group Derzhavina was a diversionary group: Levanov, Smimov, Golubev, Belousov, Shuvalov and Petukhov.¹¹

In September of 1934, I was called to the Headquarters of OGPU of the Leningrad District ... a member called Druabin asked me questions, after that he took me to Baltsevich, head of the First Department. There, the investigator Petrov started to ask me questions whether I knew the date of this attempted assassination. I said yes, but I did not know the exact time. Then Baltsevich sat by me and told me: "Listen Volkova, forget all about this. Say that the counter-revolutionary group does not exist and that the assassination attempt is not going to take place, then you will have everything. If you do not want to cooperate with us, then it's the firing squad for you." I told Baltsevitch that you can shoot me if you want, but I will not take my words back. They jailed me and put me into cell 36. There, I sat for 5 days, after that, I was asked to appear before Petrov, and asked to write what he would dictate. I was to write that I'm serving as an agent, and I continue to be so adamant, they will sentence me. After that, they took me below, where they placed me many times in a steam bath, stuck needles in the soles of my feet. Then after a couple of days, they let me go, made me sign a release form and drove me outside Leningrad. After I was let go from a Mental Institution where they put me in, I went to a Plenum of the Regional Soviet, since I was a member of the Committee. After the Plenum, I went back to my

apartment. At home, I was met by Nikolaev and together with him, we went to Ligovo to a private house of a member of CC Shadruchin (that was the name I knew him by). During the auto ride, Nikolaev asked me: tell us the truth, what did you tell them about us at OGPU, but I found out that he was already informed of what transpired by Zaporozhets. I laughed. I called him crazy, and he said that if that was the truth, then the first bullet from his revolver would be for me. I said – go ahead. Our talk stopped at this junction. When we arrived in Kogovo, some people from Moscow were already there, whom Nikolaev called by name: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov. There were containers on the beach, put there from a submarine (the cargo was from Germany). These crates were taken beneath the house and while no one was looking, I managed to hide one sample that I got, which was a grenade, in order to show proof to my chief Sokolov. I also told him of my arrest, torture and other incidents. Together with Sokolov, we went to the head of SPO Gorin-Lundin and together with Gorin-Lundin, we went to the apartment where Kirov lived. Together with Sokolov, we waited in the reception room while Gorin-Lundin went to see Kirov, from there he came out and told us that everything was fine, he reported everything and after that, we went on our way.

In the evening, together with Semeniuk, member of our District Soviet, together with my brother, we went to hotel "Astoria". Semeniuk, knowing foreign languages, from Nikolaev, I found out that after drawing straws, the fate fell on Shuskij to do the killing of Kirov. Shuskij was studying the daily

route of Kirov, but decided to kill Kirov in his home, he stated. I tried to assassinate Kirov in his auto, standing on the running board, but I was taken off the machine by the Commandant of the Guards, who was his bodyguard. Shatski told me the following, after this episode: "Look at the fools, in my pockets were the orders to kill Kirov – in my sleeve was the pistol, and I showed my party credentials to the Commandant, and he let me go!"

I wrote a letter about all this to Kirov, wrote all the details, what they did with me by OGPU. Wrote about everything in detail. I also told him what was being planned for Molotov and Voroshilov in Moscow and on October 28, 1934 at 10 a.m., I sent the letter at the Head Post Office and sent it by registered mail. Copies of letters were sent to Kirov at his home address, another copy to CC CPSU in Moscow.

On October 28 at noon, they took me to a very large home, then they took me to Petrov. There, they talked to me and asked me to forget what I had seen and then Yanishevskij and Mosevich of the Section, plus secretary to Zaporozh Belousenko, Balsevitch and the head of our district of SPO Gorin-Lundin. There, I was kept overnight and later on, I was interrogated at Smolny by Korshunov (the one to whom I delivered 5,000 rubles). I was not allowed to speak, but they wrote down things that I was not aware of, and I refused to sign this document. From noon, they held me until 11 p.m., then they took me to Ligovo to see Shadrugin, where the crates that contained arms were already nowhere to be seen. From Ligovo, they took me and incarcerated me in a Mental Institution in Prjazhek.²⁰

There, I remained from October 28, 1934 to December 2, 1934. They starved me for over 17 days – they gave me only water. In November 1934, I wrote a letter to the secretary Iliin of the Lenin District of Leningrad. I again wrote everything, asked him to get that letter to Kirov. This letter was smuggled out by a nurse Anna Murashkin. On December 2, 1934, I was taken from this terrible place to Smolny. Personal secretary Iliin to Kirov came for me, Chertok and another worker from Moscow. When I arrived at Smolny in Leningrad, I was a living skeleton. Talking with me from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov and Chudov, Kadatsky²¹, Yagoda, Agranov, Postkrebyshv, Iliin and the two enemies, Kazakov and Pletnev.

I got two sandwiches and coffee to drink. After that, they showed me a photograph of Nikolaev, and asked me whether I knew him. I said I did, then they asked me his family name and patronymic, I answered all of their questions. I told them everything that I knew in detail. I also told them of the letter sent to Kirov. Voroshilov and Stalin asked me if I remembered when I sent the letter, I said on October 28, 1934 at the Head Post Office, registered mail, and a copy to my chief Sokolov. Sokolov told me at that time that it was useless to send the letter to Kirov, because his staff would not let the letter through.

From Smolny, the leaders of State sent a messenger to the post office in order to check whether I was telling the truth. When the messenger returned, he said that a letter was sent, it was registered and that it was received by the head of the

Kirov's personal office staff, by Yanishevsky.²² When Yanoshevsky was called to the office by Voroshilov and Stalin, and asked whether he received the letter addressed to Kirov, he replied that he did. Comrade Voroshilov then asked Yanoshevsky what he did with the letter, to which he replied that he tore it up. Voroshilov then asked why he had done so, to which he replied that the letter was of no importance.

When they brought in a witness, Petrov, when he saw me he got frightened at first; Voroshilov showed him where I sat – asked him whether he knew me. Of course I do, he replied. "She has sunk to a very low level, her mental condition is questionable." Comrade Voroshilov asked Petrov: if that is the case, why did you not send her to jail, if she is guilty. Petrov replied that to jail me they had no basis to do so. Voroshilov then angrily told Petrov the following: "You had no basis to jail her, but you had basis to put her into a mental institution, a healthy woman. What did you do to her, I hope that god gives all of us such memory as she has, even looking at the last five days of starvation and jailed conditions, she still remembers names, addresses and details."

At night, I was taken to a hospital called Sverdlov Hospital. I was given to the head doctor who was to be responsible for getting my health back again. On December 4, 1934, there came to the hospital representatives of the CC Commission who were responsible for looking into the assassination of Kirov, they brought with them many photographs, asked whom I knew, to keep these photos.

In the hospital, I stayed until February 23, 1935. After that, I went to see the grave of comrade Kirov. After that, I was taken to a health resort in Sestroretsk and Kislovodsk in order to regain my health.

In July of 1935, the party and government of USSR gave me an apartment and some furniture. In 1935, Iliin told me that he did not give my letter to Kirov, but instead, gave it to Medvedov. Medvedov demanded that my letter be given to him personally: "But I did not give the letter to him. Instead, I sat down and was writing the details to Moscow, wrote 8 pages and as I was writing the 9th page at Smolny, I heard a shot. I immediately went up to the third floor where Kirov's office was. Kirov was slumped on his face, while the assassin was also slumped over him, face up. The personal guard, who was guarding Kirov, committed suicide. I asked Iliin: "Whom did the assassin name?" He said no one, since he immediately took poison. Iliin told me that if OGPU would know that you are still alive, you would be dead by now. The same would happen to me as did to the personal bodyguard who in October took off the future assassin from the running board on Kirov's car. When OGPU were taking the personal guard commandant on December 2, 1936 to Smolny for questioning, after leaving Tverskaya street toward Smolny, they caused an accident and killed the personal guard commandant to Kirov.

"As far as you're concerned, we were going after you twice. I gave your letter to Chudov and members of the Government. I was given two people and told to go to your address and arrest

you. The first time, we were not successful since the people where you live told us that you do not live there. Then they called up Medvedov and asked him where and what did you do with me. After that, OGPU decided to send me to the mental institution – she will never survive there, thus our responsibilities will end there. But they knew that I must have sent other letters to other Governmental bodies and they did not know to whom I did – but if we could liquidate her, we would be asked where she had disappeared. After such reasoning on their part, Medvedov wrote a letter that I be set free, but he was not certain that I was still alive.

– Signed,
Volkova

P.S. In 1951, I was met by Kosenko, who somehow knows me from some place, and asked me how I survived this long, and whether I knew Nikolaev.

Kosenko told me, do not be so modest, I know you. I asked him what had transpired after Kirov was assassinated. He explained to me that during the day when Kirov was killed (December 1, 1934 at 10 a.m.), they were all called to Smolny by deputy director of the Section Miasnikov who told them that if it was not for Nikolaev, for whatever reason would not have killed Kirov in his office, then Miasnikov would have killed him on the second floor, and if Miasnikov was not successful on the second floor, then Sositskij would have killed him on the main floor when he was leaving Smolny. The Personal Guard of

Ministry of Internal Security was purposely taken off these floors and reassigned to another entrance, where Kirov never walked or through which doors he never left Smolny.

Kosenko is alive, working but I do not know where.

– Volkova

SHSD F. 5 On. 30m D. 141, L. 29-33. Typewritten copy.

1. This refers to the Commission of the CC CPSU established December 31, 1955 to look into the repressions by Stalin during the period from 1935-1940.

This was pushed through by Khrushchev in order to rehabilitate and bury all the details of Kirov's murder – those involved, those that were behind the scenes and to discredit the letters and the person Volkova.

2. "Greens" were the remnants of the Kulak class, white guards who hid in the forests, fighting the Red Army units. They were liquidated after the end of Civil War.

3. Nikolaev Leonid V. Born in 1904. During 1912, he changed jobs 12 times. From April 1934, he was unemployed. He killed Kirov. He was shot December 29, 1934.

4. Kotolynov Ivan I. He was a member of the anti-state group, called "New Opposition". Arrested December 5, shot December 29, 1934.

5. Statskij Nikolai N. Born in 1899. Friend and sympathizer of Trotsky. Non-party engineer. Arrested December 5 and shot December 29, 1934.

6. Zvezdov Vasili I. (Zvezdochkin). Born in 1902. Member of the opposition group. Arrested December 8th and shot December 29, 1934.

7. Miasnikov Nikolai P. Born in 1900. Member of Trotsky faction and intrigue. Also arrested and shot on December 29, 1934.

8. No material on him.

9. Sositskij Lev I. Born in 1899. Member of Trotsky's conspiracy. Also arrested and shot at the same time as others who were tried by the courts for anti-state conspiracy and assassination of Kirov.

10. Levi Victor S. Born 1897. Member of the leadership of Trotsky's faction. Arrested and shot.

11. These are the family names of members of the "Greens" group of bandits.

12. Driapkin G.I. Born 1897. In charge of the 2nd department of NKVD

in Leningrad.

13. Baltsevitch – head of the 2nd department of NKVD in Leningrad.
14. Petrov G.A. Born 1904. Chief of 2nd department of NKVD, Leningrad.
15. Volkova in 1934 names Karpinskij.
16. Zaporozhets (Garkavy) Ivan V. Born 1885. Ukrainian. Head of a section of NKVD in Leningrad. Arrested in December 1934 and shot in December of 1937.
17. Nikolaev was not in Ligov at that time.
18. Head of SPO and also of NKVD from 1934 in Leningrad.
19. Nikolaev was held in the home of S.M. Kirov. He was liberated by the decision of Gubin, the head of Leningrad NKVD.
20. In 1934, Volkova was in the hospital Obukhovska.
21. Chudov M.S. Second secretary of Leningrad District ACP[B].
22. Volkova made a mistake regarding D.Y. Yanoshevsky, deputy not head of NKVD of Leningrad District.
23. No information on this.

OUR COMMENT:

This document was condensed for space reasons – Editors.

This document continues with documents written by people who looked into this tragedy. They were writing in 1956 after Stalin died and Krushchev started to cover his tracks by having documents 'found' that tried to cast doubt on Volkova and her documentation. They tried to make her out as mentally unstable.

These documents were marked "Strictly Secret", sent by KGB to CC CPSU as requested by Krushchev and then by Brezhnev. These "top secret" documents went to all top CC members and in one document, they even had Volkova's daughter write a condemnation of her that she was neurotic and not of stable character.

Judging by these documents, a reader cannot but ask the following questions:

1. NKVD documents, even by the operation "cover up" instituted by Khrushchev, admit that Volkova met Stalin Voroshilov and others of the Central Committee. Why would Voroshilov and Stalin meet with Volkova, making certain that she was under the care of doctors and sent to a sanatorium to get better after her torture, if what was reported by her was not the truth?

2. When the investigators and the conspirators in the killing of Kirov were tried, sentenced and shot by the highest court of the land, there must have been irrefutable proof of this conspiracy.

3. Why were the orders given to the personal guard of NKVD guarding Kirov to move to another part of the building in Smolny, Leningrad?

4. If Volkova was not telling the truth, why was she kidnapped, tortured, put away in a mental institution, as opposed to being tried by the Central Committee or NKVD for whom she worked? Why was she not sentenced to jail for "provocation" regarding the death of Kirov?

5. If all of the documents available in the archives regarding this case were "full proof" of the insanity of Volkova, why were these documents held secret until 1994?

6. Why were all the conspirators in the case of the killing of Kirov all "rehabilitated" after Khrushchev came to power? Are we led to believe that it was only a single "assassin" that killed Kirov? Kirov was NOT in a public place – he was not in a street, he was not riding in an automobile – he was in his office at Smolny which was guarded day and night by NKVD and his personal guard.

7. Why did his personal commandant-guard commit suicide after Kirov was killed? A person does not commit suicide if he was not somehow involved in this conspiracy to assassinate Kirov.

8. If Volkova was "insane", if she was "unstable" and if she was that guilty and because of her, "numerous innocent people were shot", then we must ask this: Why did not Khrushchev get her arrested and tried for falsifying accusations and have her sentenced?

She died a terrible death in 1971 in agony, according to her daughter. Mental patients do not die in such a way unless something is done to them – which, in this case, is very suspicious.

As far as finding out details of her death in 1971, researchers were told that the "case is closed".

9. Why did it take 43 years to make these facts known to a very narrow circle of Russian intellectuals? Why are not these documents published openly for the general public? You would think that if the powers that be now feel so sure about their explanation of the murder of Kirov is correct and irrefutable proof is that it was just one person that planned and carried out the assassination – they would proclaim this to the whole world, and not just to a narrow circle of people that now serve Yeltsin and his clique!

10. The details known by Volkova, the names and addresses she remembered – all these are not ravings of a mental lunatic!

It seems that some sections of the personnel of NKVD were part of the plan in the assassination of Kirov and many others at that time of history of USSR. These were NOT random acts! These were well organized and financed actions, do doubt about it at all.

11. *The events that took place since Gorbachev came to power and now Yeltsin, indicate very concretely that enemies were hidden inside the communist party and did their anti-Soviet work, including murder.*

CONCLUSION:

It seems that every agent, provocateur, criminal, traitor that was uncovered, tried and sentenced during the time of Lenin and Stalin has now been rehabilitated first by Khrushchev, then by Gorbachev and now, by Yeltsin!

Who is going to try the present traitors, butchers and saboteurs?

Can our future generations, looking at this era, will they have any doubt as to the criminal acts that these present-former Soviet leaders perpetrated? The facts are so clear and damning that NO ONE in their right mind could defend these modern Judases! □

CENTRAL COMMITTEE REVEALS GROVELLING BEFORE FOREIGN COUNTRIES

*From CC AUP[B] Archives
How the "Honour Courts" were Established in the
Central Organs of the State*

Election of "Honour Courts" in the central ministries and agencies of the Soviet government during 1947-1948 were held during a very all inclusive campaign to develop and make stronger Soviet Patriotism against "undercover influence of the West". At the initiative of Stalin, this process was carried out by the Secretariat of CC AUC[B] after its unanimous adoption by A.A. Zhdanov, M.A. Suslov and A.A. Kuznetsov.

The prototype "Honour Courts" by the Officers Corps which was meant to instill into the Officers loyalty, patriotism and any officer that did not meet these standards was dismissed from the army. These "courts" were elected throughout the Army, from the top echelons to the lowest ranks, usually from 5-7 people for a period of one year service. The main emphasis was to enhance discipline, military preparedness of the Army.

From 1947, these "Honour Courts" were elected in 82 Ministries, governmental agencies and in the Secretariat of the CC of the party. In this way, everyone from top to bottom was judged equally by their peers; there was no official exemption from this discipline and dedication to the party, ministries and

the army. This idea took on a character of dedication and patriotism in all of the regions of the country.

These "Honour Courts" lasted until the end of 1949. These documents are being published for the first time, in order that you can judge and realize the atmosphere of those times, knowing full well the coming of the Great Patriotic War.

NOTE: These "Honour Courts" were adopted by the Politbureau of CC AUC[B] on March 29, 1937. This document, listing the points of procedure which was the document which governed "Honour Courts" was signed by J.V. Stalin, Chairman of Soviet of Ministers and by A. Zhdanov, Secretary of the CC AUC[B].

This is the number of archival document: RSHIDNI F. 167, Op. D 1064, L. 32, 49-51. Podlinnik (copy). Typewritten document.

REPORT BY SECRETARY CC AUC[B] A.A. KUZNETSOV AT THE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE CC AUC[B] REGARDING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ELECTIONS OF THE "HONOUR COURTS" – SEPTEMBER 29, 1947¹

Comrades, as you are aware, upon the decision of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of our party, in all of the Ministries and Central Organs and Army, there are being elected "Honour Courts".

The question as to why these "Honour Courts" are being elected was the result after the Central Committee of the party uncovered remains of anti-state personnel and hangers-on of capitalism, even among our own intelligentsia, remnants of bowing to western Imperialism, its culture and its reactionary

policies. Therefore, these "Courts of Honour" have the task to raise the spirit of patriotism in the governmental bodies and agencies in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, and the adoption of an attitude as servants of the government and gaining people's trust.

These Courts have the task to uncover and get rid from their positions in the Government those who flaunt the laws of the land and do harm to the working class.

In a secret letter of the CC of the party regarding the question of professors Kluevoj and Rosskin, the task of the Courts is as follows:

"Detailed analyses of the harmful work in the political-educational field should be handled by these Courts of Honour ... (re read the text of the charges against them)"

These courts delve into the anti-patriotic, anti-state and anti-peoples activities, especially with leading governmental workers, operative and educational personnel of the Ministries of USSR and Central apparatus, if these charges do not fall under our criminal activity laws.

Judging by the effect and results of these Honour Courts as they conducted their work in the Ministries of Health and Education, showed the correctness of the decision by the Central Committee of the party. We can report that after these Honour Courts went to work in all of the Ministries, we have seen the results - better work, attitude, dedication, discipline, understanding and dedication to the State and its defense in the interests of the State.

The Central Committee in its document (letter), and we can already call this letter a historical document, predicted that the

question of professors Kluev and Roskin is not a single instance, not just an odd occurrence, but a serious moral-political attitude of some of our intellectuals, especially those working in the sphere of culture. Now, we can say that we have many instances in the leadership of people in charge of our cultural development as was found out now. Let me enumerate some examples.

Our Central Committee has uncovered the slavish attitude and cooperation with and detrimental dealings with foreign powers by the former director of the Hydrometeorological Complex – Fedorov. Let me just say the following: that all of our materials which we utilize in the sphere of hydrometeorological work, in this sphere also top secret inventions and research documents, found themselves in the hands of the British and Americans; besides this, English and American agents were permitted to work and direct their activities without hindrance, as if they were in their own home. Only the following facts show the extent of the activity of these agents: I'm just giving a sketchy analysis of what transpired between this Director and the American Military Attache and the Naval Attache – the director and these attaches met 88 times, the Director of the hydroelectrical and meteorological enterprises from USA met with the Director – 55 times; employees of the British and American Embassies met with the Director 41 times; with Cloyd, 20 times, etc., etc.

This came to such a point that the Director of our Ministry had built a special secure office, where these foreign spies

behaved as if this Ministry and enterprise belonged to them and besides this, they found out all of our secrets. On top of this, the American and British spies were given documents which were marked by the Ministry as "TOP SECRET", only for the "Research Staff". Systematically, there followed letters, schematic detailed drawings, analyses of projects, plus the secret directives and plans of the Central Committee regarding future self defence projects. By the decision of the Central Committee and Soviet of Ministers, Fedorov was dismissed from his post and his rank as General was taken away from him and he will be tried by the "Honour Court".

In the Ministry of Agriculture, the Director of the All Union Institute of plant-growing research, Shlykov sent to a foreign agricultural expert – at that time in Moscow – a couple of years old research samples of alfalfa. In his letter to this American, he promised to send him the researched seeds of great value to the Soviet State. In this, he was not successful, he was caught beforehand.

In the Ministry of Transport (railways), Professor Popov, trying to make an impression in foreign countries, published in an American journal an article on the "Theory of Orthopedic Focus". This article has a very important analyses for our country in doing designs for transportation railway cars on our railways system. In this article, all the research that our state paid for was given free of charge to the Americans.

I will not go into details about what we found in the Ministry of Oil and Gas, in the Forest Ministry, in the Academy

of Sciences, in many Ministries and establishments of the research and technical spheres.

I will also not dwell on the details of this "slavish bending of the knee" in front of foreign powers by some sections of our intelligentsia. They were outlined in detail in the Secret Letter that you received from the Central Committee of the party.

This document outlines the methods, the strategy of bringing up our intelligentsia who are, in many ways, still under the illusion that foreign know-how and system are better than ours, therefore, they feel more obliged to serve the foreign masters than our Motherland which supports them in research and good living conditions. This document outlines the tasks and methods of making our work stronger in the political-party apparatus and in the ministries and agencies all across the country.

In order for us to accomplish these tasks to uproot the vestiges of this undermining activity, to deepen the love and patriotism in the ranks of our civil and party workers, to enhance and let our culture flourish as Soviet culture and not a copy of the Western mode of culture, and also to instill in the party organs this feeling, starting from its higher organ of power - the Central Committee.

What is it that is needed to accomplish this in our party apparatus overall, and in particular, in the Central Committee apparatus?

It is absolutely necessary to liquidate in the apparatus of the Central Committee the big problems in our practical work,

that our workers must be of the highest calibre of dedication, knowledge and patriotism.

Our party apparatus is gearing itself to accomplish this task. We must do away with these people, who in a position of power and decision making, are not fulfilling their patriotic duty. Everything depends on the work of our Central Committee and its cadres, therefore, we must cleanse our ranks of these remnants, who under the party label are doing great harm to our Motherland.

Therefore, the "Honour Courts" in the Central Committee apparatus will play a very important role in enhancing the prestige, in making our work effective. I'm certain that this meeting of the CC CPSU apparatus will adopt the policies as presented. (applause)

Our Central Committee is willing and able to follow this programme and to defend the programme against any deviation or lax attitude. My task is not to praise what the CC apparatus is doing, had done or will do in the future. My task is to expose shortcomings and we must also realize the fact that the Central Committee apparatus is also not without sins. You also must realize that we teach our cadres to recognize their own mistakes. We have enough evidence on hand to state that the Central Committee apparatus has many members whose work is anti-patriotic, anti-state and outright dangerous for our future. Their attitude and method of work, after it is exposed, must not only rest on this alone, we must teach them and show them the terrible consequences of their work. The mistaken idea

among people in our apparatus is that since THEY ARE now working in the Central Committee, as communists, their job is to look after others, not to criticize themselves or be criticized by others. These comrades are absolutely wrong. No one is above criticism! These people, as all of us, should understand that it is a great honour to be chosen to work in the Central Committee of the party. All members of the CC CPSU must be real and solid patriots of our Motherland, a picture to others of dedication and struggle for ideals of our state, morally, disciplined, dedication to our people – in other words, be a dedicated communist. Every one of us must be an example to all members in the CC CPSU, all ministries and organizations of our country.

Unfortunately, many people working in the party apparatus look at their job as only "civil servants", and working in the CC CPSU as ordinary work; as a must, having sat out his or her 8 hour day and left his or her obligation. These people forget that they are working in the highest organ of the country, not just civil servants. To these comrades, working in the Central Committee is not an honour – they do not feel excitement as they climb the steps into the party building. They do not feel excited that not only they are working for the party, but in the Central Committee of that party.

We must absolutely liquidate this problem within our ranks. We must replace these hangers-on, these "civil servants" whose job is just to sit and not think, just listen and not suggest.

Everything depends on the method and quality of the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee: economic and

industrial growth, work in all other sectors of our economy, cultural and military – that is why we must have people that are dedicated, loyal, patriotic and not involved in anti-state activities.

Our party has always led the fight for purity in our ranks, working in the government should be looked upon as an honourable duty, not just a place to sit and while away the time! We must control ourselves, control and teach others and not let any mistakes slip by without trying to discuss and correct that mistake. We cannot just let pass a mistake, no matter how small it might be, because in the long run, the whole party will suffer in the eyes of the people. Let me just cite a few known cases of our lax attitude to events that happened in the CC apparatus.

There was a brochure written and published called, "Six years with Vladimir Lenin" by Gill. This brochure has caused great harm to learning the historical lessons in bringing up the working class, because this brochure is falsifying this history. We certainly feel dismayed that our CC publication department would allow this brochure to be published without reading its contents, even though the decision of the CC AUP[B] of August 5, 1938, forbade the publishing of such materials without having the CC informed about the contents.

Here is what the CC stated after this brochure came out:

"Gospolitizdat has allowed a terrible mistake to transpire in having published such books as that of Gill and this shows the factual irresponsibility of our section in allowing such anti-Lenin materials to be published."

Deputy of agitation in CC CAUC(B) Morozov, consultant Zinoviev and head of the propaganda section Kovalev took this matter very lightly and thus, have allowed great harm to be done.

In the Institute of Marx-Engels Lenin, there is a fundamental way of publishing important works about Lenin and permission is given to publish after a manuscript has been reviewed before publishing.

We must characterize such mistakes as anti-Soviet and anti-people provocations, because comrades present that still have qualms about these events should be discussed by the "Courts of Honour" and these comrades should also realize that these kinds of mistakes are accumulating.

Let us take another example. Not too long ago, the Ministry of State Control uncovered actions by the Northern Research Institute which is responsible for studying the northern regions around the North Pole. Secret research materials were sold to the Americans. Americans received over 2,000 books, brochures, data and research materials with concrete results of our research in the last 25 years of our labour and expense. And you know now how the Americans are studying and showing keen interest in the northern regions of our country, just across the North Pole. All that we accumulated by our scientists about the North in the last 25 years – all this research material was given to Americans. I will not go into details of these documents.

Well, if you comrades, workers of the Central Committee of the party, who are responsible for controlling the actions and responsibilities, and if most of you felt the dedication and

responsibility for the party and country, if you would be very nervous that these secrets, this costly research that the party pays for, you could have in time prevented this sabotage to take place if you were more diligent and dedicated. But, unfortunately, we were lax in this case.

Let me cite a few examples in our internal party control.

Not being more diligent, more dedicated, being lax in our control of our district and provincial party committees, has led to the growth of membership without proper analyses and the question of quality over quantity is overlooked.

We must also admit that amongst the apparatus of CC AUC[B], we allowed behaviour and method of work that is impermissible.

Two examples: A lecturer in the propaganda section of the CC, Kulagin, did not appreciate the high position, the honour, and at the end of last month was arrested by the militia in a drunken state, naked and robbed in a Moscow apartment. Let us ask – what kind of worker is this in the Central Committee?

Or, an inspector of Cadres School to CC, Smimov. When he was in Minsk on CC business, he tied himself to a woman of ill repute and was behaving in such a manner that the Minsk comrades of Internal Security arrested him and took him to jail.

I could cite many facts, but I feel that these are enough.

Another problem is that workers of the CC apparatus do not seriously consider the importance of guarding secret documents of CC in their possession. Inspector of Internal Politics in CC, Shkurov, lost secret documents in his office. Another

inspector of Cadres Suslaev in moving from one apartment to another, left in his desk drawer a secret document, which, after a month, was found by the commander of guards for CC AUP[B].

Here's another example. On August 28th, there was a control into the method of safeguarding state secrets. On top of the desk of comrade Romanov, a complete schematic map, detailed analyses of all oil and gas deposits on the territory of USSR, their storage facilities, transport points. This document showed exactly the locations, the production facilities of all of our resources and all of the railway connections and transport routes for these natural resources.

Since the work of the CC and its Ministries are responsible for the economic life of the Soviet Union and the policy that we are following, it is absolutely necessary to understand that its very nature, this work, these materials, these directives, these plans, are secret. Every worker MUST understand this when working in the CC, and should be dedicated, not loose-tongued, and should not blab about state secrets. We must always remember that Bolshevik dedication is our most effective weapon in our struggle with the enemy, the most effective law of our Soviet people.

During this conference, we must tell our workers that everything that was written in the Secret Letter by CC of January 18, 1935 "Lessons of events, tied in to the assassination of comrade Kirov", July 29, 1936, the document "About terroristic activities of the Trotsky-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary block", and "Lack of control in issuing and safeguarding Party Cards

and rules to follow", issued May 13, 1935. Also, we should refer to the July 29, 1941 "Directives of Soviet Peoples Control of CC AUCP[B]".

The main aim of these letters-directives was to enhance Bolshevik awareness. During the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee, comrade Stalin dwelt on this in detail in 1937. Comrade Stalin stated that bourgeois governments, no matter in what position or situation they found themselves, whether in a friendly or adversarial situation, always send their spies into each other's countries. Therefore, we cannot be blind to the fact that these capitalist countries will send into our country fewer spies than they send into their allies. It is exactly the opposite - these capitalist countries send into our country 2-3 times more spies.

At the present time, the countries of America and Britain are more and more showing their reactionary policies towards us. America is doing everything in its power to dedicate all of its might against the Soviet Union. Imperialist powers - stated Stalin - are not interested in the fact that the USSR should be able to stand on its own feet and get the opportunity to catch up with or go ahead of the most advanced capitalist states, thus they use all of their might to hamper our growth in the international and internal spheres. In the USSR, we liquidated the exploiting classes - that is why Imperialism is doing all in its power to utilize, undermine, employ for its cause our workers in the CC who are not as dedicated as they should be, and who become easy targets for the foreign secret services.

Therefore, the question of dedication, patriotism and Bolshevik awareness at this time is extremely important.

Among our workers in the Central Committee are comrades who, by their own nature, must tell someone about the work that they are doing, to get the news and decisions that are made in secret known to their friends, thus showing their knowledge and importance. They tell our secrets to their wives, she tells her neighbour, the neighbour tells another friend – thus the secret decision becomes a well known fact to a wide circle of people. This was the case when the Ministry Soviet of Ministers decided to raise prices on some goods. The decision was secret, but because of family gossip, soon the whole of Moscow became aware of the decision.

I do not want to point fingers at anyone here in particular, but let me say what Muscovites are saying – do you want to know some news – go and visit the district of Mozhajku (loud laughter in the hall).

In our Ministries, there is a certain section of workers who, once per week or two weeks, come to the Central Committee of the party in order to get the latest “news”. This is to find out what is our international attitude. These are the most rabid gossipers. While our workers in the CC apparatus, somehow do not see this, they talk and talk about everything.

About people who behave not by their brains, but with their tongues, in his own way, comrade Stalin said: “There are people who have a tongue, they know how to use it and what to say. These people are unusual. But there are also people who just

follow their tongues, the tongue controls their brains – these people are the rule.” (laughter in the hall). People who let their tongues govern their brains do not know themselves that they are blabbing things that eventually will do great harm to our Motherland.

We do have such people in our Central Committee, must keep in mind the fact that foreign secret services are always trying to get to the heart of our party – to get their agents both internal and external – into the Central Committee. If the foreign secret services cannot get into their net a worker of the CC, then they try through their family or friends.

Here are some examples. In these examples, I will name families. I will not judge them here now, but they were in the employ of our Central Committee and are now expelled.

At the beginning of this year, a student studying foreign languages, Kharlamova, who was tied in with foreign secret agents, young woman, she, in her mother's home, got acquainted with an American spy, Tokarev, working in the Central Committee of the party. Later, it became known that Tokarev drank with this spy and talked. He did not report this to the CC. Why did the foreign secret service get interested? Because he was a nice looking man, it would be a pleasure to get to know him? No. It was necessary through this worker to find out what was happening in the CC.

Another example. In the CC apparatus, there worked a certain Kalinin, who, through his sister, was acquainted with a woman who was in the employ of American secret service. This Kalinin met with this spy regularly, even sharing the same

living quarters. Can we allow an employee, a communist in the service of Central Committee, to work in the CC any longer? He was removed, but what will happen to him when the Supreme Court meets, I do not know.

In our CC, there worked a certain Chervintsev. He had contact, not with a low ranking British spy, but with the top Secretary of the British Embassy, while hiding this fact from the Central Committee.

Not too long ago, arrested after being uncovered as an agent of American secret services, director of foreign language publishing house, before that he held the rank of director of Ministry of Propaganda (Information) – Suchkov.⁶ His anti-Soviet feelings were somehow overlooked and he then boldly got in touch with American spy agency and was taken on as a spy. Travelling to America and back while working in the USSR Embassy in Washington, he was giving secrets to the Americans over many years.

I would like to have an answer from comrade Alexandrov and comrade Shcherbakov. How was a person of this calibre raised and promoted into the CC in a very responsible position?

Let me just elaborate on this person's personal history. Suchkov, born in 1917, studied until 1941. No working or communist experience at all. He joined the party in 1941, did not work well in the party, did not fulfill any party function. What can we gather from this? A person with these qualifications should not be a candidate to work in the Central Committee! Is this not correct?

(Voices from audience: Correct!)

Because he knew some foreign languages, is that the only criteria to have him employed in the CC? He was hired as a specialist. Comrade Alexandrov often uses this word "specialist" when we ask him at the politbureau of the CC. He defends his work by arguing that in "My department, there are 250 specialists".

I ask, since when do we hire communists for the CC apparatus who call themselves "specialists" and not Communists-Bolsheviks?

Even 57 years ago, even now, we should understand that every Communist is equal – there are no ranks or structures. Dedication to our task should be the only criteria from top to bottom.

What was very understandable to Marxists over 60 years ago, it seems is not understood by some Communists at the present time!

Comrade Stalin showed us, as did Lenin in his days, on what principles we should base ourselves. There are three principles as stated by Stalin.

FIRST: it is necessary for a worker, whom we are accepting to work in the Central Committee, to know well the work of the party and above all, the work in the districts, provinces and republics.

SECOND: should be a Marxist trained and schooled person.

THIRD: should know the politics of our party, but amongst us, unfortunately, there are comrades who do not know the

politics of work but think that they are above the rest and try to teach them their own methods of work, based on personal loyalty but not loyalty to the collective and policy.

Looking at all of what I have said, should we not look inside our CC department and see where we have these "specialists" whom we should try to teach to become real communist workers, if they do so desire, have them replaced and assigned to lower work in the party apparatus, so that they would learn the workings of the party at the grassroots level. For others, we should find other positions. I feel that you will agree with this.

(Yes, that's the way to proceed.)

As we found out later on, Suchkov was promoted to higher party posts, because he wrote documents-reports for Alexander and was a personal friend.

Let us return to Suchkov as an example for others. Was there an opportunity earlier to uncover his work, or was he such a smooth operator, masked enemy, that it was hard to uncover his evil deeds? It is obvious now, that there were many facts that pointed to him being uncovered by us.

FIRST: In 1943, the journal "Foreign Literature" was banned. Suchkov was the Chief Editor. The reasons for closing this publication, undertaken by the CC CPSU, was that Suchkov started to praise to high heavens American bourgeois literature, published it, as opposed to other progressive literary world works. This journal was closed on the initiative of the late Alexander Shcherbakov⁹ who wrote to the CC regarding the

necessity of closing this journal: "This journal publishes only Anglo-American articles, is very one-sided. The journal does not publish critical articles about the American-British literary works at all. The journal took a line of complete solidarity with Anglo-American role in the fight against Germany, diminishing the importance of the Soviet Union and its Red Army altogether. American policies and system have been idealized and this journal has become the spearhead of Anglo-American propaganda in our country."

This was the analysis and concrete decision by the Central Committee. During his trial, Suchkov stated among other things in his defense that: "foreign literature circles, knowing my love of their writings and policies, they utilized this fact to push through very reactionary articles. This journal was widely utilized by foreign secret service spies in our midst during the beginning of the war. An extensive article by British John R ... (he reads this article).

Do you not agree that it is enough to take Suchkov from his post as Editor and also to expel him from the ranks of the party and consequently, the CC?

After this fact, Shcherbakov was requested to hire this Suchkov to CC. Shcherbakov was adamant against this. But these enemies utilized the death of comrade Shcherbakov and accepted Suchkov to an important position in the apparatus of the Central Committee. These were Alexander, and Kozakov.

What have we allowed to be done in our central party organizations?

After we took Suchkov from his Editorship, in September 1944, Secretary of Moscow organization Sokolov (deputy to Khrushchev – Editors) gives the following characteristics about Suchkov: “Worked as editor of journal ‘International Literature’, behaved well at work”! It is time now to ask Sokolov – why did he write such a request about Suchkov to the CC? Our workers in the CC read this request and saw that it was lies, and they did not do anything about this.

For people like Shcherbakov (he is now removed from his post), friendship was the primary and only reason for recommending Suchkov – nothing else.

SECOND: Suchkov had open dealings with foreigners, family gatherings with foreign agents present, correspondents, hotel visits, parties, etc., etc.

If his party organization had at least taken some interest in what Suchkov was doing, a question would have been asked right away as to why and what for all of these meetings. Party organizations are not correct when they stop being interested in their fellow communist, his friends. I feel that this is incorrect.

THIRD: Defending the Trotskyite Kopelev.¹¹ Suchkov was responsible for getting Kopelev liberated from jail when he was arrested in 1946. Suchkov, it was found out, studied together with Kopelev in the Lenin Institute and formed an anti-Soviet conspiracy even at that Institute. Deciding to liberate his school friend, Suchkov writes letters to Prosecutor Afabasiev. The Prosecutor called Suchkov in his office and told him that he is

not doing the correct thing and said that this document he will send to the Central Committee to comrade Malenkov.¹²

This document was hidden from the Central Committee. By whom? For what reason?

FOURTH: Suchkov's anti-Soviet activity was known by some comrades, but they kept quiet.

FIFTH: Suchkov, using his "friendship" with members of the CC departments, visited them regularly, found out the discussions and decisions made by the CC, then he met with his American agents and told them everything. Thanks to this method, he found out who were our workers at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, whom we were sending to work there – thus giving Americans the opportunity of knowing their names and staging provocations, thus having our Soviet Embassy workers expelled. This is why our people were thrown out, because their work assignments were known to U.S. secret service.

These elements, like Kozakov and others gave secrets to Americans about our Atomic production facilities. From comrades Egorin and Vladykin, they found out about the hunger, due to weather conditions, in Moldavia. Talking about this between themselves, Suchkov happened to listen in and thus, the Americans knew everything.

These facts should point to the necessity of awareness in the apparatus of the Central Committee.

We must always hide our national secrets, as other countries do. Those that cannot hide these secrets can become the tool of

doing tremendous harm to the state. We must always remember that foreign spy agencies are trying with all their might to utilize all manner of provocations, entrapment, friendship, loose life habits of some of our CC workers.

These are some facts, comrades. From them, we see what must be done, to enhance the awareness of our CC apparatus assigning ourselves the task of guarding our state. We are confident that these "Courts of Honour" of the CC to which today you will elect your representatives, will help to enhance our vigilance and awareness. We must utilize constructive criticism and self criticism in our work, that this criticism will prevail more and more, louder and louder in our work.

I feel that you comrades, will do everything in your power to fulfill the necessary task that is before us, that our Central Committee personnel will work in the methods that were prescribed and stated by comrade Stalin. (Loud applause).

RSKIDNI.F. 17m Op. 121, D. 616, L. 6-28 (Copy - typewritten).

1. This is according to the stenographic report from the Conference which was attended also by comrade Stalin.
2. This is the secret letter of CC ACP[B] about the trial of Kluyev and Roskin, June 5-7, 1947.
3. GILL S.K. (1888-1966) personal chauffeur to V.I. Lenin, the author of this book.
4. Narkomat (Ministry) of State Security, established in 1940. This Ministry was abolished in 1957 (by Khrushchev).
5. Section of Mozhajski Highway, where most of the workers of CC CPSU lived from 1940-1960.
6. SUCHKOV B.L. Was rehabilitated by Khrushchev in 1955-1956.
7. Alexandrov G.F. (1908-1961) member of CC since 1928, Philosopher, Academician. Alternate in CC CPSU 1940-1947, Head of the propaganda section of CC CPSU.

8. October 23-24, 1947. The "Court of Justice" expelled them from the party. In 1955-1956, they were admitted again by Khrushchev.

9. SHCHERBAKOV A.S. (1901-1945) General, member of CC Politbureau, was Head of the Political Commissariat of the Red Army.

10. Shkiriatov M.F. (1883-1954) member of CPSU since 1906, member of CC and Chairman of Control Commission.

11. Kopelev Lev Z. Born in 1912, writer, publicist.

12. Makenkov G.M. (1902-1988) member of Politbureau of CC CPSU, was member of the Defense Staff of USSR. One of three rulers after the death of Stalin.

13. Egorin A.N. (1896-1958) member of Soviet Academy of Sciences, Deputy to Minister of Propaganda.

OUR COMMENT:

Those of us who still cannot get over the shock of the temporary demise of the Soviet Union, and who still are trying to rationalize the reasons for its collapse ... this document should give you the answer.

Time frame was 1947-1948. Devastating war was over. Tremendous losses had to be overcome. The country was in ruins. The Cold War was at its zenith. Spies, agents, sabotage, diversions and other activities were in full swing, trying to accomplish what fascism was not able to do!

There were still enemies inside the USSR, inside the CPSU as can be seen by this document! What would you, as one of the members of the CPSU, have done in order to safeguard the victory that cost over 27 million lives to win?

The answer was these "Honour Courts" which were meant to make the country safe from internal and external subversion. Every country tries to safeguard itself from harm! Only natural and expected.

This document is only a segment of the dangers that faced the Soviet people.

Communists, especially those that are leading the country, were expected to be loyal, devoted, patriotic and "real communists", not just card-carrying party members.

These "Honour Courts" obviously were needed; they tried to do what was necessary in order to fight the subversion that was mainly sponsored, supported, urged, financed and guided by the Western imperialist powers. Keep in mind, that only two years before, USSR and Western powers were Allies in the struggle to the death with fascism!

Allan Dulles, the CIA chieftain, a bitter enemy of socialism and Soviet Union in particular, knew the weaknesses of some people and took advantage of this fact. Plans that CIA hatched were followed patiently page by page, events by events, until they were successful.

The modern JUDASES now in former Soviet Union are just the next generation of traitors that are mentioned in this exposé.

This document we feel helps to clarify the present situation, because it relates to what transpired. It is all inter-connected and should not be looked upon as a separate entity.

Look at the Civil Service in our "democratic" countries. It does not matter which party is in power – the Civil Servants keep on working for the given government. That is why the stress was put on the Communists, whose ideals, ideology are, or should be, with a Communist Government, looked upon not just as a job, but to fulfill your dedication as a Communist. That was what was, and should be, demanded of Communists.

Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin all stated this TRUTH! □

DISSIDENT ELEMENTS IN THE HANDS OF GERMAN REICH INTELLIGENCE

From Personal Archives of J.V. Stalin.

Published in Russian in Journal "Istochnik", March 1994

SPEECH BY J.V. STALIN AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

In the personal archives of J.V. Stalin, there was found an unedited typewritten stenographic copy of his speech at the enlarged session of the Defense Council of the Ministry of Defense. This meeting took place on June 2, 1937 in the Kremlin and meetings of the members of the Politbureau from June 1-4. Aside from the permanent staff, there were present 116 Army officers and commissars from all across the USSR and its Central Command. It is necessary to understand the fact that on June 1, 1937, members of the Army Command were already arrested as "conspirators".

All of the participants of this extraordinary meeting were aware and informed about the charges against people such as Tukhachevsky, Yakir and others – thus, the atmosphere of this session was very tense.

During the first day of the session, Minister of Defense Voroshilov spoke about the "Uncovering by NKVD of counter-revolutionary activities in the armed forces of USSR". Voroshilov reported that this grouping of enemies was already long in existence and these same people were in the top echelons of leading figures governing the country.

"We knew that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and others were close family friends, but from this family friendship to counter-revolutionary activity is far. Last year, in my apartment, there arrived Tukhachevsky and started to blame me, Budyonny in the presence of Stalin, Molotov and others, that I am grouping around me a loyal following and am proceeding to lead a political struggle against everyone else. Then, on the next day, Tukhachevsky repudiated everything that he had accused me of. Comrade Stalin at that time said, 'that time has come to do away with these personal attacks and call a special session of the Political Bureau of the CC CPSU, and at that meeting, to come to grips with this problem and settle it once for all time'. At this session, we again went over the details of the accusations against these members and came to the same conclusion."

STALIN: Did he take back all of his accusations?

VOROSHILOV: Yes, he repented, although the group of Yakir and Uborevich were very antagonistic to me and the CC CPSU. Uborevich kept quiet, but Gamarnik and Yakir went at me with tooth and nail.

Voroshilov in conclusion demanded cleansing the Army from people of this calibre, for the future of the Motherland. He also mentioned that of course in this "cleansing", we might suffer, but it has to be done. Voroshilov admitted also that:

"I, as a People's Commissar ... must admit that I not only did not see or realize what these elements were preparing for our country, but even when our state security organs

showed me irrefutable proof of people such as Gorbachev, Feldman and others (Gorbachev was a family relative of the present Gorbachev – Editors) ... I did not want to believe, that these people, working with us could be capable of performing such terrible criminality. I am to blame in this very much. But I was not aware of this, no news of this was told me by people that are in charge of these questions ... I repeat again, that no one signalled to me or to the Central Committee about what these elements were preparing, that inside our Command, we have this counter-revolutionary conspiracy!"

On June 2, 1937, during this Military Session, Stalin spoke, and went into details of the conspiracy that was uncovered by the NKVD and the evidence that these elements were financed by German fascists.

On June 11, 1937, at the Special Military Court of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, the guilty were sentenced. They were charged with trying to undermine the country for benefit of a foreign enemy, sabotage, and treason. Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Yeideman, Feldman, Primakov, Putna were sentenced to death by a firing squad.

Below, we publish the text of J.V. Stalin, without any corrections, abridgment or editing. This is according to the stenographic records of the trials from the Archives.

STENOGRAPHIC RECORDING BY THE SECRETARY OF THIS SESSION

Speech by J.V. Stalin at the Enlarged meeting of the Defense Council of the Ministry of Defense – June 2, 1937

STALIN:

Comrades, about this, that a military-political plot was working against the Soviet State, I know now that no one can question these charges. The fact is that the admission of these conspirators themselves and the facts gathered by our people working in our Soviet Army, such an enormous mass of evidence, such numbers of comrades from all over the USSR who testified as to the work of these traitors, that everything points to the military-political undermining of the Soviet State, stimulated and financed by German fascism.

They agitated the people: some villains-cranks, and former landowners.

But these attacks in themselves did not do anything. For this, in order to completely eradicate this behaviour, we must uproot them and to do this, we must understand why and what for these people did what they did. We must take steps so that in future, these roots do not grow again. Steps must be taken to learn from this.

I did not want to dwell on this question as such, but the situation demands that I say something.

First of all, let us take a look at the people that were heading the military-political conspiracy. I do not mention those that were already sentenced – I am taking those that were just recently at liberty. Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin – these were the

political leaders. I view them as I did Rudzutaka, who also headed our important defense posts in the government. He worked very cleverly, threatened this one and that, but in the end, was found to be a Germany spy. Karakhan, Enukidze. Then there were: Yagoda, Tukhachevsky – military leaders, Yakir, Ubovich, Kork, Eifeman, Gamarnik – 13 people. Who were these people? This is very interesting to know. This is – this is the core of the military-political – core that has systematic dealings with German fascists, especially with German intelligence, and to which they dedicated all their energy to fulfilling the whims and orders from the German fascist side. What kind of people are they?

They say that Tukhachevsky is, or was, a landowner, someone else was from a religious family. Such talk and such an attitude does not yield any results at all ... and it does not solve anything – absolutely nothing. When they talk about landownership, it means that this class is a class which is antagonistic to the working class, but this does not mean that some people from this ownership class cannot serve the people. Lenin was from a landowner class – did you know that?

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Of course we know.

STALIN: Engels was a son of a factory owner – you cannot say that it was a proletarian element. The same Engels managed this factory but at the same time was feeding Karl Marx. Chernishevskij was a son of a priest – he was a very good person. And on the other side ... Serebiakov was a worker, and you know what kind of unsavory character he became. Lipshitz

was a worker also, not well educated, but became – a spy.

When we talk about our enemies, we talk about a class, but that does not mean that every person from that class cannot help the working class and these people worked well. From a section of the people, let's say from the lawyers, there were many revolutionaries. Marx was a son of a lawyer, not a son of a worker or farm labourer. From among these people, there are always people that can and will be useful to the working class, not more or less than the pure exploited workers. So, to use the saying that of course "he is not a son of a worker" – this is an old saying and cannot be used to describe everyone. This is not the Marxist way.

This is not a Marxist method. This is, I would say, a biological way-method, but not Marxist. We Marxists do not follow the biological path, but the sociological path. I will not analyze these people from this point of view at all.

There is among you another method which is also wrong. Many times I hear: 'In 1922 someone voted for Trotsky'. This is not correct. A person could have been young not versed in the struggles that were taking place. Dzerzhinsky as you know also voted for Trotsky, not only voted, but openly supported Trotsky during Lenin's time and against Lenin. Do you know that? He was not such a kind of person that could remain passive in any kind of debate or argument. He was a very active Trotskyite and even in the GPU, he wanted to raise an argument to defend Trotsky. In this, he was not successful. Andreev was also a very active Trotskyite in 1921.

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Which Andreev?

STALIN: Secretary of CC CPSU, Andrey Andreevich Andreev. So you see, that the question of someone, some time ago voted for so and so, someone in the past was neither here nor there in his outlook, is not always absolute or correct.

Thus, this second prevalent attitude that we find in our ranks is not altogether correct and many times, it leads to misunderstanding and incorrect conclusions.

The most important way of judging people is by their own actions. There were people who were supporting now one side then another, but they left, and left peacefully and honourably and together with us, are struggling and fighting against Trotskyism. Dzerzhinski, after seeing the reality, argued and criticized Trotsky as did comrade Andreev. There still are people of this calibre. I would surmise that there are scores among our top rank leaders who left Trotskyism, left in anger and now are criticizing and exposing this activity excellently. It could not be otherwise that during the struggles of our party facts showed that the way of Lenin, with whom Trotskyites openly struggled, proved correct in the end. Facts showed that the CC of our party, following the road charted by V.I. Lenin, showed itself to be absolutely correct. This is not surprising, that people like Dzerzhinsky, Andreev and scores of other former Trotskyites finally realized their mistakes, saw the correctness of Lenin's position, and finally came over to our side of the party.

I will tell you more. I know non-Trotskyites, they were not Trotskyites, but our party did not benefit from those people either.

They voted bureaucratically for the party. Does this person deserve great admiration as a Leninist? And there were cases of comrades who vacillated here and there and who did not always agree with our position, but who did not have the truth of their conviction, to vote against us, so they decided to vote with us, then with them and then again with the party.

This matter of understanding and practice of evaluation is also not correct.

There is the third method of looking at this situation, at these people who are on trial for military-political sabotage. This is the method of judging people by their work over the years.

I am going to talk about this method. I enumerated 13 people: Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin, ENUKIDZE, KARALHAN, RUDZUTAK, YAGODA, TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH, KORK, EIDEMAN, GAMARNIK. Of course, 10 are spies. Trotsky organized the group, whom he forced and taught: give the secrets to the Germans, that they should trust us, that I, Trotsky, have people. Organize diversions, attacks, that I, Trotsky, would be believed by the Germans and Japanese, that behind me is might. A person who urged among his own circle that it is necessary to dwell on espionage, because we, Trotskyites, must have a block-understanding with German fascism, we must have cooperation, we have to help them, as they will help us when the need arises. Now, the Germans and Japanese want information, give them this information. You remember the confession of Radek, Lipshits and Sokolnikov that they did give information. This is espionage. Trotsky was the organizer of these spies,

chosen from people who were members of our party or those that circled around our party – hidden spies.

Rykov. We have no proof that he himself gave secrets to Germans, but he instigated and got that information through his own people, while others gave the secrets to Germans. Enukidze and Karakhan worked with him very closely – both became spies; Karakhan from 1927, as also Enukidze from the same year. We know through whom these messages and secrets were given, through whom they exported their messages and by what routes – this was through a person working in the German Embassy in Moscow. We know. Rykov knew that also. We have no proof that he himself was a spy, but he was the courier, tied in to German fascists.

Bukharin. We have no proof that he himself delivered the secrets, but with him were linked very firmly Enukidze, Karakhan and Rudzutak – these discussed with him, made plans, were informing him, although they themselves did not do the actual spying – but they organized and oversaw these spying activities.

Gamarnik. Although he did not spy, he was the organizer of the spying program, overseeing Ubovich, Yakir, Tukhachevsky who were involved in gathering systematic information for the German High Command.

The others. Enukidze, Karakhan I already mentioned. Yagoda – a spy, and being in charge of GPU (Internal Security) he promoted spying for Germany. He conveyed to Germans what the GPU has and how it counteracts German provocateurs

and spies. He sent Intelligence agents across the borders, on the pretext that they were going on holidays, and these names were given to the German General Staff. Now, the German Counter-intelligence agency, knowing these names, set a trap and caught these people. They were made to spy for Germany, or otherwise they would be exposed to the CC CPSU. Yagoda told them: 'I know that Germans have you in their clutches – you have a choice, either you will be my people, devoted to me and you shall work as I direct you, blindly follow my instructions, or I will expose you to the CC CPSU – that you are German spies.' That is the way he started with Gayem – the German-Japanese spy. Yagoda admitted this himself at the trial. (At that trial, there were scores of foreign journalists, ambassadors and other political observers. None of them wrote at that time that the trial was staged. The American Ambassador himself stated that the trial was in harmony with international law and that the defendants themselves confessed without any urging from the prosecution or that torture was seen on any of the accused – Editors.) Thus, those had to obey and carry out everything that Yagoda demanded – those were his own people. These people themselves confessed. He also did the same with Volovich – German spy. The same was with Paukero – spy for Germany, he admitted himself, already from 1923. It is evident that Yagoda was the organizer. Further, Tukhachevsky. You read his statement?

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Yes, we read it.

STALIN: He gave away our operative plan – our sacred plans for defense of our Motherland; he gave to German High

Command. He always met with the representative of the German Reich Intelligence Agency. A spy? Yes, a spy! The Western countries, so-called 'civilized countries', call these people 'informers', but we in Russian know that this is an outright spy. Yakir – systematically informed German High Command. He pretended that he had this sickness 'kidney ailment'. He travelled to Germany to get treatment. Ubovich – not only with friends, with his comrades, but he singly informed Germans about our defense potential. Karakhan – German spy. Eydemann – German spy. Karakhan – informed the German High Command, starting from that time when he was our Military Attache in Berlin, Germany. Razutak – I already spoke about this that he admitted that he was a spy, but we have all the information about his activities. We know to whom he gave the secrets. There is one Secret Agent in Germany, in Berlin. If sometimes you will have the opportunity to be in Berlin, Dzhosefina Genzi is the lady that will charm you. Maybe some of you here know this charmer. She is a first class intelligence with much experience. She ensnared Erukidze. She helped to ensnare Tukhachevsky. She holds in her hands Radzutak. She is a very clever agent ... Dzhosefina Genzi. She is supposed to be a Dutch national working in Germany. Beautiful, and she's willing to go to all lengths on all proposals made by men, and then she buries you. You might have read an article in "Pravda" about some covert operations which included this lady. Well, she is one of the most efficient, masterfully getting you into her clutches, the best that German

intelligence has. Here, you have people! Nine spies and three organizers who were involved in supplying the German High Command with the plans that were made for saving our Motherland. These are the people!

We can ask ourselves the question: How is it possible, these people yesterday were communists, and now have become deadly weapons against us? Why, because they were compromised. Today, the Germans demand from them – give more information. You will not give, we already have your passport and your papers, that you are now our employee, we shall publish them. Under terror of being exposed, they give and gather information. Tomorrow, the German masters demand: No, this is not enough, obtain more information and you will receive money, give us your papers and passport. After that, they demand – start spreading lies, start disrupting the work of CC. At the beginning, start arguments, diversions. If you will show that you are on our side, things will improve. If you do not comply, we shall expose you, tomorrow we shall give all this information to Soviet agents and your heads will roll. These people start diversions. After that, the Germans say – No, somehow you must start something in the Kremlin or in Moscow Army Garrison and try to get the top army-command posts you can. These newly recruited spies start to do whatever they can to fulfill the German commands so that they would not be exposed. Further, this also becomes too small and too little for the Germans. They demand something more concrete, more noteworthy. They comply by assassinating Kirov.

Well, you will get paid, you did an excellent job. They are urged to go further, can't you make certain that the whole government will be overthrown?

The spies then start organizing through Enukidze, through Gorbachev, Egorov, who was then the Commander of the Army School for Officers, which was situated in the Kremlin. They are told to organize a group, who will then proceed to arrest the Government. News flashes back to German High Command that there is such a group, we shall do everything, we shall arrest and go further. But according to the German masters, this is not enough, to arrest and kill a few dozens of responsible leaders – but what about the people, the Army? Well, these spies reply that they have such a post, such a command in their hands and we ourselves, they state, are in command now, here we have Tukhachevsky, here we have Uborovich, and here is Yakir. Germans demand – what about helping Japan in the East? A campaign is mounted by these elements against Blukher. They want him removed from the Far East Command. They already proposed to CC CPSU their own candidates. Of course, Tukhachevsky is in first place. If not him, who else? Why should Blukher be removed? Agitation is started by Gamarnik, and is prolonged by Aronshtam. They proceeded covertly to such an extent, based on falsehoods that they had agitated practically the whole command against Blukher. More than that, they managed to covertly and overtly convince the Military Centre to replace Blukher. We asked why, please tell the CC CPSU, why must we dismiss him? Well, he drinks a lot!

OK, what else? Well, he does not get up early in the morning as we do, does not go to observe or inspect the soldiers as often as he should! What else? Well, he is too old, does not understand the new method of work. Well, today, he might not understand, but tomorrow he will, the experience of elder soldiers does not die out. Look at these lies and innuendoes that were sent to the CC about Blukher. They bombard with these accusations comrades Putn, Aroshtam and bombard us in Moscow in a well orchestrated campaign. At the end, we had to call the Central Command and CC CPSU. When Blukher came to the meeting, a muzhik, ordinary working muzhik, not bad at all. We do not know him personally, what is the problem? We give him the opportunity to speak – he spoke excellently. We examine him and bombard him with questions.

He is more clever, more understanding and more experienced than Tukhachevsky, or Uborovich, who is a panic-monger or any Yakir, who does not understand anything to do with the military or tactics. To take Blukher from his post and put in a person who does not drink and who cannot lead an army or know how to organize a battle – is absolute nonsense. If people with 10 years of experience, even though they have grey hair, to get rid of these people would be a crime. We must depend on their experience for our defense. We at that meeting criticized Germanik for demanding Blukher's dismissal, Tukhachevsky supported Gamarnik. This of course everyone saw as an agreement between these two spies. Germans tried with all their skill in order to replace Blukher on

the Eastern Front against Japan, but in this, they were not successful.

The core is composed of 10 patented spies and 3 patented instigators. It is clear that the logic of these people depends on German Reichstag. If they will produce the work that is given to them, it is clear that Germany will be sending these people back to us. This is the real state of affairs. This is a military-political espionage, make no mistake. I feel that these people are marionettes and dolls in the hands of Reich intelligence. The German fascists wanted there to be a plot and these people started this conspiracy. The Reich wants these people to give them systematically military secrets and these elements started to gather these secrets and passed them on to their masters. The Reich wanted to change the government of USSR, these traitors undertook this job as well, but they did not succeed. The Reich intelligence wanted that in case of war, everything would be ready for their success, that the Red Army would automatically go over to the German side, that our army would not be ready to defend our Motherland. This was wanted by the Reich and this is what these elements tried to accomplish. This "Agentura" was composed of 10 spies and 3 experienced leaders - 13 spies that are traitors to our country. This conspiracy was not only an internal matter for our country - it became also an external policy of Germany and the political aims of the Reichstag intelligence agency. These people tried to make out of the USSR another Spain, by finding among us traitors, then they

compromised them to do their bidding. This is the situation that we are facing now.

Tukhachevsky in particular, who played the role of a noble man, was not involved in small details. We considered him as a capable military figure. I asked him personally: 'How could you, in the course of three months, allow the decimation of a division of soldiers to only 7,000? What is this? This is an ignoramus, not a military leader. What kind of division is this of only 7,000 soldiers? This is only a division without artillery, or a division with artillery but without escorts. In reality, this is not a division – this is shameful. How can you have allowed this to happen?' I asked Tukhachevsky: 'How can you, a person who calls himself an expert in army matters, how can you demand that we comply with your wishes and make all of our divisions to be composed of only 7,000 soldiers? Not only that, that our division have only 40-60 howitzers and 20 cannons. There could be only one of two things: either you eliminate all the equipment to the devil and only have cannons or eliminate the cannons and have just the other equipment! What is it going to be?' He tells me: 'Comrade Stalin, you are exaggerating.' This is not exaggeration at all – this is sabotage being carried out by the German High Command.

There, you have this core and what it represents? Did these elements ever vote with Trotsky? Rudzutak never voted for Trotsky, but became a sleuth. Enukidze also never voted with Trotsky, but also became a spy. Well, here is your argument who voted for whom?

What about the question of whether these enemies came from a landowner family? I do not know who is left of these people on trial, aside from Tukhachevsky. Class composition from where these elements come from has no significance. In every case, we must judge by the deeds, not family. For many years, these people had contact with German intelligence agencies, were performing espionage. Of course, most of them were vacillating and did not perform their work of espionage well. I do believe that very few of them performed their spying from beginning to the logical end. I see how they cry, when they are taken to prison. Look at this Gamarnik. Look at him, if he was a counter-revolutionary, he would first of all ask to see Stalin in person, and at that meeting, he could have killed Stalin, and then kill himself. This is how counter-revolutionaries work. If these people were nothing else but people who were ensnared by German Intelligence and made to spy, they fulfilled their master's orders, to take measures in order to give up Leningrad, Ukraine and other plans that were advanced by German fascism. German Reichswehr, as an enormous power, ensnared for itself dissatisfied elements, weak people, and weak people must do the bidding of their masters. A slave is always a slave if he so wishes. This is what is meant by falling into the trap of espionage. If you fall on this wheel, whether you want to or not, it will keep on turning on the road to the end. This is the basis. Not because of their politics, no one asked them about their politics. These are just people who do favours and get ensnared.

Collective farms. What did they have to do with collective farms? You see, they became sorry for the farmers. Let us examine this villain Erukidze, who in 1918 gathered the peasants and established his own landownership, and now, he feels sorry for the peasants who are prospering in the collective farms! How could he pretend to be a poor peasant and cry, this 'lanky woman' (laughter), and he was believed.

The second time, in Crimea, when some elderly women came to see him, women, as in Byelorussia, came and cried, he then gathered all the men, this villain gathered the peasants and established his own domain. I even at that time proposed that we should expel him from the party, but I was not believed – they thought that I, as a Georgian, am very hard and uncompromising towards fellow Georgians. While the Russians, as you see, gave themselves the task of saving this Georgian from another Georgian.

Here, the question is not of politics – no one asked him about his politics. They were in the service of German intelligence. The Germans commanded, gave orders, and these villains carried out the orders. These idiots thought that we are so blind, that we do not see anything. These villains wanted to arrest the Soviet government in the Kremlin. But it shows that we saw what was happening. They wanted to have in the Moscow Army Garrison their own people and to start an uprising in the army. They thought that no one will be able to detect their plans, that our country is helpless, that it is the Sahara, there are no people., but there is a working class,

farmers, intelligentsia, that there is a government and a party. It showed that we knew more than they thought possible.

And now, these agents of the German Reichswehr are in jail and crying. Politicians! Leaders!

Second question – why was it possible for their masters to ensnare these people? We arrested around 300-400 people in the military. Among them are good people. How could they have been ensnared by Germany?

I cannot say that these people are capable, talented. How many times did these same people fight openly against Lenin, against the party of Lenin and after Lenin, and always, they were defeated. Now, they opened up a bigger campaign and they lost this battle also. You therefore cannot say that they were talented, starting in 1921 and ending up in 1937. Not very talented or not very genial people at all.

But, how was it possible for Germany to agitate and ensnare these people? This is a very serious question. I think that these German fascists were successful by this method! A person who is not satisfied, with whatever, not happy that he, a former highly placed Trotskyite or Zinovievets, and he is not being promoted as quickly as others, or not satisfied that he is not as capable as some of his peers, or he is not capable of performing the tasks that the party gave him, and consequently, he is being demoted according to his capabilities, but he feels himself capable. It is sometimes very hard for a person to understand and accept his capabilities and his or her weaknesses. Some of these people felt that they are geniuses and when this genius

is not recognized, he is dissatisfied and ready for any means to prove himself.

These people started from small, from an ideological grouping, then they proceeded further. They talked and argued like this: See my friends ... The GPU is now under our control (State Security), Yagoda is ours ... Kremlin is in our hands, so is Peterson with us, the Moscow military district is ours, Kork, Gorbachev are ours also. Everything is in our hands. Either we rise up now, or tomorrow, when we come to power, it might be too late. And many, who were weak, not rational people, yes this question is realistic, to hell with everything, this will be our chance. The plan is good, during that time we shall arrest the present government, we shall take over the Moscow Army Garrison and everything else will fall into place, and if I remain on the sidelines, I might be left in the dust bin (laughter in the audience).

This attempt was not realistic. But these weak people thought along these lines: to hell with it, I cannot remain behind. Let me, as quickly as possible, involve myself in this adventure - otherwise, I might be left behind.

Of course, in this way, you can only agitate a small number of people. Of course, each character is different. Still, how was it possible to get these traitors involved in espionage? The enemy hypnotized them with glowing promises: tomorrow, everything will be in your hands, we are with you. Kremlin is yours, you will work internally and we externally. This is the method of promises and rewards for the future.

Third question – why did we overlook such dangers for so long? There were sufficient signals. In February, there was the Plenum of CC.² This question was on the agenda, but somehow we muddled and went through the session without taking any action ... we did not raise the question of these elements working in the Red Army. Why was this not done? Maybe we are not very well organized people, or were we altogether blind? There is a different encompassing reason. Of course, the Army is not divorced from the people, from the party. As you well know, that in the party, we saw successes in all spheres of our country – this somehow made our heads spin from the economic, political and other successes that our country was achieving, day in, day out ... life was becoming easier, political life was not bad, international prestige is growing for our country in the world, the army from top to bottom is in technological and military sciences growing, everything is going ahead at a fast pace, our strength is colossal, weaknesses are being overcome – this caused our vigilance to be lax, people then began to think, what else do we need? What is still lacking? Can there be any possibility of a counter-revolution brewing amongst us? There were such thoughts in our minds. We did not know at the beginning that this “seed” was already planted by the German Reichswehr. These agents knew that they must fulfill the German plans or they would be exposed and lose their heads.

As I mentioned, these successes made us complacent. This was exactly the moment that these agents thought that they would succeed.

We must always look into the dealings of our people, of foreign nationals working in our country, of foreign powers and their staffs. That means that we must have a very tightly dedicated internal security, that every party person and every non-party Bolshevnik, especially the personnel of OGPU, together with our counter-intelligence service, that these organs should control their personnel and country-wide be more vigilant. In all sections, we smashed the bourgeoisie, only in the sphere of intelligence service did we proceed like little boys, like children, trusting that everyone in this important service for the country was a dedicated party person and patriot. This was our weakness. Our intelligence in the military sphere is weak, it is full of spies and elements that do harm to our country. Our internal intelligence service was headed by a spy, Gai, while in the internal security, we discovered a nest of these spies working for Germany and Japan, for Poland, but not for us. Intelligence – this is the only sphere of our work that in the first 20 years we suffered a great defeat.

Now, the question remains before us to put this matter back on its feet. This agency is our eyes and ears. We must understand that the USSR has become an attraction for spies. A great country, great railway system, navy is growing, agriculture is on an incline of production, collective and state farms are being more and more mechanized and effective, industrial potential is great. This is such an inviting bit of sweetcake for the imperialists, that they'll do everything to get their hands on this delicacy. History always proved that

enemies will always covet a country such as ours ... in this respect, we became a bit too complacent. Germany is trying to grab our riches. Japan is always sending their spies into our country – it has its constant nest within our midst. They want to grab our Pacific region, the others want to grab Leningrad. We overlooked this, we did not want to understand. As we proceeded to enrich our country, our life, we became a sweet piece of fruit that our enemies dearly wanted.

In their quest, the enemies were able to get our traitors involved in their plans, because they will not be satisfied as long as our country is intact. We overlooked this question. That is why our security system is not adequate and is ill-prepared for this onslaught. We were beaten in this sphere as children by a bully.

But this is not all, that our internal security is bad. Fine! We now know this. But this is not all. We talked today that there were signals about this question. Yes, there were, but very haphazard. But the signals were weak, not enough of them. If these signals were as Lenin wanted, that would mean that every communist, every non-party person would consider himself concerned about problems that we still have – he should have informed the CC CPSU. Lenin wanted this method to be utilized for the safety of the Motherland. But he was not able – or his followers were not able – to bring this kind of method to reality. We depend on the party comrades to be the eyes and ears of our country. We, at the centre, are not always aware of these problems. People have a tendency to think that the

Centre knows everything, sees everything. No, the Centre is not always able to see and hear and know everything. The Centre sees and knows only a part, the rest should be seen by the people that are in every corner of our country.

We send people, but we DO NOT know these people 100% – you must see who they are. There is one sure sign of knowing whom we send to work in your district – this is the control of people right on their jobs – how they fulfill their work, their attitudes and results. They can only be done by people in the localities, not by the Centre in Moscow.

An example of what comrade Gorbachev told us about one aspect of this sabotage that was proposed innocently regarding the quality of our army rifles which in all respects are still manufactured according to designs approved by these elements in a position to make decisions – our army rifles are practically a sports rifle.

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: (Kokhnocki cutting, it is.)

STALIN: Not only the groove and bore of the rifle were changed; thus making the mainspring weak and not as effective as it should be. This is not a small matter, comrades. Our soldiers' lives depend on their rifles! I received a letter from a rank and file Red Army soldier complaining that this should be looked into. Some defend Vasilenko who is responsible for this section, others condemn him. In the long run, it was proved that it was he who is to blame for this. We did not know that this was done purposely on instruction from his German bosses. After investigation, who was this Vasilenko?

We found out that he was actually a spy. He himself admitted this. From what year, comrade Yezhov?

YEZHOV: From 1926.

STALIN: Of course, he calls himself a Trotskyite, where else could Trotskyites go other than to spying.

You comrades are not vigilant enough, you do not give us signals about some of the problems. You have people that are not altogether 100% reliable. At the Centre, we haven't enough such people to fill all the needs of the whole country. Your task is to see who these people are, how they work on the job that they were assigned. Every member of the party, every non-party citizen of USSR not only has he the right, but an obligation to let us know about the problems. If only 5% of the people reported the problems, the sabotage or anti-Soviet performance by the people we send out to their respective posts, this would be a step forward. The people should send these complaints to their local authorities and a copy to the CC CPSU. Whoever said that these letters should only be written to the local authorities? That is not correct.

I will cite here one incident which happened to Lenin in his struggles with Trotsky. This was when the Council of Defense was being organized. This was at the end of 1918 or early 1919.

Trotsky came complaining to Lenin that the Central Committee CPSU is receiving letters instead of him as the Commander, even without a copy to him ... over his head. "This is not as it should be", complained Trotsky. Lenin asked him: "Why?" "But I'm the chief, and I cannot answer

their questions if I do not get their letters", complained Trotsky. Lenin brought him down to size like a little boy by these words: "Do you think that you are the only one who cares about the military? War is the responsibility of all our people, of our party. If a communist wants to write to the CC CPSU, there is nothing wrong with this. He should complain to the CC CPSU. Do you think that the Central Committee of CPSU will step aside and give you the sole right to make the decisions? Never! You feel that the CC has no right to look at these complaints? You should be interested in the details of this letter only – whether they are correct or not. Why must even copies go to the commander ... it's the CC CPSU that you belong to and that is in the end responsible for the fate of the country."

Did Voroshilov ever stop anyone of you to write letters to the CC? (Voices: never). Who among you can state now that someone has forbidden you to write letters to the CC? (Voices: no one). If you fail to write to the CC and even to your commanding officers, you are guilty of promoting and following the Trotskyite line. Our fight with the remnants of Trotskyism should be waged even now. A party person, a non-party person, whose heart aches with things not going correctly, about illegal practices, about scoundrels that hide under the party cards, and I must admit that some non-party persons write better and are more dedicated patriots than some of our so-called leading comrades. They should write to everyone with complaints – if no results are obtained, they should write to the CC as often as needed be!

If this correct road would be followed, and this is Lenin's truth – you will not find any person in the CC CPSU that would have a bad word to say regarding this method – if you would follow this road, we at the Centre would have been able to solve many of the problems that are confronting us now.

This is in regard to receiving signals from below.

There is one more problem – checking out people in responsible positions from the top. This is also a weakness, not always is this control carried out. Why did we organize the General Staff? For the purpose that it would be they who would check into the background and work of the army personnel. I unfortunately do not hear or have heard that the General Staff would carry out a systematic looking into their commanders and personnel. Otherwise, they would have uncovered the likes of Uborevich and drawn the proper conclusion. We had one comrade speak at this session about the cavalry of the armed forces – where was the General Staff during this crisis? What do you think, that the General Staff is only for looks? No, it should always keep its eyes open, look into the personnel – their job is to do this. After all, our fate is in the hands of the General Staff in matters of defense. Commanders of Districts are not Chezhan-Tszolin, to whom they gave Districts after Districts ...

VOICES: That is correct, that's the way it was.

STALIN: Such practices cannot be allowed. Of course, people do not like to be combed against the grain. But unfortunately, it is also prevalent that the commanders do not

want to complain about the District Commander. This is wrong – this is a deadly attitude. General Staff exists so that it can look at the personnel from day to day, give them their help, correct their mistakes. Maybe some commanders of districts haven't the knowledge that they should have, maybe they also make mistakes, they should be shown the correct solution and come to help him.

This is how these incidents happened – in Ukraine Yakir, here in Byelorussia Uborevich.

Overall, we do not know all the activity that these people did, because they made reports themselves and what these people did in their Districts, God only knows!

General Staff must know everything about their personnel, if it wants to command effectively. I do not see that the General Staff rates very highly in its effectiveness as to the policy or its personnel selection and quality of its cadres.

Further. You did not pay too much attention to the selection of cadres to important military posts. Let us look at what is happening. The most important task is how to place the cadres. In military tradition, it is accepted thus: you got an order, you fulfill it without question. But if at the head of this department is a villain, he could sabotage everything. He can send good soldiers, good commanders either here or there, not for the betterment, but into the arms of the enemy. Military discipline is more secure than it is in the party. A person is sent to the command post, he starts to command, he is the main authority, everyone must listen to him.

Here, you must be extra careful as to whom you send to the districts.

I'm on the sidelines. But I do hear now and then about certain problems, about commanders who are absolutely not capable of commanding. Why is this? Let us take the example of Aboshidze, debaucher, villain of the highest order. Why is it necessary to give this person a mechanized brigade? Am I correct?

VOROSHILOV: He is head of the ABT.

VOICES: Head of the motorized tank brigade.

STALIN: Thank you. Congratulations! Very good! Why must he be in command there? What knowledge or expertise has he? General Staff started to look into this. What did we find? He was removed many times from the party, then readmitted again and again, someone was helping him in this.

A telegram was sent to the Caucasus in order to find details as to his previous whereabouts. We found out that he was a former hooligan in Georgia, drunkard, responsible for physically beating up Red Army soldiers. But he had reasons, according to him! (Laughter in the assembly.)

We started to dig further. Who was it that recommended him?

I do know him personally. This person is no fool, knows how to be a "tamada (toast master)" (laughter) but he also has an explanation for that! Today, he will toast and declare for the Soviet State, whatever is needed! Can we have placed such a person in high position or recommend him for a higher post? Well, he was removed finally!

We started to look further. We found the same events in other places. In Moscow, for instance, Olshansky ...

VOICES FROM AUDIENCE: A rascal!

VOICE: Is it Olshanskij or Olshevsky?

STALIN: I'm talking about Olshansky. I asked Gamarnik about him. I know about Georgian kings – worst bastards the world has seen. They lost a lot and never were able to forgive the Soviet state for their loss of privileges, especially this family of Aboshidze. How did he appear with us? They tell me that it's impossible, comrade Stalin. How can it not be if he is a commander of important districts? What about the former commander of a tank brigade Khalepsky, how come he received this post? A drunkard, very unsavoury character, I was responsible for him being removed from Moscow. Finally, we dug deeper and found out that Sergo recommended him. It was proven that this was done without a written recommendation.

YEGOROV: At that moment, he was at the Military Academy.

STALIN: Recommended that he is a nice person! That is all! What about his politics – they did not know, but he is entrusted with a tank brigade (Laughter in the audience). Also, the General Staff did not look at the fact that as head of commanding regions were people like Garkavy, Savinsky, Feldman, Yefimov. Of course they tried, but not everything depended on them. The matter of a Military Attache was another matter. Seven candidates are suggested for this Embassy posting. Six idiots and one of theirs, he among the other 6 idiots looks good. The 6 letter requests are sent back,

not approved, and this agent is agreed upon as the brightest. These enemies had many opportunities to do us harm.

General Staff did not look carefully at Military Academies, instead of bright, dedicated future officers, they open the flood gates to all. This must be remedied and cleaned up.

VOICE: Ten times we demanded an explanation, comrade Stalin.

STALIN: Raising questions is not enough, decisions had to be made.

VOICE: I have no right.

There was not enough attention paid to the military newspapers. I read some of the journals from time to time, sometimes there appear articles that are very disappointing. To us, these journals might not be a serious weakness – journals are looked upon by the youth as something sacred – the young recruits read these journals and try to learn from them, but if dirt and articles with no morals are allowed to be published, this is not acceptable.

Here is an incident that transpired. Kuttyakov sent me a brochure and he complains that the military command will not publish it. I know that if a person writes, a former partisan, we should pay some attention to it. I do not know whether the content is good or bad and I wrote to him that in Leningrad, there are all sorts of people – Dennikin was also a Leningrader, Miklyukoc is also from Leningrad. Many of these people wanted to come to Moscow and thought that they would receive governmental positions. No use demonstrating, rather, we

shall write to our representatives and they will help us. These people want a soft job, they're sick of struggling. We explained to him very calmly, and he went away satisfied. After that - another letter telling me that he wrote another book about the Soviet-Polish conflict.

VOICES: "Kiev Rocks".

STALIN: "Kiev Rocks" about 1920. The military again refused to publish his book. I asked the Military to read it. It was absolute dirt. He praises to high heavens the Polish side and heaps abuse at the Soviet side. The whole purpose of this book (fulfilling German Reichswehr plans) was to abolish the whole Cavalry Army as a concept ... but this 25th Cavalry Division played a clear definitive role in beating the Poles.

Such attempts to undermine our defensive preparedness is prevalent throughout our Soviet Army and the General Staff. We cannot allow this to continue. This is very suspect!

VOICE: I and we agree.

STALIN: You agree? You should make certain that the military journals are cleansed of this.

One more question. These problems have to be liquidated and I will not speak of them again.

In which area are the traitors weak and where are our strong points?

Where is their weakness? - in the fact that they are not connected with the people. They were afraid of the people, tried to rule from the top: here, put one task into works, here, put their people into a commanding position, take over another,

there to pacify someone who got scared. They did not depend on their own strength, they depended on the might of Germany. The Germans told them that they will help them. But the Germans in the end did not help them. The Germans thought: you fellows cook the porridge, we'll just look. The Germans wanted these traitors to show them concrete results; they told our traitors that Poland will not allow the Germans through; but if Leningrad was opened, there the doors would open. They also knew that in the north, near Leningrad, they were not that strong. These traitors depended upon the Germans, but the Germans were playing with them. These traitors were afraid of the people. If you were to read their plans, as we found out during the investigations and interrogations, you would see that first they wanted to take over the Kremlin, then to fool the Higher Party Cadre School and Officers' Academy ... throw one section to one, place, reshuffle others to different sections of Moscow, sow confusion – then asking the others to come to the defense of the Kremlin, while inside the Kremlin were to arrest the Government. During the day, it would be easier to arrest the Government, since that's the time they meet regularly, but how can you do it during the day? "You know how Stalin is? There will be shooting and this is dangerous." Therefore, they decided that it's better to get the Kremlin and Stalin at night (laughter in the audience). But at night, it is also dangerous, again the security will start shooting!

Weak, unlucky people, divorced from the people, knowing full well that the Soviet people will not support them, or for that

matter, the Army, thus shying away both from the people and the Red Army. They really believed that the Germans would come in force to help them. Their weakness is our strength!

People are asking, how is it possible for such a mass of personnel in the Higher Command to be fooled and to be so complacent? I see in front of me some heads down and unbelief in your eyes.

VOROSHILOV: This is nothing, small problem ... we have all sorts of people.

STALIN: In our army, we have great talent. In our party in our people, great talent all around. Do not be afraid of recommending people from below. Here's the Spanish example.

Tukhachevskij and Uborevich asked to be let go to fight in Spain and we told them: "No, we do not need well known names to fight in Spain. To Spain we shall send less well known people. Look at what transpired? We told them, that to send you, everyone in the world will know your names and your position in the Higher Command. Who was this Pavlov that we sent? Was he that well known?"

VOICES: He was a commander of a 6th Division.

VOROSHILOV: There were two Pavlovs, Senior lieutenant ...

STALIN: Pavlov became a hero in the Spanish Civil War.

No one could predict, but he led the attacks exemplarily. Do you know Shtern? He was only a secretary to comrade Voroshilov. This is where our strength lies - ordinary, dedicated Soviet people. "Send us people with well known names to Spain". No, we are sending unknown people, lower

and middle officers cadres, they will perform miracles. It is from these people that the Higher Command should promote to higher responsible positions in the Higher Command ... they will overcome all difficulties, they will smash the biggest bricks that are put in their path. Promote these Soviet officers! Do not be afraid. They will perform wonders! (Tremendous applause from the audience).

VOROSHILOV: We shall work in this session until 4 a.m.

VOICES: Let's have a break – give us an opportunity to have a smoke.

VOROSHILOV: I'm announcing a ten minute break.

BLUKHER: We now have to return to our base, and we must start from the fact of calling together a group of commanders-activists. We must tell the soldiers-Army what we discussed here.

STALIN: Do you mean to report on all of the people that were arrested?

BLUKHER: No, not all together.

STALIN: If I were in your place, the commander of OKDVA, I would approach this matter in this way: would gather the top commanders and explain in detail about our discussions. Then I would gather the lower rank commanders and with you present, I would explain to them in less detail – but it should be done very correctly, that the army personnel should know that we have among us certain elements that have begun to sell their country to the enemy, that these arrested commanders and highly placed personnel are just as

much our enemies as are the German and Japanese fascists. We are going to cleanse our Army from these elements, do not panic, they will all be found out, sentenced. This is the way I would go about this difficult task. To the top commanders, I would tell in detail.

BLUKHER: Red Army men should be told the same detailed facts as the Higher Command!

VOROSHILOV: Maybe we should, in order to be more tactical, give a High Army Command Directive, that such and such a plot was uncovered. After this Directive, the commanding officer would then explain to the men.

STALIN: Yes, you must explain to the men. But in order that all commanders and political commissars should be informed, a stenographic copy of this command should be available to them.

VOROSHILOV: Yes, this is the way to proceed. There will be complete detailed information.

STALIN: This will give us an opportunity to teach our comrades.

VOROSHILOV: This, this same boss of bosses Feldman, I, over a period of years, asked him to give me 150 people which we could promote to higher posts and retire the older, "Tsarist formed" commanders. For close to two-three years, this list was going commanders to commanders and no one knows what happened to this day.

BUDYONNY: I saw the list, half of them are Trotskyites, others are already under arrest.

STALIN: Well, if half of them are arrested, then that list is obviously not helpful.

BUDYONNY: This command that we're talking about should not be printed – just a verbal report will be sufficient.

STALIN: Only for the Army and then the stenographic copy should be returned. Yes ... when does the GHQ meet? Twice a month?

VOROSHILOV: Every three months.

STALIN: Since army regulations do not allow criticism in the ranks, let us come up here with our plan of action, pick 5 comrades from the Military who will launch this criticism.

VOICES (That's the way to do it.)

STALIN: Let's start from the commander of a regiment, but, on second thought, it will be better to go to lower ranks, his deputy.

VOROSHILOV: We must have the best qualified people. If this is done quickly, then I will not bother anyone, so that this question can be looked into quickly.

STALIN: We must be certain that those we pick are reliable and not hidden agents of the arrested ones.

VOROSHILOV: This means that at 8:00 a.m., there is a meeting of all commanders in my office-reception hall.

STALIN: This is not an idle question. I think that among our people, among commanders, among political cadres, there are also such comrades who are without knowing it involved in this conspiracy. He might have been told something, they wanted to agitate him to join, threatened him, compromised him.

We must save these people, after they tell us the truth. Are there such people in the command?

VOICES: Of course. Absolutely!

STALIN: These traitors worked 5 years, they must have had some success. If among them someone realizes that this whole plot has become known, they would recant, tell all. These people should be saved.

SHADENKO: This is like before, when we forgave the bandits, if he gives up his arms and comes to admit his guilt. (Laughter in the audience.)

STALIN: These people do not have arms, they know about the enemies, but are keeping quiet.

VOROSHILOV: The situation is dangerous. We tell them, they spread it to all, but we must tell them in no uncertain terms, that we shall get to the bottom of this conspiracy. Better that they come forward themselves and talk, otherwise the process has to take its due course.

STALIN: We should absolve the beguiled ones. We should forgive, we must give them our solemn promise!

SHADENKO: We must start from the High Command. Kuchinskij and others.

VOROSHILOV: Also Meretskoy. This one is a worker, devil take him!

MERETSKOV: This is a lie, furthermore, I never ever was with Uborevich at work or in Sochi. I never saw him!

VOROSHILOV: There are great family-friendship ties among these people. Now, in my reception hall at 8:00 a.m.!

* AP RF 45. Op. 1. D. 1220: *L. 48-81 Typewritten stenographic report.

BIOGRAPHY OF NAMES IN THIS STENOGRAPHIC RECORD

- ANDREEV A.A. (1895-1971) Member of Politbureau, Secretary CC 1924-1946.
- ARONSHTAM L.N. Deputy Commander of Moscow District Soviet Army.
- BERZIN Y.K. Army Commissar. Chief Consultant in Spanish Civil War to Republican government.
- BLUKHER V.K. (1899-1938) Marshal of USSR. Commander in Chief of Eastern Army.
- BUDYONNY S.M. (1883-1973) Marshal of Soviet Union, Member of GHC of Soviet Army.
- BUKHARIN N.I. (1888-1938) Member of CC Politbureau, Editor of newspaper "Izvestia". Was sentenced to death as a member of the "right-Trotskyite anti-Soviet block". Gorbachev rehabilitated him.
- VOLOVICH Z.I. 1936-1937 Senior Major of Security, Head of NKVD of USSR.
- VOROSHILOV K.E. (1881-1969) Marshal of Soviet Union. 1934-1940 Chief of Defense of USSR.
- GAI G.D. (1887-1937) Hero of Civil War, Professor in the Military Academy.
- GAMARNIK Y.B. (1894-1937) Army Commissar and Deputy to the Minister of Defense.
- GARKAVY I.I. (1883-1937) Commander of the Ural Army.
- GORBACHEV B.S. (1892-1937) Hero of Civil War, occupying many leading army posts.
- GORYACHEV E.I. (1892-1938) Hero of Civil War and career officer.
- DENNIKIN A.I. (1872-1947) General of the counter-revolutionary forces of counter-revolution.
- DZERZHINSKY F.E. (1877-1926) Held extremely important positions in the Soviet government. Trusted comrade of Lenin and Stalin. Took a position against signing of the Brest Peace Treaty.
- YEZHOV N.I. (1895-1940) General Commissar of internal security.
- ENUKIDZE A.S. (1877-1937) Member and Secretary of Presidium CC USSR.

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- EFIMOV N.A. From 1935-1937 he was head of the artillery command, and in the Ministry of Defense.
 - KARAKHAN L.M. (1889-1937) Deputy to Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Ambassador to Turkey.
 - KIROV S.M. (1886-1934) First Secretary of Leningrad and Member of CC AUC[B]. Assassinated on December 1, 1934 in Leningrad by terrorist Nikolaev.
 - KOZHAKOV I.K. (1897-1938) Commander of the Black Sea Fleet.
 - KORK A.I. (1887-1937) Commander, 2nd rank and Head of the Military Academy M.B. Frunze.
 - KOTOVSKIJ G.I. (1881-1925) Commander of the Red Army, Hero of the Civil War.
 - KUTIAKOV I.S. (1897-1938) Head of different army units and Deputy Commander of all army forces.
 - KUCHINSKIJ D.A. (In 1934, Member of General Headquarters, then a Military Commissar of the Military Academy of GHQ.)
 - LIVSHITS Y.A. (1896-1937) Head of Railway System in South Russia, Member of Trotskyite opposition. Was sentenced to death in 1937 as part of a counter-revolutionary plot. Gorbachev rehabilitated him.
 - MERETSKOV K.A. (1897-1968) Headed many commands, the last being the Leningrad District GHQ.
 - MILJUKOV P.N. (1859-1943) Russian political leader, history specialist, White immigrant.
 - ORDZHONIKIDZE G.K. (1886-1937) Minister of Heavy Industry.
 - PAVLOV D.G. (1897-1941) Commander of International Brigade in Spain. During early war years from 1940, he commanded the front district. Hero of Soviet Union, General.
 - PAUKER K.V. Employee (1933-1937) of the Operations Division of the NKVD.
 - PETERSON R.A. (1897-1940) Veteran of the Civil War and the Commander of Moscow Kremlin.
 - PUTNA V.K. (1893-1937) Military Attache in Great Britain.
 - RADEK K.B. (1885-1939) Journalist of Foreign Affairs in newspaper "Izvestia". Arrested in 1937 for anti-state activities and counter-revolutionary activities, sentenced to 10 years. Killed by jail inmates. Gorbachev rehabilitated him in 1988.
 - RUDZUTAK Y.E. (1887-1938) Deputy Chairman of SNK and Stop-USSR.
 - RYKOV A.I. (1881-1938) Member of CC. Arrested for anti-state Trotskyite activities. Rehabilitated by Gorbachev in 1988.
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• SEREBRIAKOV L.P. (1890-1937) Many times expelled from the party, then reinstated by contacts. Arrested for illegal typography and heavily involved in spying for Germany. Sentenced to death in 1937, rehabilitated by Gorbachev.

• SAVINSKIJ. Head of the Caucasus Military District.

• SEDIKIN A.I. (1893-1938) Commander, Deputy to Internal Security Head. Commander of Bakin region.

• SOKOLNIKOV G.Y. (1888-1938) Former Deputy to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Forestry. Arrested in 1937 as part of the anti-state spying organization connected with Germany. Sentenced to 10 years. In jail, his fellow prisoners killed him. He was rehabilitated by Gorbachev in 1988.

• TROTSKY (BRONSHTEYN) L.D. (1879-1940) From 1918 to 1924, Commander of Military and Navy. Member of Presidium of CC. In 1929 after a long struggle with Lenin and Stalin, he was tried for anti-Soviet activities and expelled from the country. He was killed in Mexico in 1940.

• TUKHACHEVSKIJ M.N. (1893-1937) Member of CC AUC[B] First Deputy to Commander-In-Chief of Defense of USSR and in charge of military preparedness. Heavily involved in anti-state activities.

• UBOREVICH I.P. (1896-1937) Commander of all units in Byelorussia, from 1934 Member of General Headquarters Staff.

• FELDMAN B.M. (1890-1937) Commander of Internal Security forces.

• KHALEPSKIJ I.A. Holding many important state and army posts.

• CHZHAN TSO-LYN (1876-1928) Chinese General and dictator of Manchuria and working hand-in-glove with Japanese Imperialism.

• SHTERN G.M. (1900-1941) Held commanding posts in the army and navy, Head of Ministry of Defense and military consultant to Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

• SHADENKO E.A. (1885-1951) From 1937 Member of Military Council of USSR and Kiev district. One of the commanders of the Internal Security troops RKKA.

• EYDEMAN R.P. (1895-1937) Member of the Military Council and then Chairman of the Chemical Industry.

• YELIAVA SH.Z. (1883-1937) Minister of Internal Trade of USSR, after that he became Head of Light Industry of USSR.

• YAGODA Y.Y. (1891-1938) From 1924 Deputy of OGPU-NKVD, after holding many important posts, in April of 1937 he was removed because of his anti-state activities. In 1938, he was sentenced to death by the Military Council of USSR.

• YAKIR I.E. (1896-1937) Commander of Military District of Kiev, Deputy to USSR Military Council.

OUR COMMENT:

This document is extremely important now, since it shows concretely and devastatingly the danger that the young Soviet Union faced, both externally and internally. This document also shows the role of Stalin during the extraordinary meeting of the Soviet Military High Command, the trial and the discussions that took place.

Stalin is shown as a voice of reason, a voice that analyzes the dangerous situation, dissects the problem, explains the dangers and warns of future consequences in the country if Lenin's path is not followed faithfully!

We must ask ourselves the following questions after reading this extraordinary document:

1. *Why was it necessary to keep this document secret for so long? During the Great patriotic War, it was only logical that this document should not have been published. From 1945 to 1953, the country was reconstructing, the Cold War was on, the internal struggle in the CPSU was on and, Stalin and his comrades found themselves in the minority in CC CPSU. There are documents that point to the demand that these documents be published, but Stalin was outvoted.*

2. *After Stalin's death, why did Krushchev and Malenkov not take the steps to publish this document? What were they afraid of?*

Was it not the warning by Stalin that, if steps are not taken by the CPSU, in cooperation with the people, that these elements that were still hidden, will again rise to the surface and try to accomplish what their predecessors tried to do?

3. *Stalin is shown by this stenographic document to be very understanding, very attuned to the frailties of humans and he asked that some of these confused or even guilty conspirators be given a chance to recant and thus save themselves!*

Future documents will show that Khrushchev was the "blood thirsty" member who demanded that they should all be shot. WHY? Because it would not do to have these people point fingers at the guilty behind-the-scenes manipulators that were still hidden! □

“SHORT HISTORY OF ACP[B]”

J.V. STALIN

A Stenographic Report of a Meeting of Propagandists in Leningrad, 1938. Published in the Russian Journal “Archives of Leaders”

In September of 1938 in numerous issues of newspaper “Pravda” and later on in the theoretical journal of CC ACP[B] “Bolshevik” there was published the text of the new, just written text book about the history of the party which officially was called “History of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Short History”, but unofficially – “Short History of ACP[B]”. The appearance of this textbook was given much publicity in the press. These articles stated: “As a result of the enormous theoretical work, accomplished by the Commission of the CC ACP[B], and personally by comrade Stalin, our party, Komsomol, all workers received a studied work, deeply etched in the struggles of our party and the victories of the party of Lenin-Stalin”.¹ “Pravda” newspaper called upon “serious understanding and dedication to learn from this history” ... recommended it as of “the highest quality of historical analyses and documented to have a world-wide significance”.²

At the end of September – beginning of October – 1938, after very extensive and positive publicity in all of the press, ACP[B] called a meeting of the propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad and workers in the ideological fields of the party. The meeting, according to its organizers, should be able to adopt

this "Short Course", adopt its format and thoughts and its utilization in the party schools.⁴

During this meeting, which was chaired by the secretary of CC ACP[B] in charge of ideology, A.A. Zhdanov, Stalin took an active part in this meeting. He attended all of the sessions (the meeting lasted 4 days, from September 28 to October 1). He asked questions, encouraged discussions, asked questions and held dialogues with certain speakers, and in the end – this is without precedence – spoke twice at the meeting – during the first day in order to guide a departure from the program, which went against the adopted policies of CC, and with a more detailed speech at the end of the meeting, on October 1. Both of these speeches were never published. His second speech dealt with some criticism of the "Short History" and pointing to the fact that the CC is the authority in making this textbook serve a purpose for cadres, and thirdly, to deal with some problems in this textbook which he wanted to discuss further and change its wording. He touched on some theoretical questions also, dealing with the theory and safeguarding of the socialist state in case the capitalist encirclement of USSR continues. Because the speech of Stalin was held in a narrow circle of propagandists and ideological workers and not publicized widely to the general public, this meeting contains some bitter truths which otherwise would not be made public.

There are two documents: one is in the Russian Archival Centre, while the following full text is in the personal archives of President Yeltsin. The full text is 15 pages typed, while the other

is 48 pages long. There are some stenographic mistakes made in this text and it is published as is.

This document is prepared by Doctor of Historical Sciences N.N. Maslov.

SPEECH BY J.V. STALIN AT A MEETING OF PROPAGANDISTS October 1, 1938

STALIN: Comrades, I thought that the comrades present will help the CC and will give us something of a serious criticism. Unfortunately, I must say that the criticism heard here was not serious, not deep enough, and in some places, unsatisfactory. A more serious criticism would have been more of a help to the Central Committee, because the CC does not always see everything. You are working in your locality, you see more and from one side, we at the top – we see things from another side, but if we are able to combine the two points of view, can you imagine the results that we could achieve? Unfortunately, this unity, we did not achieve. We just skated over the top.

Too little was said about Moscow – some comrades complained. This is correct. Of course, too little was said. More could have been said. Workers are saying: "Why did you say so little about Moscow?" Since among us at this meeting, there are no comrades from Ural, Baku or Kharkov, they would also complain that not enough was said about the work in their cities. If we are to continue as one comrade stated here, then we must say more about the Ural, Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov, Rostov, and others. What would this accomplish?

This would not be a history of the ACP[B], but a guide to what transpired in all of the localities of our country. This would be what the CC did not want to give, because we have enough of these historical documents about every region where revolutionary activity took place. More than enough. We need an overall history of the party's activities, taking the experiences from all parts of the country and have a history which will show the growth of the party.

It is unfortunate that those comrades criticized this Short History only from a narrow point of view – they are wrong, they somehow did not realize what is meant by a Short History of ACP[B]. The easiest thing for us to do, according to these comrades, is to add a bit more about Moscow, something else about the Urals, Kharkov, Baku, but this will be wandering off all over the place, not a history of ACP[B].

Others state: "What's this, not much is said about the agrarian question? At the 2nd Congress and the 3rd Congress, something was said about this question, but in this Short History, nothing is mentioned." CC looks at this question in this way: if we are going to mention the agrarian question, then we must go into the complete history of this question. At the Second Congress, Bolsheviks asked for the return of private plots to the peasants. Is this characteristic of a Bolshevik party? No, it is not. Our policy was correct, when we demanded that all property be nationalized into cooperatives, collective farms or state farms, leaving a private lot around homes. This point of view was decided upon at the 4th

Congress. This was stated in the Short History of ACP[B].¹ What else do we need to state?

There is not enough said about the national question, some stated. Full resolution of this question which was adopted at the April Conference is included in full.² What else do you want from us? We should not allow this Short History of ACP[B] to become so long as to contain the full text of articles by Lenin and other theoreticians – this is not needed.

Third criticism is that the history textbook does not say enough about the international situation as it was then and how it affected the composition of the first paragraph of our constitution. Am I correct that some comrades brought this up?

VOICES: Yes, that's correct.

STALIN: To this day, I cannot see what kind of effect on the international situation was had by our discussion on the wording of the first paragraph of our party constitution. I cannot understand this. This is small talk, comrades. Our first paragraph of our party constitution did not have any influence on the international workers revolutionary movement. What did this comrade want to say? Where is he? Let him repeat his question again.

Facts are such that the Bolsheviks struggled for the composition of the first paragraph of our constitution, while the best people of the Western social-democrats, the left were against the Bolsheviks: Rosa Luxemburg,³ Pavlov, against. Not one person of the Western revolutionaries supported the Bolsheviks on this question. If this is called an influence on the

international revolutionary movement for the first paragraph of the constitution, then I do not know what is called a non-influence? (Laughter)

Regarding this question of the first paragraph of our constitution in the textbook of this Short History, I feel that it is said correctly, clearly.

Some stated that not enough was said about the influence of the 1905 Revolution on the international movement. Yes. But even less is said about the influence of the 1917 Revolution on the international revolutionary movement. But if we want to include the three revolutions that we had and their influence internationally, then we should enlarge this Short History three or four times in volume.

Here, we talked about what should be in this Short History of ACP[B] as a textbook⁴ – writings about the 1905 Revolution are mentioned, then for 3-4 pages, but they do not contain anything about the actual influence on the international movements and they do not mention the effects and influence of the 1917 Revolution, which was a more serious revolution than the one in 1905.

It is interesting to ask the question of the authors of this Short History of ACP[B] as a textbook, as to why they give such prominence to the 1905 Revolution and its influence on the international scene, while glossing over the tremendous influence of the 1917 Revolution? Am I correct or am I not? Are they correct or not? No, they are not correct. This is not, it is disproportionate – disproportionate in all proportions.

If we are to talk of the effects of all of our revolutionary steps, they all had some more, some less, international influence, and if we would follow this line of thinking, then we should write a textbook on only the influences of our revolutions on the international situation of our three revolutions. This then would become a separate theme, a separate book. In this textbook, we cannot depart from the main theme as to how the revolutionary process took hold of the people, how our party developed and grew, and change horses in mid-stream and start writing the influence on the international revolutionary movements of the working class.

There is discussion to the effect that hardly anything is stated about the work of the Comintern and its congresses. I know about many of our textbooks about the history of ACP[B] where this subject is covered extensively. This way of thinking is incorrect. Either we write the Short History of ACP[B], or a history of our congresses. It's either one or the other. We cannot mix the two together – this is nonsense, this is chopping chips of wood. The CC cannot support such comrades who are thrashing all over the woods.

Central Committee has a task to publish a textbook about the history of ACP[B]. The criticism that was given here, did not give substance – it was not serious criticism; it was just skimming over the surface of the problem.⁴

The question remains – what was the idea of the Central Committee in promising the publishing of the Short History to act as a textbook on the history of ACP[B]? CC knows that we

have literature in hundreds about the short and not so short histories for our party cadres and our party schools – from all points of view. We also know that all of these publications are doing more harm than good, because they befuddle the people. Some members of the party do not know which textbook is correct. None of the previous textbooks, histories, reminiscences, etc., ever had the sanction of the Central Committee up to this time, permission to publish or to write on behalf of the Central Committee. People and our party cadres did not know whom to believe or learn from – was it Yaroslavsky,⁵ Pospelov,⁶ Knorin,⁷ Bubnov⁸ or Popov⁹ or someone else? From all these textbooks, none of which were sanctioned by the CC, all this confused our cadres, so that our party cadres don't know which author to read and study or which author is correct or represents the thoughts of the Central Committee. The cadres looked at the situation in this way: if the textbooks by Yaroslavsky or Pospelov was given to them, that meant that the CC is in agreement with these authors. There was NO agreement by the CC. These comrades got the assignment to write the history, they wrote, while we in the CC had not time to study it, analyse its contents – this was a weakness on our part, comrades. This could be explained away by the fact that the CC was and is over-burdened with serious internal and external problems. This was the situation. Unhealthy as it was, but it existed.

How do we get out of this situation? Central Committee made the decision to give leadership to the publishing of this

Short History textbook, to show our cadres that the CC of the party is in agreement with the textbook, has sanctioned it and that it recommends this textbook to the party members, cadres and party schools.

Our first task is to look over all the books we have, eliminate inaccuracies, pick out the important, truthful aspects of the history, get from under this chaos, give our party activists one leadership about our history, that will not confuse the cadres – this is what the Central Committee officially recommends – how to project, promote and put across the thoughts of the party – this is our first task.

The comrades who wrote the previous textbooks, study materials, wanted it best for the party. Of course they did, but this did not happen. Instead, we found ourselves in a quagmire of information, misinformation and different interpretations.

Question is not to write about everything, explain all happenings – the question is that this Short History should show the birth and work of the party, first steps and goals achieved, around which all other events evolved and above all, what characterized these moments in our history.

What were or are these events? I would suggest that there are such stages.

First stage, I would call: "Struggles for the birth of the Bolshevik Party", or "Preparing for the Birth of a Bolshevik Party" – this should be in four sections. The question is not to write about all the insignificant things – the question is to make certain that under these four sections, everything else

should be concentrated, period of 1900-1912, to the Prague Conference. This should be the stage in the birth of the Bolshevik Party. This is how the work of writing should be divided into sections.

From here, this short textbook should analyze, condense the essence from books by Lenin such as: "What to do?", "One step forward, two steps back", "Two tactics",¹⁰ "Materialism and Empirocriticism". These four books and that is all, they in detail describe the birth of the Bolshevik Party, that the party was formed from political groups into an independent party. From all of this, there are enough materials for the 4 sections. The questions raised here that nothing too much was said about Moscow, about the agrarian question – this is nonsense. The idea is to give in these four sections the best characteristics of the fight of the Bolsheviks for the birth of an independent Bolshevik Party. This is the first stage.¹¹

Second stage should contain the following sections: 1905, starting from Prague Conference, ending with 4-5-6 and 7th Conference-section.¹²

This stage, or this period, could be called: "Struggle of the Bolshevik Party to Win the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, for the Victory of Proletarian Revolution". This is a separate period. The party was formed, is working among the population as an independent political entity fighting to clear the road towards the workers' revolution. I still feel that it would be headed as: "Struggle of the Bolshevik Party for Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and the Victory of Proletarian Revolution".

All other inconsequential matters, small details are not necessary. Concerning this time, there should be only facts and quotations.

All other small details, they will detract from the main aim of our task – to get the facts, the ideas, to show how these ideas and facts accomplished the dictatorship of the workers.

The third section – 8-9-10-11-12 congresses can be the conclusion. This section could be titled: “Party of Bolsheviks as Head of the State”. Yes, I think that this heading would be correct.

Well, this is the proposal, the contents, which the authors worked around for the textbook of the Short History of ACP[B].

Now, judge for yourselves as to the importance and suggestions of the comrades who, instead of a Short History, wanted to insert all sorts of local events, instead of a concrete history of the Bolshevik Party. A textbook cannot be made to cover every district, every city, every episode, which I have mentioned, contained in numerous books, publications and journals. Comrades should realize that if we start with one city, then every city, district will be complaining that there is not enough about Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Ural and others. Some would say to their children – “See youngster, how little is said about our city, our movement, our history?”

Either we adopt a direct, concrete, historical approach of the most important aspects of our work, or we shall be chopping wood and tracking all over the forest.

Thus, the CC is responsible for this textbook, everyone will know that it is the official book for cadres, and no questions will

come into the mind as to the fact – is it a book by Popov or is it Ingulov?¹³ No, this is a book by the Central Committee. This is our first task.

Our second task is to remedy and eliminate the gap that is being promoted in the last few years between marxism and Leninism. You see, I have in front of me the program about Leninism for study groups of the party and look, there are 11 themes. Maybe you are aware of this. First theme: lectures about Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin. Why is there Stalin here, I cannot understand this to this day. Here are the themes of the historical beginning of Marxism, Marx and Engels – they are the founders of scientific communism, "Communist Manifesto" – first, document by Marx and Engels; all the works by Marx and Engels; the works of Lenin in three different periods – from the revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune, second from Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution in 1905, and third from the Russian Revolution and onwards; also, the formation and growth of opportunism of the 2nd International; Lenin and Stalin are just followers of Marx and Engels.

This is all that is necessary. These are the formulations. These were the foundations for Lenin. The book written by "Stalin about Lenin" was to show the progress made by Lenin by proceeding from Marx to the present. The term "Leninism" is being used. If Lenin did not add to the theory, practice and revolutionary practice in building socialism, then there would not exist the term 'Leninism'. I am stating that in the book by Stalin, not everything is covered in detail. You will, if you read

it 3 or 12 times, you will see the brilliant ideas, words of Lenin, new thoughts, new ideas and we must understand that the new thinking of Lenin is necessary to learn and to teach to others, because Lenin lived in a different world than Marx and Engels – Lenin brilliantly developed the theory and practice of Marxism to meet the needs of that time and our present situation. We cannot just study Lenin without studying Marx and Engels.

In order to understand Lenin, you must also read and understand Marx and Engels. Lenin always considered himself a pupil of Marx, and he was correct. This is not just his modesty – it's a historical fact. We must read and re-read "Capital" again and again. Many of us now think: what – read "Capital"? We have finished with capital in the USSR, is it necessary just to carry the book "Capital"? This is incorrect, comrades. The truth is that what is contained in Marxism and Leninism is all given in the work "Capital" by Marx.

Those who want to study Lenin must also study Marx and Engels. Lenin came up with new thoughts and theories because he was standing on the shoulders of Marx and Engels. New thoughts, brilliant as they are, but the shoulders are also great, on which Lenin stood, this was the foundation, dialectical materialism, historical materialism. Without understanding the political economy of capitalism, all these problems cannot be understood and Leninism cannot be understood, comrades. It is all interconnected and intertwined. In our program, we have let develop a break, bluntly saying – we let develop a chasm between Leninism and Marx.

We are all – or should be – students of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Our second task: we must make certain that the “Short History” tackles the question of the gap between Marx and Lenin, that this gap be absolutely liquidated, and that the “Short History” unite what was contributed by Marx with what was contributed by Lenin. This problem should be resolved by the Fourth Section of this textbook. This is tackled in this “Short History of ACP[B]”.

Therefore, the task of the textbook is to liquidate the lies which were allowed to develop regarding the teachings of Marx and Lenin; meaning that what was contributed as a foundation by Marx and Engels, and what has been developed by Leninism, is a logical continuation. It is necessary to talk about Marxism-Leninism together in order to breach this gap between the founders and the builder of socialism.

Third task of the textbook is to show Marxism-Leninism in the work of the ACP[B]. There are two ways of looking at Marxism-Leninism. One way is to lecture on this or that theme, taken out of context – or you could base yourself on historical facts, which are not only theoretical, facts that happened, which were demonstrated as the result of Marxism-Leninism and to show how Marxism-Leninism was existing and helping the ACP[B].

This means that the third task is to teach the beginnings of Marxism-Leninism in short historical contexts, but not a lecture, or theoretical thoughts, but, combining theory and showing facts together as facts of history of the ACP[B].

The CC thinks and is absolutely correct, that writing this textbook in a lecture manner would not produce the desired result. Facts are needed, and by these facts, you can judge Leninism, when history confronted us with numerous problems, and how we utilized Marxism and Leninism to gain victory. History – this is the best school, this is higher learning. If the theory was proven correct in life in a period of let us say ten years, it means that this theory is worth something. This is our third task.

The fourth task in publishing this “Short History of ACP[B]” is to show, to demonstrate the theory in practice, with results. If there are not enough old laws to come up with answers, we must enact new laws. This is an absolute truth. It works.

Many comrades think that theory is a very difficult problem to learn, to adopt, to utilize in practice. Theory is like any science – the task is real, you just have to have the will and conviction to solve it, not to retreat at the first problem and to dilly dally in making decisions, but attack it directly, and where you cannot attack it directly, find other paths around the problem, because theory is in your hands.

This is the way it should be done, presented. To my mind, this is exactly what the concluding remarks in this “Short History” do.

Think about the period when Lenin, and those that were around him, they were few, if they, in April of 1917, did not give a new orientation to the party regarding the fact that the road

from the "democratic republic" must become a Soviet Republic, the party would have been disoriented, lost in the dark. I clearly remember our situation at that time in Leningrad – we were nearly lost as to what must be done. But when Lenin arrived and gave a new orientation, everyone saw the light: the party knew where to lead and the goals to be achieved. Suppose that the new thesis by Lenin would not have been put into effect, we would have been disoriented, wavering from one side to another, trying to cooperate with that helpless democratic republic and eventually we would have lost the revolution. There you have it – this is the strength and effectiveness of proper theory, find new methods, new roads that were closed or not thought of – focus the projector on this road to show the masses where to go and what to do.

Or the question of the victory of socialism in our country is an interesting episode. Well, we threw the Tsar out, Kerensky¹⁶ just managed to hold on with the premier Lvov.¹⁷ Further on, no one knew where to go or what to do. Our party was small, not fully developed, Russia was backward in the political struggles, culture was very low – what kind of socialism is that? People were talking in this way: what kind of socialism is this, God gave you some freedom, hold on to it and wait. And these were the thoughts of the masses at that time. From this, Lenin was able to state: "No, this is not correct, Russia has matured for a socialist revolution, we must take the next step towards socialism."¹⁸ He showed us the road and he accomplished it. Let us suppose that there had not been

this small group around Lenin who heeded his advice and started to plan the revolution – they understood the theory and proceeded onwards, overcoming all odds and opposition. If this was not done, I do not think that we would have been able to save a Soviet State. Here, you see the meaning and strength of a forward looking theory!

In speaking about those events, I wanted to show our cadres that the meaning of theory is tremendous, that without theory, the party would have been wallowing in uncertainty, going from one situation to another: today, you are pulled by your nose here, tomorrow, you are pulled to another side, you would be going like a blind man. There, you would have a leader. What kind of a leader are you? In order to lead, you must know the situation, you have to predict the situation ahead, but in order to be able to see ahead, you must know your theory, meaning, you must know the laws of economic and political development of a society. This is in fact, theory.

Or, let us take the question of Narodniki (Populists) and Marxists. Where did these poor souls slide off the path of the revolutionary process? – it is when they suggested and fought for the idea to base the revolutionary movement on the peasants and not on the working class. They thought so because the peasantry constituted the majority of the population. That is why they looked down upon the workers or the working class. Why, because they stated that you cannot find workers even with candles in your hands. They did not understand the class struggle or the law of development, that

the peasant class, as a class, does not develop but falls apart – it is tied to such a form of production that there is no way for the population to grow because industrialization of farming eventually decreases the number of farmers rather than increases, as does the working class.

Only the theory of development allowed the Marxists to tie in their future to the working class, even though at that time the working class was in the minority. This means a lot, what class the Marxists should support. The future of the party depends on this. This is why the "Narodniki" lost their influence.

Or this fact, that these "Narodniks" wanted socialism, yes of course, but they stated that socialism must be started from the farming villages, not understanding the basic laws of economic development, not understanding that it is not the village but the city that governs the development, and if the question of building socialism is on the agenda, you must start from the city and not the village. They on the other hand stated that the cities will die while the villages will live and grow. They did not understand the elementary law under capitalism, that the city rules the future of the village.

There you have it: One side, the "Narodniki" who did not understand the theory, the others – Marxists, who learned the theory, knew the laws of historical development and are leading and following the line which is giving results.

This, then is the essence of the Four Sections of this textbook. Our cadres should understand the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Theory is a living thought, you should not be afraid to learn it.

You must understand that the Marxists before were just ordinary people, did not finish schools as you did, did not read as much as you are reading now. You have books, while before, we did not have them. I remember in 1898 that in order to rent one copy of the work by Marx, "Capital" in Tiflis (Tbilisi, Georgia – Editors) we poor people used to collect from everyone 5 kopeks, from over 100 people, gathered 25 rubles and had the book "Capital" for two weeks, copying it numerous times. While you have all the books that your heart desires. The State is yours, the press is yours, the books are yours. You can learn and follow the theory much more readily than we did before. But, if you do not want theory – that is up to you.

Fifthly, CC, in writing this "Short History" wanted to do away with some of the baggage, vulgarization of Marxism-Leninism from our ranks.

Here's an example as to some thoughts that are allowed to be prevalent and circulating on the question of war and the position of Marxists: "Yes, Bolsheviks are against war, we should be pacifists, but of course, if we're attacked, this is something different."

We should explain to the people that it is not correct that the Bolsheviks do not see differences between different kinds of wars, but it is not impossible that under a grave danger to our Motherland that we would not attack first in order to prevent war.

Let us remember the article by Lenin about the "United States of Europe".¹⁹ Lenin stated that having won victory of socialism in one state, it will have to militarily defend itself

from attacks, drive the invaders from its soil and if requested, help the working class of other countries to defeat the exploiters of their own country and thus help stop the future danger of further attacks on Russia.²⁰

It was necessary for Bolsheviks to explain all the details, all the nuances and fine points as regards the question of war and our policy towards it. It is not enough to be a pacifist, some of whom dream of eternal peace, and then on the call to arms by their capitalist masters, they DO take up arms and DO attack the first socialist country in the world, or their own working class. There are justifiable wars and there are Imperialist wars, colonial and nationalist-chauvinist wars ... they cannot be looked upon in the same way.

All governments mask their deeds: "you live with wolves, you must be and act like a wolf and howl like a wolf." (Laughter) It would be foolish on our part to put all the cards on the table, while surrounded by enemies. They would look at us and call us idiots.

Another example. The question of victory of socialism in one country also was understood differently. Our comrades looked at this question under the edge of outlook: is it possible for one country alone to build socialism, but they did not look at the other side, that the victory of socialism in all developed countries at the same time is impossible. Lenin not only taught us about this, that victory in single countries under conditions of uneven development is possible, because the uneven development of capitalist countries, some lag behind,

others surge ahead, but Lenin also came to another conclusion, seeing that some are behind, others are going ahead, others just biding their time , therefore, spontaneous revolution is impossible.

This basically is in some opposition to what Engels wrote about principles of Communism. This question is being somehow hidden. What is meant by uneven development? If the question of even development of all countries was the truth and they were ready for one world revolution, we could state that one world revolution would be possible. Lenin stated: "Development is proceeding unevenly." Today, one country surges ahead, tomorrow another, others are also racing ahead, while still others are left far behind – development goes in different tempos and still others are standing still. How can we talk about the possibility of all countries ready for a world socialist revolution? This is nonsense. This was impossible before, and it is impossible today.

This question is not handled correctly in our publications, books and schools. We must remedy this situation.

Another question as an example. The boycott of the Duma by Communists/Bolsheviks. All our textbooks write that in boycotting the elections to the first Duma, the Bolsheviks were wrong. Looks as if they're hiding something. What are they hiding? The boycott of the Bulyginsky Duma, which was at the start of this Duma, was correct, because we were able to defeat it by a boycott, we did not allow it to be even born, with the help of the All Russia strike of workers.

The later Vitevsky Duma, after it came into existence after the December Moscow uprising was defeated, we also boycotted this Duma. At the Tamerforsk conference we decided to boycott this Duma. This was a mistake. Lenin himself said that it was a mistake, not a big mistake, it could have been corrected quickly, but nevertheless, it was a mistake.²²

And how do you think that we can change history? History has to be reported correctly, successes and defeats ... not take anything away or add anything to enhance it. We seem to be now in the ditch of criticising even things that happened 500 years ago! We can't do this chronologically.

Religion had a positive influence during the reign of Saint Vladimir, during that time it was heathen, while Christianity was a step forward. Now our wise men from the point of view of the new situation, in the XX century, say that Vladimir was bad and heathens were also bad, and religion was also very bad – meaning, that they do not want dialectically to credit the situation, that everything has its own place and its own time.

This is also the case with our present history, you should not enhance it or condemn it, history is history. So that in boycotting the second Duma, Bolsheviki made a mistake and that is the way history should be written.

Another example. Our so-called wise men debase, vulgarize the role of peoples' ideas in the growth of society. They think that the economic growth is the basis, while other movements or developments, what kind of role other events play is considered as inconsequential, and thus find themselves

in the mud of vulgarizing historical facts. Marx and Engels, and especially Lenin, underlined this mistake. He was the first Marxist who especially developed the question of the role of the foremost ideal, developed the peoples' ideals. Lenin thus organized people, mobilizing them and leading them to remake the old society into a new one. New ideas are developed on the basis of economic path and without this, you cannot organize a revolution. New ideas are also absolutely necessary, as also are the methods of development, even though on the new methods of development, there could also appear new ideals or ideas. This question is being vulgarized. This policy led to the vulgarization of materialism which has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism – this was the fifth task of this new Short History of ACP[B]. This is meant to cleanse the brains from the vulgar understanding of Marxism-Leninism and to raise in full the ideas, the ideals of Bolshevism thus liberating it from slag and vulgarism.

The sixth task of the textbook – have one textbook, one course of learning, where all aspects of Marxism-Leninism would be all gathered together, which will help our propagandists rejuvenate themselves, help to teach more constructively and give more quality in our propaganda.

For us, for the CC, it is clear that our methods seem to be geared to quantity of propagandists and not their quality, that there should be more study circles, a bigger net of propagandists that we can just speed ahead: that we should have more departments: we have over 1,000 different

departments working within the Central Committee, how many departments have you put into life? Fewer than nine, you think that you are a loser. But, if truth should be told, where there are fewer departments, the overall quality is better and more productive!

Therefore, this Short Course textbook should be able to help our propagandists to reorganize themselves from quantity to quality, to become better propagandists. These were the tasks that the CC had before itself when we took the decision to publish this "Short History of ACP[B]'s Textbook".

Now, please allow me to touch upon some theoretical questions. You, as propagandists sitting here, of course you feel, that with learning and studying this new textbook, you will encounter many questions. What kind of questions will they be – you surely know what questions the people will ask, but somehow, you are keeping mum on this. You will say this or that, but it is not in this textbook! Will there be such questions asked? Of course, you will say that there shall be such questions asked. Why do some of you feel you cannot answer or should not answer? You see fit to hide away from such questions, but I want to put them on the table, into the open and into clear water. (Laughter)

Let us take Engels. In the short course on historical materialism, it states that methods of production are governed by society's attitudes and the political situation, intellectual development of society. This is said without limiting or saying what period is being dealt with. Then you will be asked:

“excuse me, Engels did not write about this.” (Stalin reads the passage by Engels here.)²³

What do you say about this passage, comrade propagandists? Is this correct or is it not? I feel that it is incorrect. Forms always under all circumstances are put into effect by the method of production, always under all of the conditions existing at this time. Engels based himself on group marriage, on the matriarchy. But the same matriarch was the continuation (as now numerous materials show this to be true) – when men were hunters, the hunted animals did not represent the stationary element for gathering food, the women were busy with agriculture, sowing different seeds, took eggs from the nests, domesticated fowl. Women became the first ones to domesticate the animals, grow food. The women always found ways and means towards better and easier production of food. What do these facts prove? Men only hunted, did not produce anything property wise, they asked the women, “give me food!”.

After this period passed, from the first agricultural workers and the coming of animal husbandry, the ruling matriarch fell away and society changed.

There are facts that the study and theory by Engels to put on the same pedestal the forms of a family and the forms of production as two equal steps. Marx never agreed with this point of view. You know that this work by Engels – “Birth of the family, individual ownership and the State” – was published after the death of Karl Marx.

We must realize that Marx and Engels, the founders of revolutionary thought, could not have foreseen all of the developments in society in all of its details. They laid the foundations for socialism-communism. It is up to us now to use this basis, enlarge upon it, add to it in a scientific manner and proceed to build the society that was envisaged by these two great thinkers and Marxists of the world.

(Here, Stalin reads from the works of Engels about blood relations and family ties, production, family unit and society.)²⁵

What Marx and Engels wrote was not meant as a dogma, absolute truth ... it was a basic scientific analysis of society, production, relations and all aspects of developing society in different stages of development.

This problem is full of risks, but we must not be afraid to state that ideas are not static, they evolve, they develop and it is up to Marxists-Leninists to see this development and scientifically analyse these problems and come up with solutions of moving society from one stage to another.

Lenin, in a very detailed analysis of the world of Marx and Engels, presented the logical conclusions as to the need to not only study Marx-Engels and Lenin, but to keep in mind the facts that since Marx-Engels wrote their tremendously important works, the situation has changed, development has turned many corners, new problems appeared, new ideas had to be put forward, new solutions had to be put into life ... in other words, Marx and Engels never regarded their works as "sacrosanct" at all. They, as scientists, knew that theories are practical

in different situations in the revolutionary movement and they cannot have considered them as absolute remedies for all situations.

You, as propagandists, will surely be asked this question: How is it with you communists, is there nothing permanent? Today, you say one thing, tomorrow something else. How can we live? You will or should explain it in this way: "If you want to be Marxists, you will have to understand that the basis of the theory of Marxism does not change, but some situations, events do; in other words, you should think with your heads."

Now, let us turn to practical questions.

How can we improve our propaganda work? That our propaganda work is somewhat weak is a fact, because we think that we have won a victory, we are building socialism. There is no need to concentrate on propaganda in full force. Even our Central Committee is to blame for this. The CC looks at this question badly, very badly. This is our fault, fault of CC and mine also plus the fault of the departments that are in charge of this important work. We were so busy. But this cannot be used as an excuse. But we must realize that if we started this work, we must finish it to the end. Our organization of this question was haphazard, it was broken up into sections, it was a mess. All of you try to be present at more and more study party circles. It seems that our attitude is to organize as many circles as possible, but how the circles are studying, what they're studying is not looked after properly. This shows lack of organization and also the idea that there are more important

tasks waiting to be done than propaganda. The quality of these study circles is to be deplored. There is no control or follow up. This is the main weakness – we organized far and wide, but not deep enough.

This is not the right approach to these study circles. Why do we have to have so many of these study circles? I do not understand. People can read, can't they read themselves? These courses are written in Russian and other languages. If something is not understandable, there is always a dictionary or help can be asked from the propagandists. Do we really need a thousand study circles in our two cities? I do not understand this. We must utilize our press more, our journals and newspapers, but we always seem to talk just about study circles. But when we did not have the state in our hands, we did not have the media in our hands, then there was a need for such study circles, but now the press is ours!

If there are very good propagandists working in these study circles, then his or her lectures could be written up, published and thus, able to reach everyone, but it seems that his or her talents are only for the narrow circle of people. This is individual handcrafting. This is unproductive. This is an elementary organization since we have wonderful and talented propagandists and lecturers. They are dying in their own narrow circle. Our Ministry in charge of this work should listen to about 20 top propagandists, their method, their materials and then proceed to publish this material for use all over Russia. State proposals are one thing, but fulfilling this proposal

by individual handicraft method is another. There are too many study circles!

Also, there are too many party organizers' offices. This is not correct to my way of thinking. This is a very interesting question. Listening to people, I realize that there are too many organizers of propaganda offices, everyone does as he pleases, there is no centralized plan or control. No centralization means full freedom to preach and lecture what you wish, wrong or right, as long as you propagandize. People are under-utilized and this way, we look at them, they die politically, die to this mania of making your office full of comrades that just sit there, their skills and dedication is not utilized, because some heads of these departments want to build their own "little kingdom" at the expense of the State.

Whether they are working well or working badly, no one knows and no one cares. If this person would be asked to meet, discuss, help and encourage but not get the job done, he sits there and no one is interested in what he or she is doing or what kind of results are being achieved. If this is allowed to continue, it will produce different ideas, different feelings, no line will be followed, thus making the situation worse instead of better. This work should be centralized but centralized in such a manner that it does not stifle individual initiative. This is a very important question: the initiative of people. The ways and means should be found to remedy this situation quickly. We must control the situation and analyze the work of our workers in the propaganda field.

We do not utilize the newspapers enough to publish the results of consultations that are taking place in the propaganda field. Answers to questions could be utilized to inform a much wider circle of people than just individual or group consultations. These materials should be gathered, edited and published ... so that everyone would benefit from them.

Why should we have come to rule the state, if we are going to work in old craft methods, instead of far and wide. The proven methods of propaganda, the excellent interpretations of these methods, must be published – our press must be utilized more fully.

The number of circles should be made smaller. Maybe in Moscow, we could abolish some circles and have these comrades work in other departments of the government, in the CC or in the Ministry of Culture.

What is the Section on Propaganda doing? Is it in existence, I do not see it. Is there a Section of Propaganda in your Ministry, comrade Ugarov?³⁹

UGAROV: Yes, there is.

STALIN: There is? We made a great mistake by closing off the Higher Party Schools, dispersed the Red Professors,⁴⁰ what other course did we have?

MOLOTOV: Course of Marxism-Leninism.

STALIN: I would not say, that the question there was presented well. We closed them because the school was graduating very loose people.

VOICE: Yes, that is correct.

STALIN: But, we should and could have improved the situation, but you immediately closed the school. We must have the Higher Party School, not only Leninism, but Marxism-Leninism. These should never be allowed to be divided. A situation is allowed to develop where a program where Leninism is taught, while the foundation of Marxism on which Leninism exists is not there. We need to organize not one, but many Higher Party Schools devoted to teaching Marxism-Leninism, because without such Higher Party Schools, we cannot exist. Whether we combine these schools with others, you will have to decide, but we must immediately have such Higher Party Schools.⁴²

Should we have a definite program on how to proceed to teach this "Short History of ACP[B]?"

VOICE: Yes.

STALIN: This "Short History" textbook is designed to bring up our cadres theoretically onto a higher plane, I mean the party cadres, not those who are employed in specific departments of the Government – we want to develop communists in all spheres of our state, bring up their level of understanding and dedication. We must understand that the present employees of the party and government are – or were – former workers. We have raised their understanding in schooling so that they are intellectuals and the leaders of our party and government. Comrade Shkiriatov went from his factory machine and is now heading the CC. We consider you now a working intelligentsia.

SHKIRLATOV: That is correct, comrade Stalin. I agree with you.

STALIN: All of our cadres should become the salt of the earth, but in order that they actually become the salt of the earth, we must make certain that they fully study and understand the "Short History of ACP[B]". They must expand their political understanding.

The negative part of this intelligentsia question is that they were spoiled by foreign secret services – this is not a coincidence. We bring these intellectuals up in a political way. We unfortunately did not bring up our intellectuals in a political way as we should have. I want to repeat what I said previously, that we had a stupid approach before towards the intellectuals, the "intelligentsia". We all went to the working place, to factories, to the collective farms, forgetting that at that time, there were not enough people who would find some spare time to learn theory, there were very few such people. For eight hours, the worker worked – he was not accustomed to study, to books, he had to learn this by himself. Our propagandists went into the factories, forgetting that in the first days of the building of socialism we had hundreds of thousands of dedicated communists who were in fact the government, helping to put this country on its feet, helping to govern it and sacrifice for the Motherland. But we have brought up the working class, the peasantry, made them intellectuals – they now govern our country, our party, our State.

Don't just think that to govern a country is just knowing how to write directives. To govern is to lead, knowing what to do when and how, give directives, but sometimes improve the directives you have given. If they are unworkable or if life itself proved them to be impractical, not always do we make the correct decisions – there are mistakes made also. We depend from time to time on having input from below – we do not always see the whole picture. We cannot know what is going on all over our country. This is impossible. We depend on people there, on the spot. These people in the localities are helping us, and sometimes our comrades, lacking the necessary skills, do not listen to them or appreciate their concerns or follow their suggestions.

There are cases that a worker, who just yesterday worked in a factory, brought by the party to school, learning what must be done. He gets his new assignment in the party apparatus or government and what do we find sometimes happening? He finds that these newly baked "officials" look down upon him, since he just came up from the factory floor. This is hooliganism by one of the "intelligentsia" and it also works both ways. This must be eliminated, abolished quickly.

Sometimes workers and peasants themselves, brought up in the old days when intelligentsia was fulfilling the wishes of the ruling class, capitalists, kulaks, etc., this attitude dies hard.

We sometimes pushed these intellectuals aside, did not take the trouble to teach them, to bring them up in the socialist

way – so they were the perfect section of our people to be preyed upon by foreign secret services – German, Japanese, American, English, French and other services. We lost quite a few of these people to our lack of foresight and our attitude to the intelligentsia.

That is why this textbook should be given and taught to these intellectuals who, for one reason or another, stand apart from our society ... this book should be given to all party comrades, and to non-party comrades also, who are no less dedicated to our country. They should be made to see their own horizons, increase their political knowledge.

What kind of program? I would suggest that three stages and sections be utilized to have people read this textbook and those that will attend political circles.

FIRST – this should be given and taught to the people who still have a low level of political understanding, those who are willing. I would divide the textbook into 3 parts: first – 4 sections, “the birth of the party of Bolsheviki, before there was yet no party”; second – three sections, “party of Bolsheviki in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat”; and third part – “party of Bolsheviki in control of the State”, when did it take power and what does it do.

This must be at first difficult, but after a year, they would understand.

SECOND – the most numerous and to my mind the most interesting to cadres. They should be taught the 12 sections. Only the 12 sections and nothing more.

THIRD – top comrades, who had schooling and have already mastered some Marxism-Leninism. This section should be given in more details, give examples, make them write their versions, their opinions and their answers. They should get more out of this textbook than the textbook states. Different themes should be discussed, debated and argued about, based on Marxism-Leninism.

I would suggest that this is the way it should proceed. In other words: Second proposal – all of the textbook; more thought given to details, examples, available materials, they should get more than the textbook offers – each section to be discussed, analyzed and brought into the context of life itself.

This is all, comrades.⁴⁶

(Prolonged applause.)

ZHDANOV: What is your pleasure or suggestions for further discussion?

VOICES: Stop the debate.

ZHDANOV: Who is for stopping the debate, please raise your hands. Who is against? No one. Debate is being closed.

APRF F.45, Op. 1, I.D. 1122, L. 28-111.

1. History ACP[B]. Short Course M. 1938, S.8, p. 82.
2. Same as above. Pages 182-183.
3. LUXEMBURG ROSA (1871-1919). Leader of the German and Polish movement, representative of the left social-democrats in the 2nd International.

4. These were the tasks of the composition of the textbook as Stalin visualized it, in order to correct the wrong approaches and weaknesses that were encountered in the propagandist materials and methods of teaching.

5. Yaroslavsky E.M. (Gubelman) (1878-1943). Historical, publicist, member of Commission for Party Control. Member of Commission that wrote the Short History of ACP[B].

6. Pospelov P.N. (1898-1970). Member of CPSU since 1934. Historian, also member of Commission writing the Short History.

7. Knorin (Knorinsh) V.G. (1880-1938). Party member from 1928, part of Russian representation in the Comintern, one of the authors of the Short History.

8. Bubnov A.S. (1883-1940). Author of many party books. He was arrested in 1938 but was rehabilitated by Krushchev after the XX Congress.

9. Popov N.N. (1891-1938). Member of party apparatus of Ukraine, historian. He was demoted and arrested 5 times. Krushchev rehabilitated him after the XX Congress.

10. This is the book by Lenin: "Two Tactics Social-Democracy in a Democratic Revolution".

11. Four sections of the "Short History" about the Prague Conference were written by Stalin.

12. Ingulov S.B. (1893-). Head of the Press Bureau of CC.

14. Stalin. Soch. T. 6, pages 69-188.

15. This is about the April theses by V.I. Lenin, pages 149-183.

16. Kerensky A.F. (1881-1970). Member of the temporary committee of the State Duma, Chairman of Government overthrown in Nov. 1917.

17. Lvov G.E. (1861-1925). Minister of Kerensky's government from March-July 1917.

18. Lenin and his works about the readiness of Russia for a socialist revolution.

19. Correct name of this article by Lenin is: "About the Slogan of United States of Europe", pages 351-355.

20. *Ibid.* – pages 354-825.

21. *Ibid.* – page 133.

22. *Ibid.* – pages 17-19.

23. Engels. The beginning of the family, private property and state, published in 1947, page 11.

24. This is meant as the article by Lenin: "what is meant by the 'Friends of the People'," pages 125-346.

25. Belton – pseudonym Plekhanov.

26. Stalin talks about Lenin and Plekhanov and analyzes some of the works by Engels.

27. Mitin M.B. (1901-1987). Philosopher, academic who praised the publication of the Short History of ACP[B] and compared it to the "Communist Manifesto".

28. Engels in the work *Anti-During*, page 202.

29. This is not explained in the stenographic version.

30. Papanin I.D. (1894-1986). Director of the first hydroelectrical station "CP-1". Hero of Soviet Union, Deputy to Supreme Soviet.

31. This theme of preserving the state under Communism in case the capitalist states exist, Stalin elaborated on this theme: Stalin-"Questions on Leninism".

32. This question is about the trials of the enemies of USSR in 1937-1938, including some of the CC members of CPSU.

33. This is the same theme by Stalin at the XVIII Congress of ACP[B], pages 604-606.

34. Karl Marx on philosophy, pages 65-185.

35. Stalin explains the questions of the production of workers as the most important factor in society.

36. Marx and Engels - Communist Manifesto.

37. Same as above.

38. Same as above.

39. Ugarov A.I. (1900-1939). First Secretary of Ministry of Culture, member of CC. Rehabilitated by Krushchev in 1956.

40. This refers to the Institute of Red Professors which was closed by persons who were later taken to task, and the Institute was re-established.

41. Molotov V.M. (1890-1986). Member of Politbureau CC since 1926, then Foreign Minister, then dropped by Krushchev after 1953.

42. This proposal was put into effect in later years when Higher Party Schools were established by the CC CPSU, plus 177 two years schools in 1947. All these schools were taught from the "Short History of ACP[B]", plus the world of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

43. Shkiriatov M.F. (1883-1954) was a leader of CPSU from the peasants and worked in the CC from 1921-1934, was member of the Commission for Party Control.

44. This term "intelligentsia" is in reference to the fact that between 1930 to 1942, there was not one member of CC CPSU that had completed university or college. In 1939-1971, 4% of the secretaries of regional districts and 41% of the secretaries of republican districts and republics did not have secondary school education.

(The author of these facts sneers at these figures and quotes Solzhenitsyn as to the "low level", cultural upbringing of communists in the Soviet Union. But these "uneducated functionaries" built the USSR and did not sell it as did the so-called "intelligent intellectuals of the 1990's" – Editors)

45. This refers to the textbook of "Short History" which became the textbook that was studied by all Communists.

46. Zhdanov A.A. (1896-1948). Secretary of CC CPSU from 1934, also First Secretary of the Leningrad District, member of Politbureau from 1935. He was assassinated in Leningrad by counter-revolutionary forces.

OUR COMMENT:

After reading this extremely revealing document, you marvel at the knowledge, perception and analytical skill of J.V. Stalin.

Can you imagine to yourself if all of the proposals, plans, well thought-out human analyses of cadres had been put into practice, what kind of Soviet Union it would have been now?

Stalin had a manner of speaking without empty phrases, embellishments – he cut right to the core of the problem, repeated it

twice or three times for clarity – to make certain that it sank into the heads of the listeners.

He pointed out shortcomings, the areas where the work of Communists must improve. He stated bitter facts, uncovered mistakes and demanded that Lenin be followed. He (Stalin) was only a disciple of Lenin. Where is this "cult, dictator, ogre, selfish, brutal" and many more falsehoods can be added that were ascribed to Stalin?

The main question should be asked as such: Why was this textbook, full of analytical Marxism-Leninism systematically taken off the shelves, away from Soviet people in the last 10 years? Can anyone, after reading Stalin's speech to the Propagandists, find any fault with it? Was there no criticism and self-criticism in it?

This brilliant analysis predicted what would happen if certain rules, attitudes, behaviour and departure from Marxism-Leninism would not be followed. History has certainly proven Stalin correct! History certainly has absolved J.V. Stalin!

Onwards after the XX Congress of CPSU, Krushchev, then Brezhnev, Gorbachev and finally Yeltsin, all have proceeded to dismantle the Communist ideals and ideology step by step. This was done systematically, well planned, well thought-out and with the help of "Agents of Influence" from the West. These enemies of the people achieved temporarily the disintegration of the mighty USSR. □



LEONID NIKITOVICH KHRUSHCHEV

We publish his photo in order to show readers the face of the son of Nikita Khrushchev, both of whom betrayed their country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

There is evidence that Nikita Khrushchev started his attacks against J.V. Stalin, partly because of the death by a firing squad of his son during the Great Patriotic War.

WAS NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S SON SHOT?

From Military Archives of the NKVD-KGB and the Military-Historical Journal, 1989

Much has been written about Leonid Khrushchev, son of Nikita Khrushchev and how he met his death; or was he captured by the German Army? was he shot down, since he was an officer in the Soviet Airforce, a fighter pilot?

There is a persistent theme by historians that point to Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in his infamous "cult of the individual" speech at the XX Congress of CPSU, only because he could not forgive Stalin for not saving his son's life when he was sentenced by the Military Tribunal.

Many scientists, historians and analysts were looking into this question with some astounding results.

Looking into all the archival materials, reading all sorts of books and diaries by different authors, I was surprised as to the inaccuracies of these stories. It seems that each author tried to "white-wash the sordid situation" to please certain patrons or on behalf of certain highly placed government and party officials.

I talked to Ivan Kuzovkov, Commander of the Unit of fighters where Leonid Khrushchev was a fighter pilot. Kuzovkov was a Major General of the Soviet Airforce and here is what he stated. It's a pity that he died in August of 1989.

General Kuzakov said that the son of N.S. Khrushchev, Leonid, was shot down by German artillery and became a prisoner of war. Having found this out, Nikita Khrushchev immediately asked Stalin to rescue his son from the POW camp. Stalin agreed to the exchange of prisoners, thus Leonid Khrushchev was part of this exchange.

But the KGB knew facts that were very critical of Leonid Khrushchev, because reliable information was that when Leonid Khrushchev was in the POW camp, he behaved extremely badly and was fulfilling practically the role of a "Quisling" in order to get Soviet POW's to desert from the Red Army. He propagandized on behalf of Nazi Germany.

According to the Military Tribunal and in accordance with military laws, Leonid was tried and was sentenced to death.

Having found out about the military sentence against his son, Khrushchev pleaded with Stalin. According to the stenographic record in the files of KGB, Stalin replied:

"The guilt of your son is indisputable and I have no jurisdiction or right to overrule the sentence as prescribed by the Military Tribunal according to laws during wartime and hostilities!"

General Kuzakov stated that because Stalin did not intervene - or could not - this is why Khrushchev, besides other activities of his in the party, started this campaign against J.V. Stalin. General Kuzakov showed me his personal records of the trial - all of this pointed to the guilt of Khrushchev's son.

What was interesting is the fact that documents that are now in the Archives of KGB have 180 pages missing from the dossier on Leonid Khrushchev since Nikita Khrushchev became head of the Soviet Union in 1954. Who was it that started to "revise" the KGB documents? It started in 1954 after Stalin's death.

Why was Leonid Khrushchev awarded the highest medals after his death?

Why are the pages missing which dealt with the trial proceeding?

The numerical order of the trial pages starting with No. 892 to No. 12481 plus supplementing documents marked No. 296 – all these numbers are completely not in chronological order.

Who was it, and on whose instructions was this done? ... this is an enigma that maybe will never be known. But, history will not rest until all the pieces are put into place.

It is needed to be said that Stalin's son Vasili was also captured by German fascists who wanted him exchanged for Von Paulus, the Marshal that was captured in Stalingrad. Stalin would not concur in this.

This act alone showed the courage, the dedication of J.V. Stalin who said, "All Red Army soldiers are my sons, I cannot choose one over the others!"

- Editor

Military-Historical Journal

OUR COMMENT:

This document also confirms the role that Nikita Khrushchev played in the leadership of the CPSU. Supporting Trotsky; going and promoting the liquidation of "enemies of the people"; slavish "promotion of Stalin", for which Stalin criticized him; firing his complete staff while in Moscow; finding "enemies" under every table; demonizing Stalin and the "cult of the individual"; making certain that his son's trial documents are "missing"; the disastrous "corn" planting spree. All these events point to a man who was vain, self-indulging, not very cultured, a great opportunist who was the kingpin in the process of liquidating the USSR and in devastating the Communist movement in the world.

Let us remember that his infamous XX Congress anti-Stalin speech was in the hands of New York Times newspaper even before the CPSU and 17 million Soviet Communists knew about its contents!

His unsavoury history will record him as one of the greatest traitors the world has ever seen. □

GREATER GERMANY

***From: NKVD-KGB Archives
As Published in the Military-Historical Journal***

Much has been written about the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and their role in the Second World War in the West, mostly about the struggles and fight against Hitler's fascism and German armies when they occupied Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Here, we publish an article and photographs that were never before published. These are from the Archives of former USSR and they show clearly, without any need to agitate the reader, as to what German fascists planned for these Republics and how these Republics, through their leaders, welcomed Hitler to their country, not realizing what was being planned for them – Editors.

"Photographs that are seen here are under the heading of "Greater Germany". From May 14-21 in 1942, Minister of fascist Germany "in charge of Eastern territories", Alfred Rosenberg, visited these occupied Soviet lands and other Soviet territories that Germans had captured.

In memory of this high echelon visit, three official photo albums were put together. Later on, near the end of the war, these documents and photo albums were captured near Berlin, when the First Ukrainian Army was reaching Berlin. These albums were returned to the State Commission on War Crimes in Moscow, to be analyzed and studied, to see who was involved in helping the Nazis in their criminal activities in the Baltic states.



GREATER GERMANY

Photocopy of the geographic map from the photo album of Rosenberg – incorporating the 3 Baltic Republics and Poland. These lands were to be resettled by returning German officers and men, after the population would either be liquidated or expelled.




Top: At central train station in Riga, Latvia, Reichskommissar Loze greets Rosenberg.

Bottom: Girls greet with flowers the Reichskommissar at the central train station.





Top: University of Riga, Latvia officially welcomed the Nazi occupiers with honours.





Left: This is the way real patriots were taken care of.

This is in Orshe, Latvia

Photo taken from a dead German soldier's


Below: Mitau castle holding a parade of welcome to Germany Army.







Top: City of Doblen, greeting the REichsminister with Nazi salutes.

Bottom: Estonians welcome the fascists with bread and salt.





Top/Bottom: The Reichsminister and entourage, after receiving keys to the city as guests, wined and dined, were welcomed by hundreds of thousands of citizens with Nazi salutes and shouting "Sieg Heil".



These photographs were supplemented by captured photos found on German officers and soldiers.

Take a look at these photographs and see the bowing and warm welcome for the fascist butchers.

The materials that are in the Archives, although still not published (no one knows why – although we have a good guess ourselves – Editors) these documents that we looked at, gathered from the “Book of Contents”, it is clear that the overall plan of German Reich as the map here shows graphically – that if Germans were victors in the Great Patriotic War, and if the Red Army did not liberate these 3 states, by 1950, these lands would have been given outright to the returning German soldiers and officers to settle. The local population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was planned to be liquidated. There are official documents showing the orders that were given for mass extermination of these people. It did not matter that most of these people welcomed German occupation forces or had fascist-nationalistic leanings. They were to have been exterminated as other people were.

OUR COMMENT:

Need we say anything more? Photographs do not lie!

BUT WHY – were these photographs not published and the Archives not opened up until now? Stalin died in early 1950's when the country was rebuilding itself from the horrible devastation – the publishing of the history was not the first priority then, there were more important things to do. People knew these horrors, they saw it with their own eyes.

BUT – why did Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev prevent these documents from seeing the light of day?

Can there be any other proof needed as to what the governments of these three Baltic Republics at that time promoted to their people?

The lie that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were all anti-fascists is nothing but complete lies. Yes, there were many patriots, but most of them were hung on the gallows or shot.

Who were the first former Soviet Republics that Gorbachev urged to secede? You know the answer, don't you?

PHOTOGRAPHS CERTAINLY DO NOT LIE!

□

KATIN FOREST MASSACRE

From: Military-Historical Journal, 1991

By Romyald Sviatoc

Translation from Russian by Max Rinis

Before presenting the information in my possession, I would like to re-establish in the memory of the readers the political situation of that time and then present the question: Who gained more from the murder of the Polish officers?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to, at least sketchily, clarify the relations of the Germans and the Russians towards the Poles. It is known that the Germans started the war with Poland, as they required Polish lands and Polish workers. From the first days of the occupation, they began to destroy the Polish intellectual elite. The movement of the Russians into the eastern part of Poland had a different character, which was expressed in the note of the Soviet Government handed to the Polish ambassador in Moscow. The Polish-German war exposed the insolvency of the Polish state. In the course of ten days of military (German) operations, Poland lost all of its manufacturing and cultural centers. Warsaw, as a Capital of Poland, did not exist any more. The Polish government fell apart and did not show signs of life. This meant that the Polish state and its government factually ceased to exist.

With this, the agreements that had been concluded between the USSR and Poland were no longer valid – left to itself and abandoned without direction. Poland became a convenient

field for all kinds of the accidental and unexpected, capable of threats to the Soviet Union. Because of this, being until then neutral, the Soviet Government could not be indifferent to these facts any more, as also to the fact that the Ukrainians and the White Russians, – being of the same blood (as the Russians) – and living on the territory of Poland, and having been thrown to the mercy of such destiny, remained unprotected.

In view of such a situation, the Soviet Government gave an order to the High Command of the Red Army that the army cross the frontier and take under protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia. After this took place, the war between Poland and the Soviet Union was officially ended and Poland represented no more of a danger for the USSR. Those elements out of the number of the Polish population who were still dangerous, were being deported by the Soviet authorities in 1940 into various locations in Siberia.

The situation with the Germans was exactly the opposite. In spite of the fact that the German armies were occupying Poland, the war between the two states was continuing, as some of the Polish army were fighting against the Germans in France and England, and therefore, any Polish officer presented to the Germans a potential danger.

According to Polish statistics, in September 1939, the Russians took prisoner ten to twelve thousand Polish officers. It was also known that the majority of them were kept in two camps: in the Korelsky where there were located nearly 4,500

people, and in Starobelsky – nearly 4,000 officers. There was also a third camp in Ostashkova in which were kept about 4,000 officers, the rest was composed of officers, NCOs, low rank people, field gendarmes, investigating organs, border guards, prison guards.

Koselsk – ancient residence of famous Polish decent Oginsky and Puzin, is situated 250km south-east of Smolensk. The camp was located in the buildings of a former monastery which included the basic complex of buildings surrounded by a forest and arranged at a half kilometre of the complex.

At the end of November 1939, Kobelsk became an officers' camp which contained about 5,000 people. Right up to the beginning of April 1940, the camp was abandoned and occupied just by insignificant groups of the confined and separate, individual persons (the same was in the Starobelsky camp). On the eve of Christmas 1939, all the priests, with the exception of Father Jelkovsky, were given rides out of the camp. From this whole group was separated just His Holiness Father Kantak, a professor at the seminary in Pinsk.

The removal of the confined from the camps was being concluded at the beginning of April 1940. Among the departing, there were several higher ranking officers: generals Bokhaterevich, Minkevich, Smorovinsky, Bolkovitsky and Admiral Charnitsky.

Among the officers of a much lower rank, we could count nearly 100 regimental commanders, 300 majors, 1,200 captains,

2,500 lieutenants, 500 students of military schools. The general quantity of officers – nearly 4,500, among them 200 military flyers and 50 naval officers. For example, 50% of the last group of inmates consisted of officers of the reserve, among them 21 professors and teachers of university, more than 300 medics (physicians and therapists), many of whom were outstanding specialists, several hundred judges, lawyers, secretaries, hundreds of engineers, teachers, journalists, businessmen, etc.

Starobelsk – a provincial little town in the eastern part of the Ukraine. The Polish camp was located on the outskirts of a former monastery whose walls were taking up a section of the public square of about 15 acres with a large Greek-Orthodox church in the middle. On the left side of the complex, there was a different little church and more than a dozen various constructions of brick and wood. In the post-revolutionary years, the monastery was used as a transitory camp for travelling further towards the east. Afterwards, until the arrival of the Poles, grain was being stored there.

From the end of November 1993 to the first days of April 1940, when the last groups of prisoners were being transferred, in the camp, there were exclusively cadre officers and reserve officers, generally 4,000 people. For example, half of them were taken prisoner after the surrender of Lvov and were sent east, in contrast to agreements regarding surrender. Others had been captured as war prisoners or arrested in various sections of East Poland as a consequence of the order registration in occupied territories.

The general number of war-prisoners, the same as the character of their keep in the camp, remained unchanged up to the beginning of April 1940. Same as from the Kosyolsky camp, from here, the officers were taken in small groups, a large part of whom completely disappeared without a trace. To the moment of beginning the evacuation of the prisoners, according to the Polish commanders, 230 majors, 1,000 captains, 2,450 first and second lieutenants, 30 military students, and also civilian persons. Per orientation, the number of prisoners – 3,910 people, including several hundred officers of the Polish BBC, the whole institute of Chemical Defence, surgeons, priests of all denominations. Amongst the reserve officers, there were several hundred professors and teachers of universities, nearly 400 war and civil surgeons and helpers, several hundred engineers with university education, workers in jurisprudence, lawyers, judges, many school teachers, poets, writers, journalists, businessmen, social and political activists, and, in their midst, the vice-president of the anti-Hitler League in Poland, A. Enger.

Ostashkov – provincial town spread out north-westward of Kalinin on the Lake Salinger, on the cut-off of the railroad between stations Velikiya, Luki and Belogoye. The camp proper was situated on the lake island 15km from the city and, like the camp described above, sitting on the territory of a former monastery.

From November 1939 to the beginning of April 1940 – i.e., to the moment of the start of evacuation of the camp – there

were in it nearly 6,500 prisoners. In contrast to the two mentioned already, this was not an official one. There were there altogether only 400 officers, 300 of whom belonged to the military police and the rest of them officers, sergeants and privates from reconnaissance, the police-military-border guards, provincial police and prison guards.

From the recollections of the officers kept at Kozelskoye and Starobelskoye, we know that at the beginning of 1940, all the three camps were visited by international committees for control and the keeping of war prisoners. In the process of this activity inoculations against typhus and cholera done to the inmates, clarified and registered with such information each person's data - place of birth, address of the last place of residence, type of occupations before the war, where he plans to settle down after being freed from being a war prisoner. When the commission finished its work, the inmates were divided into groups according to which territory they were from before the war. At the same time with this, there were floating around rumours that individuals from western and central regions of Poland will shortly be sent home. And in fact, beginning with April 1940, the directors of the camps started to send groups numbering 200-300 of war prisoners to Smolensk from which officers who had been living there before the war (i.e., in western and central Poland) were sent to Brest into camps in the vicinity of Smolensk.

At present, it is complicated for me to tell how many thousands of Polish officers were freed by the Soviets from

April 1940 to the moment of the beginning of the German-Russian war of 1941. Just one thing is known: as soon as the Polish officers crossed the German border, no kind of news about them was known, up to the 13th of April 1943 when the German radio broadcast the sensational news to the whole world about finding in the forest of Katyn the murdered bodies of the Polish officers.

I have a basis to suppose that a part – possibly 2,000-3,000 officers – which were found in the Katyn Forests were transferred from the region of Smolensk, which was under occupation of the Germans, in 1941 and the rest – from other places known only to the Germans. Knowing the history of the beastly deeds perpetuated by the Hitlerites, I don't doubt that the Germans planned these murders and carried them out with their customary accuracy. They knew that the sudden disappearance of several thousand Polish officers, who it was universally believed, had been held in the USSR, would arouse serious suspicions amongst their friends who were still living in the Soviet Union, and would become the cause of antagonism in the relations between Poland and the Soviets. And actually, after the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement, the relations between our two countries were soured. This was provoked by the fact that the Polish officers did not appear for reregistration into the Polish army after the announcement of the amnesty.

In reality, to no one's surprise, Germans did everything possible to sow discontent between the Poles and Russians, since they did not want them uniting against Germany. To

prove that such a conspiracy factually existed, I quote here an excerpt from the story "Salus" by Yedzhislava Bay, published in the "Pariska Kultura" (No. 4/367/1978) in which it is confirmed that at the beginning of December 1941 in the Office of General Anders in Buzuluk, there arrived four men under the leadership of Lieutenant Shatkovsky. They announced themselves as coming from Poland and belonging to the underground organization named "Musketees". They told of rumours that Polish officers disappeared or were murdered somewhere near Smolensk.

It was later proven that this quartet was working for the German Gestapo and their job was to sow discontent and disagreement and distrust between Poles and Russians.

Similar provocations by the Germans were regular occurrences, and this one more time confirmed that the fascists will not stop at anything in order to ignite hatred between the Poles and the Russians ... the purpose being to prevent the unity of Slavic peoples.

Precisely from this standpoint, we must look at the discovery by the Germans of the graves in Katyn. It is generally known that in spring of 1943, the Germans were retreating along the entire Eastern Front and the "discovery" of the graves of the murdered Polish officers was not at all accidental, as the Germans and the Ministry of Propaganda headed by Goebbels kept on repeating to the world. It was a well-planned and calculated exercise by the Gestapo in order to provoke antagonisms and hate towards the approaching Red Army.

Of course, if you look at the situation from a German point of view, then there was nothing reprehensible in this entire procedure. You can state that all states during war behave that way, trying to provoke disagreements within enemy ranks in order to weaken them.

From my point of view, the Germans played this question of Katyn masterfully. They hung the guilty sign on the door of the Russians, and at the same time, cleansing themselves for the defeat and retreat from the onward rush of the Red Army ... and this, across the territory of Poland itself. In this way, they provoked serious arguments between the Poles and the Russians. At the same time, they even managed to split the Allies into different sections. They accomplished this colossal task worthy of admiration, if this could be said.

I have no doubt that the Germans knew, having committed this butchery that this territory would soon be overrun by the Red Army, thus giving themselves more time to spread this propaganda even more widely. The local inhabitants will surely come across these graves – they would have heard the shooting in the forest, or could have seen German soldiers escorting Polish prisoners of war.

It also made sense, when Germans planned this massacre near Smolensk, near the town of Kozee Gori, where there was a House of Rest for the NKVD, long before the war, and it was open for visits by the general public. After Germans occupied this territory, they erected a barbed wire fence, and it was strictly guarded, and no one was allowed to go near the grounds.

Even Russians, who were hired by the Germans for kitchen duty, were not allowed to go into the local forest, because that is where the Polish officers were murdered. Therefore, from the very character of the behaviour of the Germans, it is possible to conclude that the German Gestapo were hatching plans for the massacre. They took great pains to keep this location as secret as possible.

Being in Varkut, Camp #10, I met a Major of the German Army who, from 1941, found himself in Smolensk. From him, I found out that it definitely was the Germans who operated several camps for Polish war prisoners. In one conversation, I got interested in his knowing about Katyn. He answered me directly that this is the work of the hands of Germans, as it was in the interests of Germany to commit this massacre.

He was sincerely surprised that the Polish officials were blaming the Russians. The Major stated that a good soldier, especially an officer, must die, if his Motherland is perishing. He stated that after he had fallen to the Russians as a prisoner, he understood very well that he might die, and if that would be his fate, he would accept that as a good German soldier. He also knew the attempt by General Sikorski in Moscow to free the Polish officers and soldiers, which he said would assist the Soviet-Polish agreement. This German major did not, in the slightest, consider his Polish officers' massacre by Germany as a crime. To his way of thinking, these Polish officers represented a danger to the German Reich. This was also the opinion of most of the other German prisoners of war.

In Camp #11 in Verkut, I met Vlodzhimir Mandryk, who, before the war and during the period of occupation, worked in the main post office in Smolensk. He absolutely insisted that near Smolensk, from 1940 there were German camps for Polish prisoners of war. He was adamant that Germans murdered the Poles.

By his account of the period between August and October of 1941, letters to Polish prisoners of war ceased to arrive and be processed by the post office. Any letters that kept on coming to the prisoners, the Germans gave the post office orders to destroy all these letters. Also, at this time, Mandryk recalls the Germans told everyone in Smolensk that the Polish officers were relocated back in Polish territory.

In the fall of 1952, I was transferred to Norilsk where in Camp #4, I met Captain Vladislav Zak, who fell into Russian hands as a prisoner of war in September 1939. During the whole year that I lived in the barracks, I witnessed and heard discussions and arguments between Poles about the Katin question. Majority feeling concluded that it was the work of the Germans. Zak stated himself that he would have been one of the victims in Katin if he was not transferred from Smolensk to near Moscow. Here, he was accused of spying, sabotage and sentenced to 10 years loss of freedom.

We must also remember that the Polish officers at that time were schooled into a reactionary force, fed propaganda by the Polish "government in exile" which fled to London, having

refused the Red Army permission to go through Poland in order to stop the Germans.

But in my viewpoint, Captain Zak was an important witness of the Katyn affair and his story completely coincided with information from other Polish officers who in 1942 left the Polish Army for the Middle East.

Amongst the many recollections which I read about Katyn, there was a book by Stanislaw Svjanevich by the name of "In the Shadow of Katyn", and also in the book by Joseph Chapskov, "Upon the Inhuman Earth". I learned that Polish war prisoners were treated very well by the Russians. In 1940, there were 3 Polish Generals in POW camps – Minkewich, Smorovinsky and Bakhaterbur. When these prisoners were departing the camps, the Soviet authorities gave them a farewell banquet, especially for the higher officer corps. The Russians wanted to show the Germans that they are civilized and knew how to treat prisoners. This might be looked upon as having little meaning, but if you lived with the Russians during those hard times of war, you would appreciate the real meaning of that gesture.

Russians wanted to show the Polish officers that they, the Russians and Poles have one common enemy, therefore, uniting together would be in the interests of everyone. No one can convince me that it was the Russians who murdered these Polish officers. The Polish-Russian agreement of 1941 when thousands of Polish prisoners of war were freed from the camps, and the formation on Soviet territory of the Polish Army took place.

In July of 1952, together with a group of invalids, I was directed into the region of Irkutsk to camp #233. Here, I got acquainted with Father Kozera, who showed a great interest in the Katin massacre. During the eight years we were together in many camps, he accumulated many interesting materials, which brought him to the final conclusion that the Katin crime was perpetrated by Germans.

But from all the people that I met, the most significant was by the eyewitness Russian Major who was working before the war in the Commission of Forestry. After the invasion by Germany, working underground, he located himself by working on the railroad. This Russian major found out from his underground members that the Germans had encircled with barbed wire the town of Kozieh Gor, and forbade everyone to cross this zone.

The major said that "I was thinking that the Germans were building there some sort of a warehouse and other structures. I ordered my people to try and verify this fact. They found out from the population that they saw huge lorries filled with Polish prisoners of war riding towards the Katin forest, the forbidden zone. I really thought that the Germans were building a POW camp.

At the beginning of 1943, the Russian major (underground) was sent to work in Germany and there, he heard that the Germans had discovered in Katin forest the graves of murdered Polish officers, then and only then did I understand the whole treachery of the Nazi propaganda."

It was an accidental happening that I met this Russian major, and his statement convinced me that only the Germans could have perpetrated such a massacre.

Altogether, I spent nine years in the Soviet Union – two years in exile and seven years in camps. During that time, I went through much, met thousands of interesting people, but I also know that if the Soviets had wanted to get rid of the Polish officers, they would have sent them to the "Novaya Zemlya" to work and thus, be productive.

I am far from praising the Soviet system. I myself became an innocent victim. Others were not as lucky as I. I also do not pretend that I am not guilty of many things. There were people that got into the NKVD and the party who were real enemies of the system. They got rid of many dedicated people. But I cannot keep quiet on this Katyn event. I must defend the Russian people, if only to correct the existing lie that is being nurtured and promoted to this day about the Katyn massacre.

Even though I do not like the communist system, I must admit that this system has shown decency and follows the established law and order of the system. This cannot be said about fascism. If a person is condemned to be shot, the sentence is carried out in jail, but only after the approval of the Supreme Court or the Supreme Soviet of USSR.

This is why the findings of the "International Commission" that was established in the German occupation zone, must not be taken as truth almighty. This "Commission" was under the

guidance of the German Gestapo. Professor Booktz from the Wroclaw University who took part in the exhuming of the grave knew the truth, because later, he was killed by the Nazis.

With all the documentation that I have in my hands, I state categorically that the accusations by the Polish Government in London, England were made solely for political reasons. I can also say the same about General Anders, who when he heard the announcement about the Katyn massacre, began to demonstrate unhealthy psychological symptoms, ordering the Polish Army in Russia to send a search party and investigate this event. He ordered Captain Chapsko to gather slanderous materials against the Soviet Union. Captain Chapsko, after leaving the USSR, wrote the book for the purpose of poisoning the Polish-Russian relations.

Here, I must point out that General Anders having influence on the High Command of the Polish Army in USSR, made a major mistake, and incompetence of General Sikorsky who should have found a more suitable person for this task. In his place, he could have had General Boruda-Spekhovich – I'm sure that he would not have been afraid to fight on the Eastern Front against the Germans. Russian bread would not have irritated him or sleeping on a straw mattress. He would have been able to be the head of the Polish Army, entering and freeing Warsaw. We know that General Anders was not able to forget this demeaning time, spent in prison and filled with hatred towards Russia and the Russian nation. General Anders did everything from the very beginning to have bad relations

between the Russian and Polish commands. With every step he took, he never wanted to have the Polish Army fight together with the Soviet Army the German occupation. He never wanted the Polish Army to fight on the Eastern Front in order to liberate Poland. From the very beginning, he wanted to lead the Polish Army out of Russia to the Far East.

Together with the Polish Ambassador Kot, they did not want to understand that together with all of the Allies, from the East and from the West, they could have taken part in liberating Poland. They behaved so badly, causing such dissent, that they did tremendous harm to Poland and to the Polish people.

Towards this end, I checked Polish documents, diplomatic correspondence, Polish Archives at the Polish Institute in London as well as the British Archives. I confirmed that the answers given by the Soviets regarding the Katyn massacre were hidden from the eyes of the press and from its own people.

Here are these answers:

- In September of 1941, Molotov in connection with the announced amnesty of August 12, announced that all Polish citizens who had lost their freedom; as for instance, war prisoners, were freed, and besides this, were given financial help by the Soviet government.

- Stalin, in conversation with the Polish Ambassador Kot on March 18, 1942, stated that he ordered all Poles freed. Why hold them? Some could be living on German territories (occupied) got scared and escaped to Poland.

- The Minister of Security Beria answered: Maybe we committed a mistake by freeing the Poles and they returned to Poland under German occupation?

- Commissar Vishinsky of Foreign Affairs: We freed all the prisoners of war who were on our territory, we cannot return those that are not here.

From the above, it is clear that General Anders received a full accounting about the Polish prisoners of war. Is it not possible that General Anders lied to the Polish Government in London and in this way, was helping the Germans regarding the Katyn Forest?

KATIN IN THE LIGHT OF BRITISH DOCUMENTS

As we already stated, our journal received British Archival materials sent to us by Rimoud Svjatek from London. Below, we publish the Polish and Soviet excerpts, the theme deals with the disappearance of Polish officers.

October 14, 1941, there took place periodic meetings between the Polish ambassador, Professor Kot, and Commissar Vishinsky. During this meeting, the Polish ambassador referred to the Moscow meeting of General Sikorsky: "I will permit myself to hope that General Sikorsky will find his officers when he will arrive." Answer: "We will assemble all officers that have arrived on our territory" answered Vishinsky. But we cannot give you those that are not here. The English, for example, gave us a list of their co-citizens, who, according to their opinion, are in the USSR, but who, in reality, never were here.

November 8, 1941, the amnesty given to all Polish citizens who had been kept under guard in the POW camps were freed. All other categories were also freed by Soviet authorities and given all the help necessary to get to their own country or the choice of remaining and join the Polish Army to fight the Germans."

November 14, 1941, Soviet ambassador Bogomolov handed the Polish representative a note repeating the contents of the note delivered by Molotov on November 8th. In it, the following was emphasized: Freed also are all Polish officers who were held under guard on the territory of the USSR. The assumption made by the Polish Prime-Minister that a large number of Polish officers are held in the Northern territories of the USSR, are based on inexact information."

Two days earlier, there took place (November 12, 1941) a regular meeting of Polish ambassador Kot and Commissar Vishinsky, who announced: "In my opinion, all the officers are already freed. At present, it is necessary just to establish their place of living. And if by chance anyone is not freed as of this date, he will, without question, be freed. As I see it, this problem does not exist anymore."

Finally, after three and a half months of fruitless attempts to find the lost people, during which not one of the Soviet institutions was able to give a "concrete answer" - this is according to the Polish London Government who questioned the Soviets as to them telling the truth. The Polish ambassador on November 14, 1942 asked for an audience with Stalin.

At that meeting, there was present also Commissar Molotov. Below is the record from the Archives of the conversation that took place at the meeting:

AMBASSADOR: I have already taken much of your time, while you have so many other problems. Can I ask one more question?

STALIN: (politely) Of course, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR: You, as the author of the amnesty for Polish citizens within the USSR, would it not burden you to use your influence so that the initiative would be carried out fully regarding the Polish officers?

STALIN: Are there Poles who are still not freed?

AMBASSADOR: Not one Polish officer is freed or appeared from the camps which were closed in the spring of 1940 ...

STALIN: (interrupting) I will check this out. However, after the Poles were freed, much could have happened. What was the name of the commander in the defense of Lvov? Langner, if I'm not mistaken.

AMBASSADOR: Yes, it was General Langner.

STALIN: We freed him last year. We brought him to Moscow and conversed with him. Then he left for abroad - Romania.

MOLOTOV: (nods in affirmative)

STALIN: For our administration, there are no exceptions, however, something identical could have happened also with the other officers, same as General Langner.

AMBASSADOR: We have a list. For instance, General Stanislav Haller up to now has not been found, or persons from other camps when they were freed.

STALIN: We freed them all, even those people who were sent to us by General Sikorsky to blow up our bridges, and kill Soviet people; we freed even those people. Actually, it was General Sosonkovsky.

AMBASSADOR: I have a request to you, Mr. President, that you give an order to free the officers, whom we need for the organization of the army. We are preparing for their settlement the moment they are out of the camps.

STALIN: Are those exact lists?

AMBASSADOR: Each name written by the management of your camps according to the daily roll calls. We were not given any names of Officers of the Army of General Anders, which he commanded in Poland.

(Stalin, who up to then was standing, began slowly to walk around the room, smoking a cigarette, but attentively listening. He quickly went to the desk where there was a telephone to NKVD and asked to speak to the commander. Molotov also stood up, walked over to the telephone table. There was a busy signal.)

STALIN: (into the telephone) Stalin speaking. Are all the Poles freed from POW camps? (keeps quiet to hear the answer.) I have here the Polish Ambassador who tells me that none of them were freed. (he again listens to an answer. He returns to the table.)

After several minutes on a different subject in discussions, the telephone rings again. He returns to the table without saying anything at all. Obviously, the ambassador was asking questions that he probably already knew the answer to. The ambassador basically accused the Soviets of lying, of not telling about Katyn that they could not have known.

December 8, 1941 – there took place a meeting of Stalin and General Sikorski at which there was present General Anders and Commissar Molotov. Here's part of the conversation:

SIKORSKY: I wish to note in your presence that your declaration regarding amnesty is not transformed into life. Many of our people are still in your camps and prisons.

STALIN: (making notes) This is not possible, because the amnesty is for everyone and all Polish citizens were freed. (the last words were addressed to Molotov.)

MOLOTOV: (nodded in agreement)

ANDERS: Details of this question raised by Sikorsky. This does not correspond to the present situation.

SIKORSKY: This is not our concern to give the Soviet Union a detailed list of our Officers ... this should be done by your people. I have a list only of the 4,000 officers who were detained by your forces, but it is not a complete list. We know that you are holding them. The Germans told us that they have no Polish officers in custody. These people are here, no one has returned to Poland!

STALIN: This is not possible, they were all freed, they must be someplace else

ANDERS: Where could they have hidden? The majority of these officers on this list, I know personally. They were on my staff, commanders who were serving under me ...

STALIN: They are without any doubt freed and maybe have not appeared in Poland yet.

SIKORSKI: Russia is a huge country, maybe some of your people did not receive the command to let these officers free. You have no reason to hold even one Pole.

MOLOTOV: It is impossible that your people are still in our POW camps!

ANDERS: I am absolutely sure that they are still here.

STALIN: This question is unclear. Official persons will again be given orders regarding Polish officers, which I doubt have been disobeyed by our people previously. We have to get to the bottom of this!

March 18, 1942, General Anders, together with some of his staff, again had a meeting with Stalin. He raised this question again. Here are excerpts from their notes:

ANDERS: Still, we think that you are keeping our Polish officers in POW camps. None have returned. Therefore, you people must have them. (He hands two pages of names which Molotov accepted.)

STALIN: I already told you, and I also issued another command. We were told by all commanders that every single Polish officer was freed. We searched every detention camp, including the German POW camps all the way to Kamchatka! I am assuring you that there are NO POLISH OFFICERS in our

camps. Why should we hold them? Is it not possible that your Polish officers were in POW camps on the territory that German occupation forces have under their control now? They could have seized them and dispersed them.

OKULITSKY: It's impossible, the Germans would have told us.

STALIN: We detained only those that were engaged in spying and sabotage, which is extremely small in numbers.

July 10, 1942, the Polish authorities received an official note from the USSR Ministry stating the following: "It is known that many Polish officers and others who were freed in accordance with the Amnesty, went to other countries. Part of them left for Germany ... in conclusion, as the result of the freed Poles migration from Northern and Southern territories of the USSR during the winter of 1941. In spite of repeated warnings by our General Command that the freed Poles should not try to leave for Poland or Germany during the heavy fighting at the fronts, many freed Poles nevertheless decided to take their chances by crossing the front lines. Hunger, weather, heavy fighting they encountered produced countless deaths. They were safer in the POW camps or working in the rear.

On July 8, 1942, this question of the Polish officers was discussed for the last time with Ambassador Kot, accompanied by temporary entrusted authority in Polish Affairs in the USSR, Sokolnitsky, was visiting Vishinsky. Sokolnitsky wrote up this meeting as follows:

VISHINSKY: Concerning the missing Poles, I am authorized to assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that we verified this question and are absolutely convinced that in no place in the USSR are there ANY Polish officers left. These officers are neither in the Far East, nor any other location. Possibly some have died in POW camps. Mr. Ambassador, we are at war, in the death struggle with German fascism. They were ALL freed before the beginning of the war with Germany, the last part after hostilities started.

KOT: Regarding the Polish officers, let me remind you that I received countless enquiries from Poland, from their families, who are worried about the fate of their loved ones. There is not one officer back home.

SOKOLOVSKI: If our prisoners were freed, then give us the list of them, showing the dates and places from where they were freed.

VISHINSKY: In spite of our diplomatic contacts between Polish authorities in London and our Government, and in spite of the confidential information gathered by us and the Officers of the Polish General Staff, which the Soviets in the autumn of 1940 transferred from the Giazovetsky camp to Moscow – a group of officers, sympathizers of the Soviet Union and its struggle against fascism, gathered in Moscow and on the outskirts of Moscow, these patriotic officers had discussions with the Soviet side at which meeting a group of officers decided to organize a Polish section within the Red Army.

In confirmation of this event, Joseph Chapsky in his book "Memories of Stavrobelsk" stated the following: "On October

1940, 8 months before the outbreak of German-Soviet war, a group of Polish officers were transferred under the Regimental Commander Berling where a suggestion was made to organize a Polish Army which together with the Red Army would struggle against German fascists and liberate Poland. This was agreed to and the hope was that in this Polish Army would enlist all other Poles, of all political persuasions but with the idea of fighting to liberate Poland from the German army.

In the meeting, Beria and Merkulov were present. Everyone was convinced that this Polish Army would unite the patriotic Poles in the struggle for the ending of the bloodshed and the liberation of the occupied lands.

Merkulov from the Soviet side stated that "we are making a terrible mistake, knowing the attitude of General Anders". This remark played into the hands of the reactionary Poles who took it as the cause for the disappearance of the Polish officers.

In April of 1943, the Germans "discovered" the bodies of the Polish officers in Katyn. The Polish Army, under the command of General Anders, was already in the Near East. General Anders commanded a Polish Army loyal to the Polish London Government in exile, who did not want to fight on the Eastern Front, choosing to go to the West and join the Allies on the African front against Italy.

On May 4, 1943, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Eden made the following statement in the house of Commons: "The House will no doubt get through listening to my short announcement regarding the difficulties which regretfully

arose between the Soviets and the Poles. I don't see the necessity of going into the reasons or the origin of this quarrel. I merely wish to draw attention, which by the way was already done by the Polish and Soviet governments in their publicized announcement towards the cynicism with which the Nazi murderers of hundreds of thousands of innocent Poles and Russians are using history about mass murders with the purpose of destroying the unity of the Allies.

From the very beginning, the Government of His Highness was doing everything possible to convince the Poles not to allow German manipulations to have even the slightest success. The only wish of the Government of England is that the disagreement between these two U.N. countries were to be disposed as quickly as possible, in spite of the disagreement between Marshal Stalin and General Sikorsky. We hope that the coming new Soviet-Polish agreement will be signed and thus stop the German manouvers that try to weaken Allied unity or the growing resistance by the enslaved people of Europe."

AUTHOR'S CONCLUSION

In conclusion of this sad history, I would like to advise the Poles that they once-and-for-all discontinue and stop the insults regarding their Eastern neighbour, since the borders of Poland have been enlarged as the result of the Second World War, for the benefit of Poland.

Every true Pole must not only be satisfied with this, but also appreciate the country which was responsible for saving

Poland from practical extinction. I returned from the Camp in 1956 and visited our Western territories. Only then did I realize the economical importance of the new Polish borders and in my heart I forgave the Soviets for their jailing me, because it was Stalin and the USSR which brought and formed these new important borders for Poland.

For all those who still stubbornly dream about Poland from the Baltic to the Black Sea, I suggest that they read the letter by Winston Churchill to the Poles. It calls for those Poles who are not aware of history or what it is they want, nor what they now possess, and do not wish to know or admit that it was the Soviet Union through its sacrifices of many millions of its people and soldiers, so the Poles could have their own independent state – which they were never able to gain by their own strength:

To: Prime-Minister – Foreign Office

November 7, 1944

1. I don't think that it is necessary to invite the Poles, but I will inform you about that in the next two days.
2. I would suggest that you do some deep thinking before we tell the world that we're declaring war on behalf of Poland and that the Polish nation deserves to have better territory, especially that we in the West never fought for or liberated this territory ourselves, or undertake to defend these new borders and that the lives of 20-30 million Russians gave Poland this right and guarantee of the Western borders of Poland.

3. Moreover, without the Russian Army, Poland would have been destroyed or brought into slavery and the Polish nation itself would have been wiped off the face of the earth. Without the valiant Red Army, no other power on earth would have been able to accomplish this. Poland now will be an independent, free country in the heart of Europe with wonderful and better territories than the one she had before. And if she will not accept this, Britain removes from itself all obligations and lets the Poles themselves work out their own agreement with the Soviets.

4. I don't think that we can be asked to give any further assurances and promises to Poland regarding their borders or their attitude regarding the USSR. Poland fell in days to German Nazis, while the Polish government at that time refused to receive help from the Soviet Union.

Those Poles that are now vying for leadership in Poland must think that we, the British, are stupid that we would start a war against our USSR ally on behalf of the demands to restore the Polish eastern borders which had the majority of non-Poles living in those territories. A nation that proved to the world that it could not defend itself, must accept the guidance of those who saved them and who represent for them a perspective of genuine freedom and independence.

– Winston Churchill

Translation and publication by the Editor of the Military-Historical Journal
Captain B.F. Patrushev

Comment from the Military-Historical Journal

Here, respected reader, is another version of the fate of the Polish officers whose bodies were discovered in the Katyn forest. R. Sviatek expressed his opinion and in the logic of his reasoning, you cannot refute it. Of course, his report on the meetings of Vishinsky, Beria and others are based on documents, but his interpretations are his own. He must realize that he was brought up under a different system than existing in the Soviet Union, where words and deeds did not always coincide!

This terrible tragedy will be fully corroborated in the future, when German documents will be found or someone will give them up. The Katyn forest tragedy is proven by International research agencies as the work of German fascists in order to sow discord among the Polish-Russian relations and the cooperation among the Allies.

OUR COMMENT:

The writer of this article in the Military-Historical Journal, if you read between the lines, is very anti-previous Soviet leadership (Stalin, Molotov, Beria), but nevertheless, he is objective in publishing this story as a prisoner of war, a Pole who was interned by the Red Army.

As much as we know the intrigues of Winston Churchill and the role played by the British Government, together with France and USA

before the Second World War, when they were urging Hitler to go Eastward ... Churchill said the right words when he reminded the Premier-Minister of Poland that "Poland itself succumbed to Germany in days, not able to defend itself, or more to the point – not willing to defend itself, since it was sold off by the Pilsudski reactionary-fascist government at that time."

Maybe the Second World War could have been prevented if Poland had agreed to have the Red Army come in and take a stand in Poland, thus stopping Hitler in his tracks!

It is also necessary to remember that pre-Second World War Poland was a reactionary-clerical-fascist regime, trying to gain its age-old dream of "Poland from the Baltic to the Black Sea"!

Patriotic Poles fought German fascists in the East and the West, despite the opposition of the former government, which sat out the War in London!

Twenty seven million Soviet people died in that war. Over 50,000,000 people died in total in that carnage started by the Imperialist powers themselves in order to try and divide the world into economic zones, to solve their problems through war.

The Katin massacre lie is still being perpetuated and blame is aimed at the Soviet Union, in spite of all known facts to the contrary.

History has a way of putting facts in the open that no amount of propaganda and lies will be able to hide! □

MATERIALS OF FEBRUARY-MARCH PLENUM OF CC AUCP[B] 1937

Translated from Journal Questions of History (Russian), 1995

March 3, 1937. Evening Session.

ANDREEV: (Chairman of this session) The meeting is now open. Reporting will be by comrade Stalin.

STALIN: Comrades! From the reports and discussions held previously at the plenum, it is obvious that we have here a problem that could be characterized by three basic facts.

First – the harmful and diversionary espionage of foreign country agents, in whose ranks the Trotskyites played a very active part. They managed to involve practically all of our organizations to a greater or lesser degree, industrial administrative and party organizations.

Secondly – agents of foreign countries, including Trotskyites, have managed to worm themselves not only into the lower party organs, but also they managed to get some top ranking posts in the government and party.

Thirdly – some of our leading comrades, in the CC and in regions of the country, not only were not able to expose these agents, diversionists, spies and assassins, but they became unwilling tools in this anti-State work and even unknowingly appointed some of these agents to responsible positions. These are undeniable facts, according to the reports and documents that we heard during this plenum.

How can we explain that our leading comrades, having wide experience in all forms of anti-party attacks and anti-Soviet movements, have shown themselves in this regard naive and blind, and they could not recognize or unmask these enemies? Could we think that these agents were operating just by chance, without us expecting them to do so? We cannot state this. We can see their dirty work in our country for the last 10 years, starting from the Shakhtinsky period, which are written up in our official documents.

Can we honestly say that in the last while we did not have any signals that some dirty work and spying work was being done, plus some terroristic acts by the Trotskyite-Zinoviev agents of fascism? No, we cannot say that we did not know. There were such signals and we Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The terroristic act of the assassination of Kirov was the first serious signal to us, that the enemies of the state will be hiding, will cover their deeds under a mask of "Bolsheviks", hide under the party card, in order to worm their way into our confidence.

The trial process of the "Leningrad Centre" as was the trial process of the "Zinoviev-Kamenev", gave us new signals which were connected to the killing of comrade Kirov.

The Zinoviev-Trotskyites surrounded themselves with all the remaining enemies of socialism, bourgeois elements who now have become spies, terrorists in the service of German political secret service – they are the main elements who have wormed themselves into our ranks and our vigilance must be enhanced in order to deal with these traitors.

Central Committee of AUCP[B] in their closed letter of January 18, 1935, after the assassination of Kirov in Leningrad, decidedly warned leading Bolsheviks and their organizations. In this letter, we said: "We must stop with the opportunism and lack of vigilance, pointing out the cardinal fact that with our growth and with our successes, the enemy, looking at some attitudes and theories that, as our strength picks up speed and results, then the problem of enemies to our cause diminishes! This is absolutely a wrong approach and a dangerous one. This is a sign of a right wing in our party, promoting the idea that the enemies will more and more be quiet, resolute and slowly will come over to socialism, that in the end, they will become real socialists. Bolsheviks should never rest on their laurels. We must understand that the enemies, as they feel that they are losing their influence, will resort more and more to acts of terror as the only weapon left to them to fight the Soviet state. We must understand this and be more vigilant."

In our internal letter written July 29, 1936 the CC AUCP[B] again, even more directly, urged on the party organizations a maximum alertness and vigilance, to unmask the enemies no matter how they managed to cover themselves in the ranks of Bolsheviks and other governmental agencies. This letter stated: "now that it is known that the Zinoviev-Trotskyites are staging an anti-Soviet campaign of sabotage - for all of our comrades vigilance is a must, that it cannot be allowed to let our guard down - each Bolshevik must at his work place take steps to recognize these enemies. The sabotage is

proceeding and we cannot be so indifferent as to not unmask these provocateurs."

This means that signals were there, and instructions for vigilance were also forwarded by the CC. These appeals stressed the necessity to make stronger our vigilance and make our party a fortress that cannot be breached or infiltrated by these enemies. We called upon the comrades to stop their lack of vigilance in our political work, before it would be too late.

And what happened? Facts proved that the signals and our directives were not looked into or followed as they should have been. Facts from the reports at this Plenum prove beyond doubt that the lack of vigilance exists and we are paying a price for this by seeing more and more sabotage being done by these enemies. How can we explain this lack of attention? How do we explain the fact that our comrades, schooled as they are in fighting our political enemies, have obviously ignored our pleas and suggestions?

Maybe our party comrades became worse than they were before, became less attentive and disciplined? No, this is not the case! Maybe our comrades were starting to be reborn into unbelievers in socialism? Again, this is not so! Then what is the problem? Where did this blindness and non-vigilance come from?

The answer is closer to these facts: party comrades, overburdened with the economic and agricultural work, dealing with colossal victories, unfortunately forgot about some very relevant facts that all Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They

forgot that the Soviet Union finds itself surrounded by capitalist states. We like to talk about capitalism and its surrounding us around our country, but these comrades do not seriously understand what this encirclement means to us. We are only one country building socialism, but all the other countries are capitalist, just waiting for our weak points to appear and pounce on us, if not liquidating us as a whole, they try to weaken us, dismember us, plus find weak people who would do this job for them.

Our comrades forgot these facts in their excitement over our victories. Naive people could only think that there should be or are good relations between us and them. The truth is that even among the capitalist states there is disunity. These capitalist states also send spies into each other's territory.

It is far from the truth that capitalist states have "good relations" between themselves. This is a fact – markets, conquest and competition for markets that brings these countries sometimes to war with each other. It was like this before, and it is like this now. Spies are in each other's country – in England, USA, France, Germany, Japan and other developed countries.

Why should the capitalist countries treat us less cruelly than they treat each other, some may ask? It is exactly the opposite. Why should they sent into our country fewer spies than they do into each other's? Where is this fallacy among some of our comrades coming from? It is a fact, as Marxists, we should know that as long as there is capitalism, they will keep sending into our midst spies, assassins, saboteurs and provocateurs.

All this, our leading party functionaries either forgot or do not believe that this can happen. This is why the unmasking of German, Japanese and Trotskyite spies and assassins were unmasked, some of our comrades could not or would not believe this.

In our struggles against Trotskyites, some of our comrades do not understand that today's Trotskyism is much different than when we fought it 7-8 years ago. Trotskyites at that time suffered a defeat. They changed their tactics, they are not arguing for their program openly, not agitating the workers openly. This then should make our tactics different also.

Before, these elements argued for their political tendency among the working class, not afraid to show their political orientation among the workers. Seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was such a political tendency among the Bolsheviks.

Can we say that Trotskyism of 1936 is the same as before among the working class? No, we cannot say this. Why? Because today's Trotskyites are afraid to show their activity to the workers, but the opposite is true ... they hide their political outlook from the masses, because the people would curse them as traitors. The modern Trotskyites are not propagating their political tendencies openly, they hide their true identity. They try to be more Bolshevik than real, dedicated Bolsheviks - meanwhile, doing their anti-State activity.

If you will recall the trial of Kamenev-Zinoviev in 1936. They had a perfect opportunity to promote their political

tendencies ... but they refused and kept mum. Now, even the blind can see that they DID HAVE a political program. Then why did they not take the opportunity to espouse their ideas? Because they were afraid to expose their political face, thus trying to save others who were still active, but well hidden. They were afraid to officially state that they wanted to restore capitalism.

In their trials in 1937, Pyatakov and Radek took a different path. They admitted that they had another political path that they were promoting. They did not call upon the workers to follow them, instead they admitted their guilt that they did want to re-establish capitalism, eliminate collective and state farms, sign a treaty with fascist Germany and Japan; give up Ukraine to Germany while in the East, give the Maritime Provinces to Japan. These traitors admitted their work, which included terroristic acts against the Soviet Union. These confessions were heard and witnessed by foreign dignitaries of capitalist embassies (it was a perfect time for these traitors to say that they were innocent – Editors).

It is easy to understand that such a program the Trotskyites had to hide from the masses. These leaders not only hid these aims from the masses, but they hid them also from their own Trotskyite followers. The group of about 40 Trotskyites were about to be told by Radek and Pyatakov about their plans, but they decided to ask Trotsky whether this was permissible. Trotsky forbade them to call a meeting of their group. Trotsky said that such an admission might break up their group altogether.

This is the tactic of modern Trotskyites – hide everything even from the leadership – except 3-5 people at the top.

Contemporary Trotskyism is not a political idea – they are without principles, diversionists, spies, agents, killers, a band of die-hard enemies of socialism and of the working class, working for the secret services of foreign countries. This is the kind of evolution in the last 7-8 years of Trotskyism.

The mistake of our comrades is that they did not understand this cardinal difference. These comrades forgot that Trotskyites long ago have forsaken their idealism, they turned themselves into agents who are capable of carrying out anything in order to dislodge and undermine the socialist state. Thus, our comrades, not realizing this, did not take steps to deal with and struggle against these enemies.

Also, our party comrades did not see that among the present enemies of our country, among them Trotskyites, who play a very active role from one side, while diversionists from the time of the Shakhtinsky period play another role from the other side.

If you remember, Shakhtinsky people were foreign to us – they were former businessmen, landowners, former company directors, former stock exchange directors, former bourgeois specialists, who were openly our political enemies. None of our people could be taken in by these enemies. They openly showed their hatred of us. But this, we cannot say, applies to modern Trotskyites. The modern enemies, such as Trotskyites were all former communist party members. These people were not looked upon as foreigners. If the older enemies were going

against the masses openly, the modern traitors use flattery, bow before the other communists, go to all ends to praise socialism and our leaders, in order that we will accept them as our own. There is a difference, you see!

Secondly – the previous enemies, the “Shakhtintsevs” operated openly and their strength was that they were experts, technical know-how was theirs and we had to overlook their political work because we depended on them for their knowledge. Our people had to learn from them, therefore these enemies had a great deal of influence on our people. But the present enemies have no technical knowledge that we need to learn from, it’s exactly the opposite.

Then the question has to be asked as to where and how the present enemies have the influence? Their strength is that they hold the party card in their hands, thus giving them the respectability to do their dirty work ... doors open into our most important governmental posts.

They completely worm themselves into favour, becoming more patriotic than the best dedicated communist; they heap slavish praise upon the leadership in every section that they are in. They thus were able to get the top government secrets and thus, give them to foreign enemy powers. Thus, they were easily enmeshed in foreign secret services. Our mistakes are that we did not try earlier to unmask these people, thus weakening our fight against these present-day enemies.

These are just some facts that some of our comrades forgot to notice. Where did our blindness come from? Is this what we

should expect? No, we cannot allow this to happen. It's our organizational weakness and it's only a temporary weakness.

Again, let me stress, the main reason for our weakness in unmasking these elements is the tremendous victories we are achieving, taking up the time and knowledge of our people, thus, this question of enemies in our midst was put into the background, as unimportant – stating that they cannot do much harm. They looked at this danger as very insignificant in the scheme of present reality.

Victories are great, our growth of socialism is the admiration of the working class of the world. But ... successes have their negative side also. Successes in most people produced dullness in vigilance, self-satisfaction in outlook, just pure consumerism happiness, oblivious to other factors that are working at the same time. Here, I must remind our comrades of the danger of successes.

Danger from failures, we already know – this breeds pessimism, not believing in our own strength. But where there are successes and the people understand why these successes exist, then the attitude of people changes – they become optimistic, hardened politically in the struggles and ready to tackle other projects for the benefit of the people.

But, there is a danger in success also. Yes, comrades, do not shake your heads, because when successes come easily, people who are not versed in politics or in political materialism – looking at successes after successes, fulfilling plans one after another, become complacent, thinking up ways of holding big

celebrations to celebrate their successes, thus dulling the vigilance of the people, promoting the ideals of basking in the accomplishments alone.

In this head-turning atmosphere of successes after successes in building socialism in our country, people start to lose the idea of danger – they practically forget that our country is encircled by capitalist states who, as I mentioned before, send spies, provocateurs and try to sabotage our successes that we are so fond of celebrating.

Some comrades state that this danger is “nothing at all”! How can there be danger from capitalist states and our encirclement when we have such successes? Is there a need for our party organizations to give reports to our higher bodies, must we be so formal, since we are fulfilling and over-fulfilling plans in our industry and agriculture? These are small things that do not need to be done, when we see our life improving. Time to relax and celebrate! We fulfill the plans, our Party is not bad, the CC of CPSU works well, what else do we need? Very different people must be sitting in Moscow in the CC, in government departments, having nothing else to do but think up all sorts of plans, control, telling us about some kind of spies and saboteurs, they themselves do not sleep and don't let others sleep also ...

Here are some examples as to how this “happiness of success” is blinding them to the real danger that is in our midst.

How must we liquidate these shortcomings in our work? What must we do?

We must without doubt implement the following tasks:

1: We must make certain that our comrades look at the outside and inside dangers in our work, not only at the successes that we are achieving.

2: We must raise higher the political work of our party, putting in the first place the political knowledge, understanding and Bolshevization of our cadres, and Soviet people.

3: We must explain in details to our comrades in the party that successes, as needed as they are, and they will grow with every passing month and year, make them aware that the economic success must be tied to the political successes, and the weaknesses can only be liquidated if our comrades are more politically conscious of the interrelations of the two.

Explain to the comrades that further successes can only be accomplished if there are also successes in our political work, that all the successes in our economy, and there are many and more will become evident as we proceed in building socialism ... but these successes can be crumbled down as if they were built on sand, if our political work and knowledge does not keep up with the economic success!

4: We must never forget the fact of the encirclement of the Soviet Union by capitalist states. This is a fact of life, that we cannot afford to forget or let our guard down. We must also impress the people of the fact, that as long as there are capitalist states surrounding us, there will be spies, sabotage, diversionists, terrorists, all sent into the Soviet Union by our class enemies. We must struggle with those comrades who still do not believe the dangers that are facing the USSR. Explain to them that no

matter what colossal achievements we might make, this will not stop these enemies from trying to subvert our people, our policies and our defenses.

We must take steps to make certain that our party comrades and our non-party Bolsheviks become acquainted with all of the details and the harm that these elements are doing to our Motherland. They must be made aware of all the methods and tricks that are used by these enemies, in order that they may readily unmask them.

5: We must explain to our comrades that Trotskyites are the most active elements of the diversionary-spying in the service of foreign intelligence agencies. These elements have long ceased to be political in their work or outlook, they have long ago given up any of their ideals regarding the working class, that they have now become a band of enemies, spies, saboteurs, working for foreign powers. Explain to the comrades that fighting these enemies, we also cannot use old methods. There is no longer the need for discussions and debates, trying to win them over to our side – we must use the methods of unmasking and of liquidating these enemies.

6: We must explain that our previous enemies were technically superior to us, and thus we were forced to rely on their services. The modern enemies have a party card in their hands, and wave it for all to see how “patriotic” they are, it’s easy for these enemies to fool our people, to fool them on political grounds, since people trust the communists – in this then, lies the danger.

We are asked: Could we not have, 10 years ago, come up with two slogans – one being the technology drive, the second being to politically school the cadres?

No, this could not have been done. Our Bolshevik party does not work that way. During critical times in our revolution, we always put forward one slogan only. This slogan is meant to do a given task that is absolutely necessary at that time. In the past, the slogan about Technical knowledge was necessary since our comrades were not schooled in this necessary knowledge for building industry. We liquidated our technical backwardness, having to use the services of our known enemies ... Thus, we liquidated these enemies by having our own technical specialists.

Since we have our own technical base and experts in the hundreds of thousands, and our enemies are not looked upon as class enemies, it is a question now of our political weakness and the need of a new slogan. Political vigilance is needed above all. This should be our slogan now. Therefore, the Party could not have raised these two slogans at the same time.

7: We must discard the theory that is being perpetuated by enemies, that with every successful step we take, with every new step forward towards socialism, our class enemy becomes weaker and slowly but surely will evolve into a communist, support socialism. This is not only a wrong theory, but it is extremely dangerous because it makes our people unaware of the danger and takes them away from being vigilant towards the class enemy.

The situation is the other way around, as more and more successes pile up in our building of socialism. The enemies will more and more become bold, ruthless, more sharper struggles will occur, the more sabotage these elements will perpetrate on the Soviet Union – they will go over towards more and more terroristic attacks against the state and its leaders.

Let us realize that the defeated class enemies in our midst are not the same. These enemies have the support of our enemies outside of our borders. It would be foolish to think that the class struggle is only inside the USSR. We must realize that if one end of this class struggle is inside the borders of USSR, the other end is in the camp of capitalist states that are encircling us. About this, of course, our internal class enemies know about. History teaches us this fact. Leninism is teaching us this fact also. We must all remember this and be on guard.

8: It is imperative to defeat and discard another theory that is being promoted, stating that, an enemy cannot be an enemy unless he is constantly deriding socialism, or, how can he be an enemy if he is fulfilling his given task and also over-fulfilling it? This strange theory reveals the naiveté of its authors. Not every enemy will always criticize and do harm to socialism; otherwise, he would be unmasked in no time. The opposite is true – the hidden enemy works even harder than maybe a dedicated Bolshevik – but at any given opportunity, he will sabotage, if he can. I think that this question is very clear and we do not have to dwell on.

9: The third harmful theory we must defeat is the argument that the more success we have, the less effective and less dangerous will these enemies become ... This theory is meant to make our people less vigilant, less caring, less alert to danger. What does their slogan mean: "systematically fulfill our economic plan"?

Firstly – it is proven that our plans are a minimum plan, not taking into account the maximum potential that is possible.

Secondly – summarily fulfilling our plans according to directives does not mean that other extremely important sections of industry do fulfill their minimum plans, although they could have been over-fulfilled. Facts point to the sectors of urgent or strategic spheres of industry, where the plans are NOT fulfilled.

Thirdly – it is a fact, if these enemies were not unmasked and thrown out, the plans by the State would not be fulfilled at all.

Fourthly – these enemies of ours did not activate as much their activities during peaceful periods of construction, but they became extremely active in the pre-war period. Let us suppose that we would just fulfill our plans, not making certain that plans were over-fulfilled. Do we not realize what harm these elements would cause our economy if a war should break out? We certainly would be ill-prepared for an emergency.

10: We must also defeat the fourth theory, that states that the Stakhanovite Movement is the movement that will defeat the enemy in our ranks. This theory was thought up for

instituting the endless talk about the Stakhanovite movement which has swept the nation by their heroism, thus in the euphoria to get the eyes off the actual enemies within.

Comrade Molotov in his presentation gave many known facts as to how the Trotskyites and other enemies in the Kuzbas and Donbas regions, pulled by the nose the Stakhanovite workers who were not led politically by the Communists in the mines, how these enemies sabotaged the work of the Stakhanovite miners, and in the end, these elements defeated the whole Stakhanovite movement in these regions.

How could the Stakhanovite movement in these regions have succeeded, even if they over-fulfilled their quota, while the management of these mines, in the hands of the enemies, sabotaged the delivery, the transport of the coal. As you can see, the struggle against these enemies must take on a serious tone.

11: We must liquidate the fifth false theory, that in the Trotskyite camp, they have no more future reserves, they are being unmasked all the time – their dangerous work is coming to an end. This is not the truth, comrades. these elements have their reserves. They include the defeated class enemies in the USSR. They also have reserves beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, countries which are enemies of the USSR.

Let us take the Trotskyites 4th International, composed of 2/3 of spies and diversionists. Is this not a reserve? Will not this 4th International be a conduit of spies being sent inside our territory? What about the group of Sheflo in Norway? Is this group not a reserve?

Or, take another group, similar to Sheflo – groups of Suvarin in France. Are they also not a reserve? These people in France, Germany, working with fascists – are they not a reserve for spying and diversionary activity?

What about the well known horde of journalists-writers in America headed by a well known crook Eastman, all these crooks of the pen, who live there and heap lies upon us and the working class of the USSR – are they not a reserve for Trotskyism?

12: In conclusion, it is necessary to defeat and discard another theory, which tells us, since there are many Bolsheviks and agents very few, if we Bolsheviks number in the millions while Trotskyites number in tens or individuals only; that means, that we, Bolsheviks, should not even pay attention to this insignificant movement.

This is dangerous, comrades. this is thought up in order to keep some of our leadership quiet, those who cannot be bothered at their workplace to try and unmask these enemies and thus let them sleep peacefully.

The individual or small number of agents, does not mean that they cannot harm the work in the country. In order to blow up, let us say the giant Dnieproges, which took thousands of workers, it will take only a couple of agents to lay the mines and blow away the labour of tens of thousands of Soviet people. In order to win a certain battle, we would need only a couple of Corps of Red Army men. But in order to lose the battle by the Red Army, you need only a couple of spies in the HQ to get the plans, give them to the enemy. To build a steel, iron bridge, it needs

thousands of people, from raw materials to builders to operators, but to destroy the bridge, you need only a couple of saboteurs.

Regarding the weaknesses in our party work, much has already been said by competent comrades during this Plenum. I would like to again go back to the question of awareness and how we should liquidate this weakness.

I feel that we should undertake this political upbringing from top to bottom a priority – in order to ideologically infuse new awareness in our comrades. We must steer our comrades in such a way that they will be readily able to unmask these hidden enemies. We must have every communist be on guard, we must overcome our weaknesses.

How does the leadership in the CPSU look at this moment? The top leadership of the CPSU in the country is composed of 3-4,000 comrades. This, I would say, is the General Headquarters. There are between 30-40,000 middle rank party workers in all the Soviet Republics ... our officers. Further down, there are about 100-150,000 comrades in all spheres of the economy, both industrial, agriculture, culture, education , etc., etc. To bring all these cadres up to standards of political-ideological awareness – this is our task.

What do we need to do this?

First of all, we must suggest to our party leaders, from secretary of party clubs to secretaries of territorial and republic party organizations, pick out in a given time two comrades, who are capable of taking over the duties, if the need arises. We could be asked: where do we get them, we have no qualified workers.

This is not true, comrades. There are talented energetic and dedicated people, thousands of them. You should get to know them and appoint them so that they should not remain where they are and start to wither away. Seek and you will find.

Further. For party education and to train secretaries of party clubs, there must be established in all centres a four month "Party Schools". To these schools, there should be sent secretaries of party clubs, then upon their return to their party clubs, their assistants must be sent and other potential party comrades.

Further. Political schooling of District organizations must be established all across the USSR – let us say, first of all, in 10 most important centres a seven months "Lenin Courses". To these courses, the first secretaries of districts, provincial clubs should be sent, and after their return to their work, send their assistants – plus other candidates.

Further. For ideological retraining and political education of the first secretaries, a school under the auspices of the CC AUCP[B] a six month "Courses on the history and politics of the party". To these courses, there should be sent the first and second secretaries of the city organizations, and after finishing this school, their assistants and other leading comrades should be sent to the school.

Lastly, it is imperative to establish under the CC AUCP[B] a six month school "Questions of internal and international politics". To this school should be sent provincial and republic central committee secretaries and party committee secretaries of all nationalities. This, comrades, will give, not one but other

replacement cadres, who will thus be trained to replace leaders of the Central Committee of our party. This is a must and this must be done.

I am concluding, comrades. We have gone through the necessary steps to improve our work, necessary to overcome some of the weaknesses in our work and structures. We analyzed the enemies and their methods. We suggested remedies to overcome these weaknesses.

We can accomplish all this! Absolutely, this can be done. We have also the power, all the manpower and all things necessary to establish these schools. What is it that we don't have?

We lack only one thing: readiness to liquidate our own danger, our own safety. This is a paradox. Are we not capable of doing away with this laughable and idiotic sickness? – we, who have shaken off capitalism, have started to build the first stages of socialism and helped raise high the future of communism?

I am certain that we shall shed this off our backs, if we really want to do this. We shall do this in a Bolshevik way. And when we shall shake off this idiotic sickness, we can then factually say that we are not afraid of any enemies, either internal or external – we shall defeat all of them, as we are doing now and as we did before. (Applause)

OUR COMMENT:

Again, the questions has to be asked – why was this document not published until 1995?

Reading this document, you cannot but be amazed at the analytical skill of J.V. Stalin! You also must ask yourself the question as to why were all these analyses, forthright solutions and warnings of the enemy within not taken into account by the leadership of the CPSU?

Stalin foresaw the dangers of complacency, thus giving the "internal enemy" the opportunity get into the leadership and important posts in the government. Can you imagine how different the situation would have been, if all of the suggestions, analyses were taken seriously and diligently after the death of J.V. Stalin?

Why was not this very important document published sooner? After all, this document was meant to safeguard the Soviet Union?

The answer seems obvious! The post-Stalin's death leadership of the CC CPSU are the ones that Stalin was warning about – they were not called Trotskyites or enemies – these people waved their communist party cards high for all to see, thus covering their traitorous acts as Stalin warned. These were the "modern, contemporary enemies" that Stalin talked about and pleaded for awareness as to their danger.

Can you wonder why Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, not to speak of Yeltsin, did not want this document to be published!

Those who still are under the "hate-Stalin" mode of thinking, should re-read this document more than once. Is Stalin a dictator? Is Stalin promoting his "cult of personality"? Is he not criticizing the CC, himself included? Can anyone in their right mind find ANY fault in his analyses and his predictions?

Only hidden enemies of socialism will criticize this document. □

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DEFENSE SYSTEM AROUND STALIN

Before proceeding with this extremely revealing exposé, based on documents and materials that are available now to confirm that what we're saying really happened, let us remind the readers of the sensationalism that was caused all over the world by the trial that became known as "The Doctor's Case".

This has a bearing on the document about the destruction of the defense system around Stalin and the actual death of Stalin.

Let us just take you back in a condensed version of what the hidden revisionists in the CPSU structures tried to do and what they actually accomplished.

"... in the summer of 1952 ... doctors who had worked in the Kremlin for many years and treated many statesmen were summarily fired. Among them were Miron Vovsi and Vladimir Vinogradov. The former was the head of the Kremlin Hospital, Aleksey Pusalov, Mikhail Yegorov ... and Sophia Karpai were arrested." (*Y. Rapoport: op. cit., p. 72*)

On January 13, 1953 Pravda newspaper carried the report of the arrest of "... a terrorist group of doctors who had made their aim to cut short the lives of active public figures of the Soviet Union through sabotage medical treatment ... the participants, taking advantage of their position as doctors and abusing the trust of patients, by deliberate evil intent ... made incorrect diagnoses and then doomed them by wrong treatment."

(*Pravda*, January 13, 1953, page 4, in: "Current Digest of Soviet Press, Volume 4, No. 31, p. 3, January 31, 1953).

Nine doctors were named as participants in this group.

"One of the accused persons, Vladimir Vinogradov, was Stalin's personal physician". (*Y. Repoport: op. cit.*, p. 216)

After *Pravda* published this news, it concluded by stating that "The investigation will soon be concluded."

Pravda newspaper stated that "the agencies of State Security did not discover the doctors' wrecking organization in time. The security agencies should have been more vigilant. History should have taught us the facts that the great Russian writer A.M. Gorky and outstanding Soviet statesmen V.V. Kuibishev and V.R. Mezhdinsky were murdered by wrong treatment by such doctors as Levin and Pletnev."

"... the criminal doctors confessed." (*Pravda*, January 13, 1953; *ibid.*, p. 4)

And after their release by the revisionists headed by Khrushchev following Stalin's death in March 1953, the doctors admitted their confession had been genuine:

When we were all released, Vovsi and Vinogradov themselves told me that they had admitted all the crimes imputed to them ... the most tragic aspect of these confessions was that the person admitted not only crimes himself, but also the existence of a criminal organization and collective criminal actions ...

Sophia Karpai, formerly a doctor at the Kremlin Hospital, told me in the summer of 1953 about her confrontation with

Vovsi and Vinogradov and Vasilenko in prison. To her face, these doctors asserted that she had executed their criminal orders to administer harmful treatments to the patients. (*Y. Repoport: op. cit., p. 137*)

Furthermore, the released doctors testified that their confessions had NOT been brought about as a result of the application of torture. (*Y. Repoport: op. cit., p. 138*)

THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEDICATED MARXISTS-LENINISTS IN THE CPSU LEADERSHIP TO THWART THE PLANS OF THESE ENEMIES, MADE THE REVISIONISTS DETERMINED QUICKLY TO DESTROY STALIN'S PERSONAL SECRETARIAT AS A NECESSARY PRELIMINARY TO DESTROYING STALIN HIMSELF.

The above and the following documentation was researched and prepared by the Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau, Great Britain.

We have noted the role of Stalin's personal secretariat – also known as the 'Special Sector' of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party – in bringing about the treason trials of the 1930s. But this body also played an important role in defending from terrorist attack the Marxist-Leninist nucleus, headed by Stalin, at the heart of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The special sector had been headed since 1928 by the Marxist-Leninist Aleksandr Poskrebishev:

"As head of the 'Special Sector' of the Central Committee for many years, he (Poskrebishev – Ed.) was Stalin's closest

confidant up till 1952." (*R. Conquest: 'The Great Terror', Harmondsworth, 1971 - hereafter, listed as 'R. Conquest (1971)', p. 37*).

While Lieutenant-General Nikolay Vlasik, "... for more than twenty-five years ... had been Stalin's chief of personal security; he knew much and was trusted by the boss." (*D. Volkogonov: 'Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy', London, 1991, p. 333*).

Dmitri Volkogonov asserts that Poskrebishev, "... to the end of his days remained his master's devoted servant ... He was a man with the memory of a computer. You could get an exact reply to any question. He was a walking encyclopaedia ... Stalin ... trusted ... Vlasik and Poskrebishev." (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., pp. 203-204, 318*).

And, Levitsky confirms that, "... those who knew the conditions at the summit of the Party after 1945 describe Poskrebishev as an organising genius with a phenomenal memory." (*B. Levitsky, op. cit., p. 177*).

Conquest asserts that Poskrebishev was, "... the man most closely and directly associated with Stalin (later described in Khrushchev's secret speech as Stalin's 'shield-bearer')." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 156*).

Volkogonov says of Vlasik: "For more than twenty-five years, Vlasik had been Stalin's chief of personal security; he knew much, was trusted by the boss." (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 318, 333*).

And, Robert McNeal says that: "... Vlasik and Poskrebishev ... effectively guarded the approaches to Stalin's office, one as controller of security, the other, of appointments." (*R.H. McNeal, 'Stalin: Man and Ruler', Basingstoke, 1988, p. 301*).

It was clear, therefore, that a successful terrorist attack on Stalin required the prior elimination of the faithful Poskrebishev and Vlasik.

Walter Laqueur states: "During the last year of Stalin's life, Poskrebishev fell from grace." (W. Laqueur, *'Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations'*, London, 1990, p. 176).

And Nikita Khrushchev tells how this 'fall from grace' was brought about. He describes how, during the winter of 1952-53, he came under suspicion of leaking secret documents, and how he succeeded in deflecting the blame from himself in such a way that it fell upon Poskrebishev: "Stalin ... complained that secret document were leaking out through our secretariats ... Stalin was coming straight for me: 'It's you, Khrushchev! The leak is through your secretariat!' ... I ... succeeded in deflecting the blow from myself, but Stalin didn't let the matter rest ... After I'd convinced Stalin that the leak wasn't through my secretariat, he came to the conclusion that the leak must have been through Poskrebishev ... Poskrebishev had worked for Stalin for many years ... Stalin removed Poskrebishev from his post and promoted someone else." (N.S. Khrushchev, 1971, pp., 272, 273, 274, 275).

Niels Rosenfeldt confirms that: "... Poskrebishev was removed from his old post at the latest during the winter of 1952-53 ... Stalin's bodyguard, Vlasik, disappeared around that time (the winter of 1952-53 - Ed.)". (F.E. Rosenfeldt: *'Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin's Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government'*, Copenhagen, 1978, p. 196).

As does Adam Ulam: "Poskrebishev and Vlasik ... found themselves in disgrace." (*A.B. Ulam, 'Stalin: The Man and His Era', London, 1989, p. 617*).

Volkogonov states that: "... Poskrebishev and Vlasik were compromised ... shortly before Stalin's death and were therefore distanced from him." (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 513*).

And McNeal confirms that: "... both these men (Poskrebishev and Vlasik - Ed.) were thrown out in 1952." (*R.H. McNeal, op. cit., p. 301*).

Deriabin agrees that the charges of disloyalty levelled at Poskrebishev and Vlasik were completely false: "The claim about that pair of long time faithful servants was a bald and most complete lie. But ... Stalin fired them both." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 320*).

The revisionist conspirators placed Poskrebishev under house arrest: "Poskrebishev was placed under house arrest in his dacha outside Moscow, with ... guards posted about." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 321*).

"Poskrebishev ... disappeared. He was simply not mentioned again, apart from a brief sneer in Khrushchev's secret speech." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 208*).

While Vlasik was expelled from the Party and sent to Sverdlovsk as deputy commandant of a labour camp: "Vlasik ... was not only fired, he was also expelled from the Party and sent to Sverdlovsk ... as deputy commandant of a ... labour camp." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 321*).

Vlasik came to Moscow and, "... went to the Kremlin in an attempt to see Stalin ... He was picked up near the Kremlin

gates and put into the Lubyanka. Two weeks later he died there of an 'illness'." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 321*).

Volkogonov confirms that Vlasik, "... was arrested on 16 December 1952." (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 570*).

And records that, during Vlasik's interrogation, pressure was exerted on him, "... to make him incriminate Poskrebishev ... He refused." (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 570*).

Ulam confirms that, "... Vlasik, chief of his (Stalin's - Ed.) personal security since the Civil War, had been imprisoned. His confidential secretary, Poskrebishev, was chased away." (*A.B. Ulam, op. cit., p. 737*).

And Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva*, tells the same story: "Shortly before my father died even some of his intimates were disgraced: the perennial Vlasik was sent to prison in the winter of 1952 and my father's personal secretary Poskrebishev, who had been with him for twenty years, was removed." (*S. Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend, London, 1967, p. 216*).

However, the attack on the defense system around Stalin was not confined to the elimination of Poskrebishev and Vlasik. During 1952 the concealed revisionists set up, "... a commission to investigate ... the entire state security apparatus." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 317*).

This commission, "... proceeded ... to cut Stalin's bodyguards to the bone ... About seven thousand men were dropped from the original Okhrana force of some seventeen thousand ... When the slashing was finished, Stalin's personal bodyguards,

Okhrana No. 1, had been cut to half strength." (P. Deriabin, *op. cit.*, pp., 317, 318, 319).

This left Stalin, "... guarded by ... only a small group of officers ... a group that had little security experience, especially as bodyguards, and one that was headed by a mere major." (P. Deriabin, *op. cit.*, p. 319).

Rosenfeldt adds that about this time the special guard service, whose task was to ensure Stalin's personal safety, after 'a thorough purging and a big reduction in personnel', together with the Kremlin Command and the Kremlin Medical Administration, were all made subordinate to the revisionist-controlled Ministry of State Security: "The special guard service, whose job it was to ensure Stalin's personal safety, was made subordinate to the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1952 after a thorough purging and a big reduction in personnel. At the same time and in the same way the Kremlin Command and the Kremlin Medical Administration were put under MGB control." (N.E. Rosenfeldt, *op. cit.*, p. 196).

Then, on 17 February 1953, two weeks before Stalin himself died, the sudden death was reported of the Major-General Petr Kosynkin, Deputy Commandant of the Kremlin Guards, in charge of the operational arrangements for guarding Stalin: "On 15 February 1953, shortly before Stalin's death, the commander of the Kremlin guard, Major-General Petr Kosynkin, who was responsible for Stalin's personal safety, died." (B. Levitsky, *op. cit.*, p. 212).

"The Deputy Commandant of the Kremlin, Major-General Kosynkin, in charge of the operational arrangements for guarding Stalin, died of a heart attack two weeks before Stalin. Or so the announcement said." (*P. Deriabin & F. Gibney, 'The Secret World', New York, 1959, p. 169*).

"The Vice-Chief of the Kremlin Command, Major-General Petr Kosynkin, 'passed away prematurely' on 15th February 1953." (*N.E. Rosenfeldt, op. cit., p. 196*).

"On February 17, 1953 ... Major General Petr Kosynkin, the deputy Commander of the Kremlin Guard, suddenly died of a heart attack. That sudden seizure was rather unusual, to say the least. A fanatical admirer of Stalin, Kosynkin had been in the prime of life and health ... The extremely careful physical examinations regularly undergone by all such appointees as Kosynkin automatically presuppose that the guard leader was in top condition and certainly not suffering from any heart trouble ...

On February 17, 1953 there came a report, generally unnoticed at the time, that the Deputy Kremlin Commandant, General Kosynkin, the only remaining guard that Stalin could trust, had suddenly died of a 'heart attack'." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 239, 325*).

Finally, on 21 February 1953, "... a most significant change was made in the Army High Command. General Sergey Shtemenko was replaced by Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky as Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces ... And concurrently with Shtemenko's replacement the Okhrana bodyguards were removed from the general staff." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 325*).

"The Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Sergey Shtemenko, was removed from his post about the same time (mid-February 1953 - Ed.)." (*N.E. Rosenfeldt, op. cit., p. 196*).

Deriabin sums up this 'process of stripping Stalin of all his personal security' as 'a studied and very ably handled business': "That completed the process of stripping Stalin of all personal security, except for the comparative window-dressing of the minor Okhrana officers in his office and household. This had been a studied and very ably handled business: the framing of Abakumov, the dismissal of Vlasik, the discrediting of Poskrebishev, the emasculation of the Okhrana and its enforced subservience to the (revisionist-controlled - Ed.) MGB, Kosynkin's 'heart attack', the replacement of Shtemenko and the removal of the general staff from the last vestiges of Okhrana control. And certainly not to be forgotten at this juncture was the ... MGB control of the Kremlin medical office." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., pp. 325-326*).

And one which placed the conspirators finally in the driver's seat: "With state security and the armed forces under their command, the connivers were finally in the driver's seat." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 326*).

THE DEATH OF STALIN (1953)

On 3 March 1953 a joint statement of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of the USSR Council of Ministers announced, "... a great misfortune which has befallen our Party and our people." (*Communiqué*, 3 March 1953, in 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia', 4 March 1953, p. 1, in 'Current Digest of the Soviet Press', Volume 5, No. 6, 21 March, 1953, p. 4).

It reported that, "... during the night of March 1-2 Comrade Stalin, while in his Moscow apartment, had a haemorrhage of the brain, which affected vital parts of his brain. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness.

Paralysis of the right arm and leg developed. Loss of speech occurred. Serious disturbances developed in the functioning of the heart and breathing.

The best medical personnel have been called in to treat Comrade Stalin ...

Treatment of Comrade Stalin is under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government." (*Government Statement*, 3 March 1953, in 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia', 4 March 1953, p. 1, in *ibid.*, p. 4).

In the early hours of the following morning, 4 March, a medical bulletin was issued which stated: "At 2 a.m. 4 March, J.V. Stalin's conditions remains serious. Considerable disturbance of breathing is observed; frequency of breathing is 36 per minute and the rhythm of breathing is irregular, with periodic prolonged pauses.

It is observed that pulse beats are up to 120 per minute and there is complete arrhythmia. Maximum blood pressure is 220, minimum 120.

Temperature is 38.2 (Centigrade – Ed.). In connection with the disturbed beating and blood circulation, inadequacy of organs is observed. The degree of disturbance of the function of the brain has increased somewhat.

At the present time a series of therapeutic measures are being applied to restore the vitally important functions of the organism." (*Medical Bulletin*, 4 March 1953, in *ibid.*, p. 4).

A second bulletin was issued on the morning of 5 March: Medical measures taken during March 4 consisted of introducing oxygen, camphor compounds, caffeine and glucose. For the second time, leeches were used to draw blood. Towards the end of March 4, the state of health of Josef V. Stalin continues grave. The patient is in a state of deep unconsciousness.

Finally, on 6 March came the medical report carrying the announcement of Stalin's death:

"In the afternoon of March 5 the condition of the patient deteriorated especially rapidly; respiration became shallow and much faster, the pulse reached 140-150 beats per minute and pulse pressure dropped.

At 21:50 hours, with cardiac failure and growing insufficiency of breathing, J.V. Stalin died." (*Medical Bulletin*, 6 March 1953, in '*Pravda*' and '*Izvestia*', 6 March 1953, p. 1, in *ibid.*, p. 5).

The medical report was published together with a joint tribute from the Central Committee, the government and the

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

“The heart of Lenin’s comrade-in-arms and the inspired continuer of Lenin’s cause, the wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party and the Soviet people – Josef Vissarionovich STALIN – has stopped beating.

STALIN’s name is boundlessly dear to our Party, to the Soviet people, to the working people of the world ... Continuing Lenin’s immortal cause, Comrade STALIN led the Soviet people to the world-historic triumph of socialism in our land. Comrade STALIN led our country to victory over fascism in the Second World War, which wrought a radical change in the entire international situation. Comrade STALIN armed the Party and the entire people with a great and clear programme of building communism in the USSR.

The death of Comrade STALIN, who devoted all his life to the great cause of communism, constitutes a great loss to the Party and to the working people of the Soviet land and of the whole world.” (*Joint Statement of CC of CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in ‘Pravda’ and ‘Izvestia’, 6 March 1953, p. 1, in ibid., p. 5).*

There are a number of circumstances connected with the death of Stalin which make it, in forensic terms, ‘a suspicious death’:

Firstly, Stalin appeared to be in excellent health immediately prior to the beginning of March:

“And what of Stalin himself? In the pink of condition. In the best of spirits. That was the word of three foreigners who

saw him in February – Bravo, the Argentine Ambassador; Menon, the Indian, and Dr. Kitchlu, an Indian active in the peace movement.” (H. Salisbury, *‘Stalin’s Russia and After’*, London, 1953, p. 157).

Secondly, on the night of 1-2 March there was a long delay in obtaining medical help for Stalin:

“Khrushchev does not mention specific times, but his narrative makes it incredible that the doctors arrived much before 5 a.m. on 2 March. This is many hours, perhaps twelve, after the seizure ... It is not true that he was under medical care soon after the seizure.” (R.H. McNeal, *op. cit.*, p. 304).

There is a mystery about what had happened to Stalin. His guards had become alarmed when he had not asked for his evening snack at 11 p.m. ... The security men picked him up and put him on a sofa, but doctors were not summoned until the morning ...

Stalin lay helpless and untreated for the better part of a day, making recuperative treatment much harder ...

Why did the Party leaders prolong the delay? Some historians see evidence of premeditated murder. Abdurakhman Avtorhanov sees the cause in Stalin’s visible preparation of a purge to rival those of the thirties.” (J. Lewis & P. Whitehead, *‘Stalin: A Time for Judgement’*, London, 1990, p. 179).

“Only on the next morning ... did the first physicians arrive.” (W. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 151).

“Physicians were finally brought into the comatose leader after a twelve – or fourteen hour interval.” (D. Volkogonov, *op. cit.*, p. 513).

Thirdly, there was a deliberate lie in the announcement of his death, which was stated to have taken place 'in his Moscow apartment', whereas it actually occurred in his dacha at Kuntsevo, Adam Ulam asserts that:

"... conspiratorial air coloured the circumstances of Stalin's death. The belated communiqué announcing his stroke was emphatic that it had occurred in his quarters in the Kremlin. Yet, it was to his country villa ... that his daughter Svetlana was summoned on March 2 to be by his deathbed ... He was stricken away from Moscow ...

The official communiqué lied about the place where Stalin had suffered the fatal stroke and died ...

There was an obvious reason behind the falsehood: his successors feared that a true statement about where he was at the time of the seizure would lead to rumours ... that the stroke had occurred while he was being kidnapped or incarcerated by the oligarchs. Crowds might surge on the Kremlin, demanding an accounting of what had been done to their father and protector." (A.B. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 700, 739).

Fourthly, as we have seen, the revisionist conspirators had an ample and urgent motive – that of self-preservation – for eliminating Stalin:

"For many leading Soviet statesmen and officials, Stalin's demise ... came in the nick of time. Whether or not it was due to natural causes is another matter." (D.M. Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 262).

"What a strange quirk of fate, I thought, that Stalin should lie dying just a few weeks after the Kremlin's own doctors had

been accused of plotting precisely such a death. A very strange and curious quirk of fate.

But was it just a quirk? ... Was it possible that these powerful and able Soviet leaders, together with their colleagues in the Army, had stood idly by and taken no steps to halt the creeping terror that was certain to destroy almost all of them ...

While murder cannot be proved, there was no question that motive for murder existed ... "For ... if Stalin were dying a natural death, it was the luckiest thing that had ever happened to the men who stood closest to him" (*H. Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 160-161*)

Fifthly, it is necessary to take into account the circumstantial evidence of the series of measures undertaken by the conspirators in the months prior to Stalin's death to destroy the system of defenses that had surrounded him.

It is not surprising, therefore, within weeks of Stalin's death, rumours should circulate that he had been murdered: "There were rumours, above all in Georgia, that Stalin had been poisoned." (*W. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 151*).

Robert Conquest speaks of the, "... possibilities that he was killed." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 172*).

As Stalin's former bodyguard Vlasik was leaving Moscow after his dismissal, Stalin's son Vasily is reported to have cried out: "'They are going to kill him! They are going to kill him!'. By 'they' he meant ... other members of the Political Bureau, and by 'him', he meant his father." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 321*).

"Stalin's son Vasily kept coming in and shouting ...: 'they've killed my father, the bastards!'" (*D. Volkogonov, op. cit., p. 774*).

Although Vasily was an alcoholic, when he continued to make these accusations publicly, he was arrested in April 1953 in order, as his sister Svetlana puts it, 'to isolate him':

After my father's death, he (Vasily - Ed.) ... was arrested. This happened because he had threatened the government, he talked that 'my father was killed by his rivals' and all things like that, and always many people around him - so they decided to isolate him. He stayed in jail till 1961 ... and soon, he died." (*S. Alliluyeva, 'Only One Year', London, 1969 - hereafter listed as S. Alliluyeva (1969, p. 202).*

"He (Vasily - Ed.) was convinced that our father had been 'poisoned' or 'killed' ...

Throughout the period before the funeral ... he accused the government, the doctors and everybody in sight of using the wrong treatment on my father ...

He was arrested on April 18th, 1953 ...

A military collegium sentenced him to eight years in jail ...

He died on March 19th, 1962." (*S. Alliluyeva, 1967, pp. 222-223, 224, 228).*

Georges Bortoli comments: "Vasily Stalin had said aloud what the others were thinking to themselves. In less than a month, all sorts of rumours would begin to circulate in Moscow, and people would begin speaking of a crime ... Some people said that several members of Stalin's entourage were threatened by the coming purge. Had they taken steps to forestall it?" (*G. Bortoli, op. cit., p. 151).*

Robert Conquest and other commentators have drawn attention also to the sudden illness and death of the Czechoslovak leader, the Marxist-Leninist Klement Gottwald,

shortly after visiting Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral, and have suggested that this death too had been induced. Gottwald was succeeded as President of Czechoslovakia by the concealed revisionist Antonin Zápotocky: "Many commentators have noted that immediately after Stalin's death, Gottwald ... also fell ill while attending Stalin's funeral in Moscow, and died a few days later; and they have cast doubt on the naturalness of Gottwald's illness." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 174*).

The Albanian leader, the Marxist-Leninist Enver Hoxha makes the same point: "Immediately after the death of Stalin, Gottwald died. This was a sudden surprising death! It had never crossed the mind of those who knew Gottwald that this strong, agile, healthy man would die of the flu or a chill allegedly caught on the day of Stalin's funeral." (*E. Hoxha, The Khrushchevites', Tirana, 1984 - hereafter listed as 'E. Hoxha (1984), pp. 153-154*).

Hoxha also draws attention to the suspicious death of the Polish leader, the Marxist-Leninist Boleslaw Beirut on 12 March 1957: "... in Moscow where he was attending the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party." (*'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 10, pp., 14, 767*).

And was succeeded by the concealed revisionist Edward Ochab: "Later came the equally unexpected death of Comrade Beirut ... Edward Ochab replaced Beirut in the post of First Secretary of the Party. Thus Khrushchev's old desire was realised." (*E. Hoxha, 1984, pp. 153-165*).

It was Ochab who arranged for the release of the imprisoned revisionist Wladyslaw Gomulka in April and his

promotion to the post of First Secretary in October. Hoxha, in fact, explicitly accuses the revisionist conspirators of the murder of Stalin: "This cosmopolitan huckster (Anastas Mikoyan – Ed.) ... as history showed, plotted with Nikita Khrushchev against Stalin, whom they had decided to murder. He admitted this with his own mouth in February 1960." (*E. Hoxha, 1984, pp. 63-64*).

"All this villainy emerged soon after the death, or to be more precise, after the murder, of Stalin. I say after the murder of Stalin, because Mikoyan himself told me ... that they, together with Khrushchev and their associates, had decided ... to make an attempt on Stalin's life." (*E. Hoxha, 'With Stalin: Memoirs', Tirana, 1979, p. 31*).

THE ABORTED COUP (1953)

As we have noted, in the years immediately prior to Stalin's death, the security forces were under the control of concealed revisionists, not of Marxist-Leninists: "Prior to Stalin's death the Ministries of State Security and of the Interior were not under Beria's control." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 200*).

Clearly, it was a matter of great concern to the revisionist conspirators that, in any readjustment of responsibilities following Stalin's death, control of the security forces should NOT pass again under Marxist-Leninist control.

Khrushchev records a discussion with fellow-revisionist Nikolay Bulganin by Stalin's death-bed on the danger to their plans if the Marxist-Leninist Lavrenty Beria were to become

again Minister in control of the security services: "Stalin's not going to pull through ... You know what posts Beria will take for himself? 'Which one?' 'He will try and make himself Minister of State Security. No matter what happens, we can't let him do this. If he becomes Minister of State Security it will be the beginning of the end for us.' 'Bulganin said he agreed with me'." (*N.S. Khrushchev, 1971, p. 319*).

As we have seen, Stalin died 9:50 a.m. on 5 March. The revisionists immediately used their control of the security forces to prepare for a coup. The American journalist Harrison Salisbury was an eye-witness of how, shortly before 6 a.m. the next morning, "... smooth and quiet convoys of trucks were slipping into the city. Sitting cross-legged on wooden benches in the green-painted trucks were detachments of blue-and-red-capped MVD troops – twenty-two to a truck – the special troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ... The fleeting thought entered my mind that, perhaps, a coup d'état might be in the making ...

By nine o'clock ... the Internal Affairs troops were everywhere in the centre of the city ... In upper Gorky Street columns of tanks made their appearance ... All the troops and all the trucks and all the tanks belonged to the special detachments of the MVD. Not a single detachment of regular Army forces was to be seen ...

Later I discovered that the MVD had, in fact, isolated almost the whole city of Moscow ... By ten or eleven o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1953, no one could enter or leave the

heart of Moscow except by leave of the MVD ... MVD forces had taken over the city ...

Could any other troops enter the city? Not unless they had the permission of the MVD or were prepared to fight their way through, street by street, barricade by barricade." (*H. Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 163-164, 166, 171, 173*).

Robert Conquest paints a very similar picture: "The streets of Moscow were solid with MVD troops when Stalin's death was announced." (*R. Conquest, 1961, p. 200*).

As does Peter Deriabin: "Even before Stalin's body was cold ... MVD troops ... not only set up controls and halted traffic, including pedestrians, on every principal capital thoroughfare, but had also ringed the Kremlin." (*P. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 328*).

But the Marxist-Leninists succeeded, for the moment, in foiling the planned coup by mobilizing sufficient support to call for the following day, 7 March, a joint emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers and the USSR Supreme Soviet. In these circumstances the revisionist conspirators lost their nerve and judged it expedient to postpone their planned coup and refrain from opposing the election of Beria as the Minister in charge of State Security, an appointment which obviously had majority support among the leadership: "Beria immediately proposed Malenkov for Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier - Ed.). On the spot, Malenkov proposed that Beria be appointed first deputy. He also proposed the merger of the Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs into a single

Ministry of Internal Affairs, with Beria as Minister ... I was silent ... Bulganin was silent too. I could see what the attitude of the others was. If Bulganin and I objected ... we would have been accused of ... starting a fight in the Party before the corpse was cold." (N.S. Khrushchev, 1971, p. 324).

DEAR READERS:

The three documents: "The Destruction of the defense system around Stalin", "The Death of Stalin" and "The Aborted Coup (1953)", published in a condensed version from an indepth exposé by the Marxist-Leninist Research Bureau in Great Britain, is of tremendous value to understand the times in which Stalin worked and lived.

All facts point to a conspiracy right from the success of the Great October Revolution in 1917! Internal enemies in contact with external ones tried by every means at their disposal to bring down the Soviet Union.

It is only through the dedication, the genius and determination of real Communists such as V.I. Lenin, J.V. Stalin and others who managed to fight off, defeat and keep on building socialism.

Lenin, Stalin, Zhdanov, Kirov, Kalinin and other leaders warned over and over again against complacency in struggling against the hidden foes, who adapted themselves to every situation.

All the facts point to a definite doing-away with Stalin. There cannot be any other conclusion. the whole gamut of lies, falsification of historical truths and documents – noticed even by foreign journalists, writers and analysts, who in 99% of the cases were or are anti-Communist, cannot be just pushed aside!

It's also interesting to note that many important and damaging documents in the Archives are either "missing", "lost" or in the hands of Western Intelligence Agencies!

WHY?

History has uncanny ways of bringing to the light of day the most damaging evidence against the perpetrators of the "Crime of the Century"!

This is why, close to 44 years since Stalin's death, the controversy about Stalin is not lessening, but instead, is getting hotter and hotter as new materials are unearthed and the world begins to see the genius of Stalin and what he predicted would happen if the party did not cleanse itself regularly of these hidden enemies.

HISTORY IS ABSOLVING AND WILL ABSOLVE STALIN! □

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
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
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